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In the context of a changing political landscape, where shifts in state boundaries and socio-
economic structures deeply affected the Italian peninsula and its people, this thesis analyses 
women and the law in action in the years from the Restoration up to the enactment of the 
Pisanelli code (1815-1865). It does so with particular reference to the Kingdom of Sardinia 
and the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia. These years also saw a number of changes in the 
legal system with various new laws instituted. The quick succession of these legal acts 
testified to the new ideas, behaviours and perceptions that began to take form in the period 
in question, but which the patriarchal and hierarchical nineteenth century society – so reliant 
on strict class stratification to perpetuate its status quo - resisted fully accepting.  
Within this context, women began to redefine their sense of self and to think of 
themselves as having an identity which went beyond their traditional domestic roles of 
mother, wife or daughter. This work aims to describe this process by focusing on women’s 
attitudes towards the law and their interactions with the legal system.    
The thesis is structured in the following way: the first part focuses on the Ottocento 
context, the ideals promulgated about women in public discourse and the legal framework 
of the Italian peninsula. In the second part attention turns to relevant case studies from the 
Kingdom of Sardinia and the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, brought to light by first-hand 
examination of archival documents and court proceedings preserved in legal journals of the 
time. Each part is subdivided into three chapters. After an examination of the social, political 
and economic context of the nineteenth-century Italian peninsula (Chapter one), the 
discussion presents a picture of contemporary views about women according to scientists, 
theorists, moralists and jurists (Chapter two). Chapter three is devoted to the law in force in 
the pre-unification states with regard to women, paying close attention to the institution of 
dowry. Chapter four deals with a selection of case studies concerning marriage promises, 
seduction, and extramarital relations. What emerges from the investigation is the 
intrusiveness of authorities and the reach they extended into people’s private lives in an 
effort to maintain social order and exercise power within a society founded on hierarchy, 
immobility, and obedience. Chapter five examines lawsuits questioning dowries and wills. 
These acts show the families’ choices to preserve their wealth, often inevitably paving the 
way to future discord, with women initiating lawsuits to obtain more money from their 
relatives. Finally, Chapter six analyses widowhood and separation, two possible moments 
in a woman’s existence that had important implications in terms of both their intimate sphere 
and the devolution of wealth. In particular, the chapter traces widows’ actual access to 
inheritance, and women’s requests for separation, focusing on the reasons that drove them 
before a court to relate issues pertaining to their very intimate lives, such as contracting 
diseases.  
Through the analysis of the law in action and women’s use of the law itself, this 
thesis will recover the forgotten voices and lives of those ordinary women, who, in their 
everyday life, reacted against the limitations and constraints imposed upon them by society 
and decided not to passively accept their status.  
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Padre. Io ho fatto, come forse avrete inteso, una donazione generale ai miei figli e vostri fratelli 
all’oggetto di conservare in famiglia l’integrità del mio patrimonio; ma nel far questo ho pensato anche a 
voi, avendo fissato, oltre la dote già stabilita e pagatavi da alcuni anni, di assegnarvi altri mille scudi di 
Milano. Vorrei però che ne parlaste anche a vostro marito, e che vi disponeste a farmi un’ampia e generale 
liberazione. 
Figlia. Sarà assai difficile, che mio marito si determini a questo; e se ho da dirvi il vero, non ne 
sono nemmen io persuasa, perché il Codice presente mi ritiene eguale ai fratelli, e tutto al più vi è permesso 
esser liberale con essi di una quarta parte del vostro patrimonio. 
(La donna legale ossia i diritti di natura richiamati dal Codice napoleone. Dialogo 
 (Brescia: Bettoni, 1806), pp. 3-4) 
 
 
The protagonists of this short passage from La donna legale ossia i diritti di natura 
richiamati dal Codice napoleone. Dialogo, published anonymously in 1806, are a father and 
his daughter. The latter conveys an image of women that contradicts most eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century commonplaces: she knows the law, does not consider men superior to 
women, and does not accept different treatment from her brothers. She responds to her father 
with a certain degree of deference, but she does not stand in the awe of him, and asks for 
her rights to be recognised. The father, by contrast, perfectly matches the patriarchal 
stereotype: he is the head of the family, and wants to preserve his patrimony ‘in famiglia’ 
by excluding his daughter from his inheritance. He informs her of his decision, considers 
himself to be magnanimous with the dowry he assigned her, and urges her to talk to her 
husband, the head of her new household. There is something even more striking in the 
father’s words: he does not consider his daughter as part of the famiglia. Through marriage, 
she would give birth to children bearing the name of another famiglia, and should not be 
entitled to share the wealth of her family of origin.    
This fictional dialogue is a telling example of the existing social dynamics across 
the Italian peninsula under French rule. The disrupting novelties introduced by the 
Napoleonic code (1804), which allowed all children to equally inherit regardless of their 
sex, encouraged some women to redefine their self-consciousness and subjectivity.  
Then, with the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) and the Restoration, as most Italian 
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states reverted to legal provisions in force before the French conquests, women – with the 
exception of those living in the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia – were again debarred from 
having the same rights as men. With the Unification of Italy and the enactment of the 1865 
civil code, daughters obtained the same inheritance rights as sons, but the new kingdom 
once again codified gender inequality and continued to abide by a legal system that 
subordinated women to men. 
 
 
1. Recovering women’s voices 
 
The aim of this study is to assess the legal status of women in the Kingdoms of Sardinia and 
Lombardy-Venetia, during the period from the Restoration (1815) to the Unification of Italy 
(1861) and the enactment of the first civil code, known as Pisanelli code (1865).  
Tracing women’s legal status requires consideration of various aspects of life and 
society, including the demographic, economic, political, cultural and social dimensions. The 
analysis of this wider context is complemented by the examination of contemporary 
treatises, in which the ideal models of women were described. These texts were written by 
both women and men: they aimed to help women correctly assess their status, and also 
allowed men to understand how to handle family life and men’s and women’s roles. They 
depicted women as weak-headed, poorly educated, depending on a male adult, and fulfilling 
their role within the household. Women in the house, within the family, in the private sphere, 
were deemed in the place nature had destined them to, and where they belonged. However, 
if the private sphere was not women’s exclusive domain, men, with their supposed greater 
firmness of mind, were entitled to monopolise civil life and spaces outside the home. In the 
words of Ruth Kelso, the public sphere implied ‘mingling freely with a multitude of persons 
in a public place, as is necessary in public relations’, and was unsuitable to women’s 
decorum and chastity.1 The construction of the identities of both women and men was 
framed by the dichotomy between the private and the public sphere, and by the opposition 
between obedience, a woman’s virtue, and command, a prerogative of men.2  
                                                 
1 R. Kelso, Doctrine for the Lady of the Renaissance (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 14. 
2 On this point, see K. Mitchell and H. Sanson, ‘Introduction’, in K. Mitchell and H. Sanson, eds, Women and 
Gender in Post-Unification Italy: Between Private and Public Spheres (Oxford: Lang, 2013), pp. 1-9 (in 
particular, pp. 2-3). See also P. Willson, ‘Introduction: Gender and the Private Sphere in Liberal and Fascist 
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As Joan Kelly-Gadol highlighted, the concepts of private and public have changed 
over time, and continue to change, depending on the culture considered;3 accordingly, the 
line that divides the two spheres shifts as well. In the case of nineteenth-century Italian 
society, women often began to trespass the boundary of their private, secluded worlds, that 
is, their households; their presence in the public sphere became much more intense than 
ever, and, during the upheavals of the Risorgimento, they strongly contributed to the cause 
in contexts such as the barricades or the salons. The two spheres often interacted and 
overlapped, blurring the boundary between the private and the public. Changes in the 
political set-up of the Italian peninsula also entailed mutations in the legal frameworks, 
affecting people and women in particular, and questioning the centuries-long notion of 
femininity. However, as we shall see, the great majority of people were not yet ready to 
accept an inclusive redefinition of women’s status in the law, or to comply with any 
challenges to the patriarchal and hierarchical Italian society, to the extent that, in the period 
in question, women even experienced a ‘fairly regular pattern of relative loss of status’.4 
In nineteenth-century Italy, women were still ‘divided into three acceptable states of 
being’: unmarried, married and widowed women.5 For centuries, this subdivision was 
reflected in conduct literature for and about women. It is only in the second half of the 
nineteenth century that conduct literature began considering women beyond these states, 
such as spinsters and separated women, new ‘categories’ that were frowned upon and often 
                                                 
Italy’, in P. Willson, ed., Gender, Family and Sexuality: The Private Sphere in Italy, 1860-1945 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 1-19 (in particular, pp. 1-4). On the dichotomy private-public sphere, see also 
S.M. Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); L.E. Klein, 
‘Gender and the Public/Private Distinction in the Eighteenth Century: Some Questions about Evidence and 
Analytic Procedure’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 29/1, The Public and the Nation (Fall, 1995), 97-109; J. 
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); J. Rendall, ‘Women and the Public Sphere’, Gender and History, 11/3 
(1999), 475-88. 
3 J. Kelly, Women, History and Theory: The Essays of Joan Kelly (Chicago; London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1984), pp. 10-11. 
4 J. Kelly-Gadol, ‘The Social Relation of the Sexes: Methodological Implications of Women’s History’, Signs 
1/4 (Summer, 1976), 809-23 (p. 810). I use the term ‘status’ in the meaning defined by Kelly-Gadol, that is, 
the power to act and the position held within family and society.  
5 L. Hosker, “Donne sole” in Post-Unification Italy: The Works of Tommasina Guidi and Emilia Nevers 
(unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2015), pp. 15-18. 
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seen with suspicion, but reflected changes taking place in society at the time.6 The conduct 
of these women, too, needed to be normalised and codified, even more so because of their 
potential disruptiveness. Conduct literature became ‘a more diversified phenomenon […] 
more reflective of social reality, and covering a wider range of ‘roles’ for women’.7  
Nevertheless, the ideal woman remained the one who played her role within the 
boundaries of marriage, ‘the institution at the heart of the social system’,8 and whose life 
had significance mainly with regard to the three related phases of life: the time before, 
during and after marriage. Marriage, in the words of Trevor Dean and Kate Lowe, ‘was 
understood to be a different act for women and men’.9 However, it had a considerable 
importance for both, being the path to aspire to, even if this implied giving up individual 
ambitions and expectations.  
A close investigation into everyday reality, beyond the conceptualisation and 
idealisation of the female sex, questions this long-standing stereotyped notion of women, 
and uncovers a different scenario. If moralists and educationalists insisted on female 
obedience and submissiveness, this was perhaps also because in every day life women 
showed resistance. Some women did not passively accept their status, and even disregarded 
the existing order and the defined rules of society: the ideals promoted by the Enlightenment 
and the French Revolution had planted their seeds.  
But if some decades ago women’s historians such as Gerda Lerner already made 
clear that ‘it is no longer sufficient to view women mainly as members of families’,10 before 
the law, men and women were still perceived predominantly as part of a family, and 
structured their subjectivities within its boundaries. The understanding of the changes taking 
place during the Ottocento should primarily focus, on the one hand, on the legal importance 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 H. Sanson, ‘Introduction. Women and Conduct in the Italian Tradition, 1470-1900: An Overview’, in H. 
Sanson and F. Lucioli, eds, Conduct Literature for and about Women in Italy, 1470-1900: Prescribing and 
Describing Life (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2016), pp. 9-40 (p. 33). 
8 O.H. Hufton, The Prospect before Her: A History of Women in Western Europe (London: HarperCollins, 
1995), p. 59. 
9 T. Dean and K.J.P. Lowe, ‘Introduction: Issues in the History of Marriage’, in T. Dean and K.J.P. Lowe, eds, 
Marriage in Italy, 1300-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 1-21 (p. 2). 
10 On this point, see G. Lerner, ‘Placing Women in History: A 1975 Perspective’, in B.A. Carroll, ed., 
Liberating Women’s History: Theoretical and Critical Essays (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1976), pp. 358-
67 (p. 360).  
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of the family, a moral body and a sort of ‘microstate’ within the state, with its own customs, 
interiorised and accepted by its members; on the other, on the impact of the transition 
towards a society in which the individual became the new centre. It is against this 
background that this study analyses the relations between men and women, between 
subjects and authorities, and the ways the law and the judicial system deployed their forces 
in this context.  
Over the centuries, the law underwent several transformations in response to 
emerging needs, but the broader framework remained substantially unchanged, with ancient 
sources still having force of law and affecting everyday lives. As we shall see in the 
following chapters, the age-old notion of women would continue to impact on 
commonplaces and mindsets for long after the Unification of Italy. The contents of the 
Pisanelli code thus reflected a male-dominated elaboration of the law in an equally male-
dominated society. 
Through the analysis of the law in action, this study assesses the extent to which 
judicial outcomes adhered to the written law, that is, the law preserved and transmitted ‘in 
the books’. In other words, it examines how, in this period of crucial changes, the reality of 
being a woman interacted with the ideals that had been elaborated over the centuries, and 
how the theorised notions of womanhood influenced everyday life in concrete and practical 
ways. The case studies examined in this work concern ordinary people and investigate the 
experiences of women belonging to different social classes, from both rural and urban 
contexts: through their actions, these women challenged prejudices, stereotypes and the set-
up of the world to which they belonged.   
 
 
2. State of the art 
 
For its position between social, legal and gender history, this study has a new and 
interdisciplinary identity. To structure this identity, the works of Paolo Ungari and Manlio 
Bellomo provided a first general, conceptual and contextual grounding on family law and 
women’s legal status. In particular, in his La condizione giuridica della donna in Italia 
(1970), Bellomo addresses women’s legal status from ancient to modern times,11 describing 
                                                 
11 M. Bellomo, La condizione giuridica della donna in Italia. Vicende antiche e moderne (Rome: Il Cigno, 
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its evolution through time and making clearly emerge the crucial link between family, 
wealth and society. Bellomo’s analysis of the widespread commonplace that pictures 
women as ‘l’immagine riflessa dell’uomo’ helps to explain the issues concerning the 
transmission of wealth at that time.12 In this context, the law itself appeared as a means 
aimed to ensure the continuity of the family name and its wealth, which was key to its status. 
Alongside the focus on law and legal changes, Bellomo’s work does not neglect to analyse 
the shifts towards a new understanding of family and women’s role as part of it that began 
from the eighteenth century onwards. This helps to identify the many peculiarities of the 
legal system, the roots of which dated back to a very ancient past and relied on a number of 
different, and often overlapping, provisions of the ius commune and iura propria.13 
Paolo Ungari’s 1974 study of family law, Storia del diritto di famiglia in Italia 
(1796-1942), examines the law in force, the writings of the jurists of the time, as well as the 
social and political changes that took place.14 It provides a clear and reliable description of 
the intricate development of the legal framework concerning family in the last two centuries. 
The stress on the importance of the family as formative of law and legal customs helps to 
understand to which extent changes such as those promoted by the Enlightenment had on 
its structure.  
The works by Bellomo and Ungari were both written in the 1970s – at a time when 
Italy was going through cirtical changes, which also involved women –, and, were the first 
attempts to provide a systematic study of women status and the legal framework of the last 
centuries. They shed light on the way families were structured and perceived, paying 
attention to the shift from the idea of family as a group sharing identity and power to a more 
intimate idea of a moral body in which emotions were its prominent component. This 
process has also been the subject of a themed volume, Famiglia e mutamento sociale (1977), 
                                                 
1996 [1970]). 
12 Ibid., p. 25. 
13 The ius commune, or utrumque ius, is the bulk of laws formed by Roman and canon law, shared and used 
across the Italian peninsula. An overview on the body of legal rules issued by the Catholic Church can be 
found in J. Gaudemet, Le Droit canonique (Paris: Fides, 1989). See also J. Gaudemet, La Formation du droit 
canonique médiéval (London: Variorum, 1980); J. Gaudemet, Storia del diritto canonico: ecclesia et civitas 
(Cinisello Balsamo: San Paolo, 1998). Iura propria refers to the law enacted by states and used in their 
territories only.   
14 P. Ungari, Storia del diritto di famiglia in Italia (1796-1942) (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1974). 
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edited by Marzio Barbagli,15 who, in his subsequent monograph Sotto lo stesso tetto 
(1984),16 clearly detects and studies this new attitude within society by adopting a socio-
demographic approach. His studies reveal a more ‘informal’ behaviour between family 
members, which had a deep effect on centuries-old hierarchical structure and questioned 
authority within the family. Luciano Guerci examines women’s perspective and assesses 
these new attitudes against the works published at that time, in particular treatises on female 
conduct, education and morality.17 He identifies a ‘crisi dell’obbedienza’,18 that pushed 
people to redefine their own roles and sense of self, and at the same time to challenge 
obedience, which was no more perceived as unquestionable. Therefore, paternal authority 
examined in La paura dei padri nella società antica e medievale (1983) edited by Ezio 
Pellizer, Nevio Zorzetti and Alberto Maffi,19 and sometimes described as a sort of ‘metus 
reverentialis’ (reverential fear), informed power relations within kinship groups for 
centuries, but, as observed by Marco Cavina, started to become more fluid from the 
eighteenth century onwards.20 
In the last twenty years, historiography on law and wealth has become more 
substantial. In his Famiglia, successioni e patrimonio familiare nell’Italia medievale e 
moderna (1994), Andrea Romano focuses on the importance of inheritance laws to preserve 
family, wealth and therefore status in society.21 The gender dimension, which is not widely 
investigated by Romano, is, instead, the core of Giulia Calvi’s and Isabella Chabot’s edited 
volume Le ricchezze delle donne (1998). This work moves in a new direction by explaining 
the key role of women in the social and familial context:22 they were excluded from 
                                                 
15 M. Barbagli, ed., Famiglia e mutamento sociale (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1977). 
16 M. Barbagli, Sotto lo stesso tetto. Mutamenti della famiglia in Italia dal XV al XX secolo (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 1984). 
17 L. Guerci, La discussione sulla donna nell’Italia del Settecento: aspetti e problemi (Turin: Tirrenia 
Stampatori, 1987); L. Guerci, La sposa obbediente: donna e matrimonio nella discussione dell'Italia del 
Settecento (Turin: Tirrenia Stampatori, 1988). 
18 Guerci, La sposa obbediente, p.11. 
19 E. Pellizer, N. Zorzetti, and A. Maffi, eds, La paura dei padri nella società antica e medievale (Rome: 
Laterza, 1983). 
20 M. Cavina, Il padre spodestato: l’autorità paterna dall’antichità a oggi (Rome: Laterza, 2007). 
21 A. Romano, Famiglia, successioni e patrimonio familiare nell’Italia medievale e moderna (Turin: 
Giappichelli, 1994). 
22 G. Calvi and I. Chabot, eds, Le ricchezze delle donne: diritti patrimoniali e poteri familiari in Italia (Turin: 
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obtaining large part of their family’s wealth, but, at the same time, women were bearers of 
their family’s honour and also seen as a means by which the power of their families of origin 
was deployed in society.  
The legal dimension on which these works drew was further examined in the studies 
of scholars such as Trevor Dean and Kate Lowe, Daniela Lombardi and Thomas Kuehn, 
who emphasised the role played by the law in action based their analysis on a solid archival 
investigation into primary sources. Society’s key institution – marriage – is the focus of 
Trevor Dean’s and Kate Lowe’s edited work on Marriage in Italy (1998).23 Since ‘marriage 
is important because it heralded change’,24 it is also identified as a starting point from which 
an investigation into views on gender and on female and male roles could be carried out. 
The authors clearly stress the variety of reasons for which marriage were made: what results 
is that, even though strategy was extremely important, individuals’ needs were not always 
disregarded. Alongside economic and social reasons, love was also allowed some room in 
the marriage market. This point, often deemed controversial, is discussed in Storia del 
matrimonio dal Medioevo a oggi (2008) by Daniela Lombardi,25 who also provides an in-
depth analysis of rituals and customs of marriage along social classes. By looking at both 
court records and the law, Lombardi shed light on how marriage has evolved in time.  
The perspective of the law in action is particularly fulfilled by Thomas Kuehn’s 
studies on Renaissance Italy by examining legal archival sources through the lens of 
gender.26 Kuehn drew attention to the ‘familial context, where gender stereotypes were lived 
and disregarded at times, where women were deeply engaged in roles seen as theirs and not, 
supposedly, threatening existing orde, but rather embodying it’.27 The author accounts 
family law as not static, but rather formative of domestic life. Nonetheless, it generated 
conflicts, to which women took part and were able to circumvent and exploit legal limitation 
                                                 
Rosenberg and Sellier, 1998). 
23 Dean and Lowe, eds, Marriage in Italy. 
24 Dean and Lowe, ‘Introduction: Issues in the History of Marriage’, p. 1. 
25 D. Lombardi, Storia del matrimonio dal Medioevo a oggi (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008). See also D. Lombardi, 
Matrimoni di antico regime (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001). 
26 T. Kuehn, Law, Family and Women: Toward a Legal Anthropology of Renaissance Italy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991); T. Kuehn, Family and Gender in Renaissance Italy, 1300-1600 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).  
27 Kuehn, Family and Gender in Renaissance Italy, p. 20.  
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to their advantage. 
The pivotal role played by marriage means that the analysis of women’s legal status 
should inevitably start by considering their three times of a woman’s life – before, during 
and after marriage. Several studies have undertaken a close analysis of the extent by which 
moral and religious limitations influenced behaviours. The works of James Brundage and 
Jean Delumeau clearly define the sense of sin, which entagled with sexuality and pervaded 
Western societies from the Middle Ages onwards. In this regard, Delumeau identifies the 
sense of sin – and its related fear of punishment – not only as means to dominate people but 
also as deeply afflicting the elites as well. By focusing on the Italian peninsula, Gabriella 
Bonacchi, Oscar Di Simplicio, Margherita Pelaja and Lucetta Scaraffia also provide an 
interesting picture of the Church, its sense of morality, and ecclesiastical authorities’ 
behaviour often seen as a sort of anxiety to ensure ‘moral order’.28 But the Church did not 
have only a moral influence on people and society: it had jurisdiction on marriage and this 
meant that secular authorities had to establish a close relation with the Church itself. 
Therefore, as Jean Gaudemet explains, canon law informed many aspects of life.29  
In such a context, people’s behaviours were subjected to rigorous assessment and 
were all to converge in what was understood to be the correct way of living. To a woman, 
in particular, the time before marriage was key to her future and she had to behave in an 
honourable way in order to avoid any stain challenging a possible, future marriage. But 
transgressions were part of life and could led to pregnancy or even infanticide:30 as Giovanni 
Cazzetta has shown in his Praesumitur seducta (1999), seduction and the birth of illegimate 
offspring were major concerns for society, and this led, from the Enlightenment onwards, 
to a new understanding of women, who went from being considered victims to being 
stigmatised as accomplices.31 But if ‘many found their sexuality beyond the boundaries of 
                                                 
28 O. Di Simplicio, Peccato penitenza perdono. Siena 1575-1800. La formazione della coscienza nell’Italia 
moderna (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1994); G. Bonacchi, Legge e peccato. Anime, corpi, giustizia alla corte dei 
papi (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1995); M. Pelaja and L. Scaraffia, Due in una carne: chiesa e sessualità nella 
storia (Rome: Laterza, 2008). 
29 J. Gaudemet, Le Mariage en Occident: les mœurs et le droit (Paris: Cerf, 1987); Gaudemet, Storia del diritto 
canonico. 
30 A. Prosperi, Dare l’anima. Storia di un infanticidio (Turin: Einaudi, 2005); A. Prosperi, Infanticide, Secular 
Justice, and Religious Debate in Early Modern Europe (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016). 




accepted behavior’,32 as Guido Ruggiero in his The Boundaries of Eros (1989) suggests, 
Maurice Daumas, in his Adulteri e cornuti (2008), demonstrates that adultery was the 
objective evidence of the double standard by which women and men were judged.33 Again, 
this was a powerful reminder that women’s behaviour had to be different from that of men, 
and their subjectivities were to deploy within the safe walls of their households. Being part 
of a family in order to avoid being marginalised was therefore key: worries and concerns 
single women carried with them are clearly explained by Maura Palazzi,34 and this was also 
the reason why families tried to do their best to make widows to marry again, as Giulia Calvi 
and Isabelle Chabot show in their articles on second marriages.35 
Alongside the socially accepted behaviour, individuals had their own sense of self 
which often clashed against that of others: in their edited series I processi matrimoniali degli 
archivi ecclesiastici italiani,36 Silvana Seidel Menchi and Diego Quaglioni explain the 
many reasons to initiate a dispute, thus showing that both women and men were far from 
abiding by societal rules. These works use a number of legal sources – law, jurisprudence 
and judicial sources – and address marriages, their rituals and the possible subsequent 
conflicts.  
Although studies mentioned above mainly focus on the period before the Napoleonic 
conquests, their contribution is pivotal to understand the several dynamics that led to the 
nineteenth-century context and then to the elaboration of the new legal framework of Italy. 
                                                 
32 G. Ruggiero, The Boundaries of Eros: Sex Crime and Sexuality in Renaissance Venice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), p. 15. 
33 M. Daumas, Adulteri e cornuti: storia della sessualità maschile tra Medioevo e modernità (Bari: Dedalo, 
2008), p. 70. 
34 M. Palazzi, Donne sole: storie dell’altra faccia dell’Italia tra antico regime e società contemporanea 
(Milan: Bruno Mondadori, 1997). 
35 G. Calvi, ‘Reconstructing the Family: Widowhood and Remarriage in Tuscany in the Early Modern Period’, 
in Dean and Lowe, eds, Marriage in Italy, pp. 275-96; I. Chabot, ‘Seconde nozze e identità materna nella 
Firenze del tardo medioevo’, in S. Seidel Menchi, A. Jacobson Schutte and T. Kuehn, eds, Tempi e spazi di 
vita femminile tra medioevo ed età moderna (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999), pp. 493-523 
36 S. Seidel Menchi and D. Quaglioni, eds, Coniugi nemici: la separazione in Italia dal XII al XVIII secolo 
(Bologna: il Mulino, 2000); S. Seidel Menchi and D. Quaglioni, eds, Matrimoni in dubbio: unioni controverse 
e nozze clandestine in Italia dal XIV al XVIII secolo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001); S. Seidel Menchi and D. 
Quaglioni, eds, Trasgressioni: seduzione, concubinato, adulterio, bigamia (XIV-XVIII Secolo) (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 2004); S. Seidel Menchi and D. Quaglioni, eds, I tribunali del matrimonio (secoli XV-XVIII) 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006). 
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Yet, the crucial period between the Restoration and the Unification of Italy has not received 
the scholarly attention it deserves, and has often been overlooked.  
This work is a first attempt to fill this gap. The chronological boundaries of this 
study comprise the years between the Restoration and the Unification of Italy. This 
periodisation categorises these decades of the Ottocento into a sort of interregnum between 
the Old Regime – the past, the old, the backward – and the birth of the Italian nation – the 
new, a point of arrival, something to aspire to. If the Council of Trent (1545-1563) marked 
a turning point for the institution of marriage, with regard to other legal matters, ancient 
sources such as Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis were still considered and used. The French 
conquests introduced several changes which represented a clash between the past and the 
present, and between various strata of society that struggled to hold their prerogatives, and 
others, which welcomed the winds of modernity blowing over the peninsula. The 
Restoration let these contradictions emerge: alongside monarchs such as the kings of 
Sardinia who firmly tried to return to the past, others – such as the rulers of Lombardy-
Venetia – attempted to introduce novelties (for example, the Austrian civil code), thus 
acknowledging these changes. At the end of this interregnum, there is the birth of Italy and 
shortly after the enactment of the Pisanelli Code (1865), a crucial step in the path towards 
the building of the nation, in which, however, women’s contribution was disregarded by 
reconfirming their subordinate status.  
Analysing this interregnum implies considering changes and continuities between 
the present and the past: since ancient times, institutions and legal norms had undergone 
very few mutations and ‘criminal and civil law […] reflected continuity in a view of woman 
as essentially a dependant of man’.37 But a first-hand examination of the law in action 
showed challenges in the centuries-long notion and ideology about women: in real life, some 
women used the law, and knew how it functioned in practice; they questioned authority and 
negotiated their status, showing an image that was quite different from that promoted in 
texts of conducts, among others.   
The geographical limits of this work comprise the Kingdoms of Sardinia and 
Lombardy-Venetia. The choice of these two states was determined by the fact that they 
present an interesting array of both similarities and differences, which make them 
particularly suitable for a fruitful comparison.  
                                                 
37 Hufton, The Prospect before Her, p. 505. 
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With regards to similarities, in these two states, as in all other states across the 
peninsula, the age-old notion of women heavily conditioned every aspect of life. Objects of 
a culturally determined vision of femininity, women within family and society were mainly 
valued as childbearing vessels. In an economic context mostly relying on agriculture, the 
patriarchal and hierarchical idea of the family deeply affected interpersonal dynamics. The 
structure of Italian society consisted of several types of families (the bourgeois family or 
the workers’ family, for example), which conflicted and interacted with each other. 
Although social mobility was almost inconceivable – and, as we shall see, often even 
forbidden – people from different social classes shared similar behaviours, irrespective of 
their wealth. Even though elaborating a consistent model would be questionable, a 
provisional hypothesis can be attempted: despite being different in their standing, lower and 
upper classes shared a common sense of honour, respectability and dignity, which was to 
be enforced and transmitted to the following generations. This common feature also 
reflected in their behaviour towards the transmission of wealth: no matter if the patrimony 
to bequeath was land or a piece of furniture, families were concerned to ensure that their 
goods were going to the ‘right’ person. As we shall see, across all social classes, men were 
considered the ‘right’ person because they would continue the family’s name, and were 
therefore entrusted with the task of controlling and administering the family’s patrimony. 
Women contributed with their dowries and/or with other intangible goods, such as morality, 
obedience, or their ability to work if they belonged to lower classes.  
The static society of both kingdoms was also characterised by the pervasive presence 
of the Catholic Church, which was entrenched in many aspects of everyday life, and still 
influenced societies and people’s behaviours throughout the Ottocento and beyond. The 
Church’s sense of morality and religiosity was profoundly interiorised by people and deeply 
impacted on their mentalities. But its force was not only moral: its jurisdiction over non-
patrimonial matters related to marriage, and the power of its courts, trespassed the 
boundaries of the actual Papal States. Canon law strongly intertwined with Roman law and 
other local sources, affecting not only judicial outcomes but the very essence of the legal 
framework itself.  
Alongside these common traits, there was also a major difference between the 
Kingdoms of Sardinia and Lombardy-Venetia: in the former, the law gave a prominent 
position to men by allowing them to exclude women from inheritance, thus amassing 
economic power in men’s hands; in the latter, women could inherit in the same way as men. 
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Women’s status in the two states also differed to the extent that, in the Kingdom of Sardinia, 
any legal act by women had to be authorised by a male relative, while in Lombardy-Venetia 
they could freely administer their goods. In both states, however, the patriarchal male-
dominated society continued to affect interpersonal rules of behaviour and pattern of 
thoughts: indeed, people tried to override the law through private acts, which, in practice, 
resulted in women enjoying lesser status than men in Lombardy-Venetia, too.  
Despite the different status of men and women being widely accepted, there was still 
room for discord and disputes. Many lawsuits challenged not only a patrimonial set-up but 
also ideas and commonplaces, and had sometimes unexpected outcomes. If, in theory, ‘the 
social function of the law is first to lay down rules aimed at the avoidance of disputes [...] 
and second to set out a normative framework to solve disputes which do arise’,38 in real life 
the distinction was not so pristine. In the nineteenth century, the concomitant presence of 
several sources of law and the extensive recourse to private acts, such as wills or acts of 
renunciation to inherit, resulted in a number of diverging interpretations of the two levels of 
the law, that is, ‘law in the books’ and legal outcomes. In the Kingdom of Sardinia, the 
presence of the ius commune as well as that of municipal statutes and other iura propria, 
such as the eighteenth-century Regie Costituzioni, made the legal framework not entirely 
coherent. Moreover, the enactment of Napoleon’s Code, and its subsequent repeal, sharply 
increased legal disputes, especially those concerning inheritance, and saw women exploiting 
the interstices of the law to improve their economic condition. In the Kingdom of 
Lombardy-Venetia, by contrast, the Austrian civil and criminal codes were introduced in 
the first decades of the nineteenth century (in 1811 and 1803, respectively). Although they 
did not allow the recourse to any other legal source, their provisions, too, were often 
overridden through private acts such as testaments. As we shall see, in both kingdoms, the 
law was often distorted to women’s detriment. 
 
 
3. Sources and methodology  
 
The core of this study relies on first-hand investigation of archival documents and primary 
                                                 
38 D. Ibbetson, ‘Comparative Legal History: A Methodology’, in A. Musson and C. Stebbings. eds, Making 




sources. First, the analysis took into account the legal framework in order to understand the 
pluralistic nature of the law in force in the Kingdoms of Sardinia and Lombardy-Venetia, 
and the way it affected women. These sources include municipal statutes, the ius commune, 
and other acts, such as the Costituzioni enacted in the eighteenth century, as well as 
nineteenth-century codes. 
Second, the analysis of the legal framework was complemented by the examination 
of a corpus of archival material held in state archives of Turin, Milan, Verona and Venice 
as well as in Church archives, such as the Archbishop’s Curia of Turin and Milan, and the 
Bishop’s Curia of Verona. These four cities were chosen for their importance, especially 
because they were the seat of higher courts such as the Senato of Turin or the Supremo 
Tribunale of Verona. Crucially, these archives also preserved documents from smaller, 
surrounding urban centres and rural villages. Hence, they provided an important body of 
material to compare and assess the social, economic and legal dynamics into play in the 
rural and urban contexts of the two kingdoms.  
As Silvana Seidel Menchi has pointed out, sources such as judicial proceedings are 
very useful as they can offer different keys to interpret society and people.39 Besides 
showing how courts carried out their judgements, these sources also allow to infer how the 
law was manipulated by the people involved in a lawsuit, and how their words were 
recorded.40 Indeed, Charles Donahue argues that ‘[t]he way in which the witness tells his or 
her story is more likely to be a product of the witness or of the clerk who recorded the 
testimony’, therefore causing considerable distortions in the process of redacting legal 
records.41 But detecting the way the law was leveraged to comply with people’s wills is 
extremely useful as it testifies to their lives, experiences, expectations and ambitions, 
offering much more than a cold description of legal acts. However, in order to limit the 
extent of these distortions, a significant bulk of archival material has been examined to 
identify recurrent features, which would allow to consider a case as a representative case 
study.42 Through this approach, among the many disputes examined in archival documents 
                                                 
39 S. Seidel Menchi, ‘I processi matrimoniali come fonte storica’, in Seidel Menchi and Quaglioni, eds, 
Coniugi nemici, pp. 15-94 (pp. 49-57). 
40 Ibid. 
41 C. Donahue, Law, Marriage, and Society in the Later Middle Ages: Arguments about Marriage in Five 
Courts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 7. 
42 For case studies as a research method, see R.K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Thousand 
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and legal journals, I carry out an in-depth analysis of those cases, which I accounted as the 
most representative of nineteenth-century legal dynamics.  
The initial research involved the analysis of a wide number of notarial documents 
such as wills and dowry instruments: from the inventories held in each archive, I have been 
able to locate notaries, who were active in the historical period that was the object of my 
analysis and whose acts were significant to my study. Each notary rogated for about 20 
years, their papers being preserved in folders containing roughly 200 acts each. Among 
these acts, there were dowry instruments and wills, as well as deeds of sale. Acts such as 
wills were made both by men and women in equal numbers. The chosen notaries were the 
followings:  
1) in Turin, notaries Giovanni Aiassa, Giovanni Pietro Ellena and Giovanni Antonio Partiti, 
who were active in Turin and in the areas of Pinerolo and Villafranca between 1768 and 
1849;  
2) in Milan, notaries Giuseppe Alberti and Giulio Caimi, active in Milan and surrounding 
areas in the mid-nineteenth century;  
3) in Verona, notaries Lorenzo Maggi and Giuseppe Merci, respectively from Verona and 
Cero in the early decades of the nineteenth century; 
4) in Venice, notaries Antonio Santibusca and Luigi Sperotti, active in the years from 1801 
to 1868. 
From this initial corpus of documents, I identified and selected approximately 300 
wills and dowry instruments. Their examination aimed to assess how these documents were 
drawn up, by whom and why. Particular attention was given to women’s role in this process, 
and to the interactions between the different family members, and especially among male 
figures, who intervened in signing the wills and dowry instruments of their relatives.  
In the above-mentioned archives, I also considered court transcripts: they came from 
courts of first instance, courts of appeal, supreme courts and ecclesiastical tribunals. Among 
others, I have analysed records from the Tribunale di Pinerolo, the Corte di Appello di 
Casale, the Corte di Cassazione di Torino, the Tribunale Civile di Prima Istanza di Venezia, 
the Tribunale di Appello Generale (Venice) and the Supremo Tribunale di Verona.  
The analysis of court transcripts showed how people approached the law, the main 
                                                 
Oaks: Sage, 1994). See also L. Webley, ‘Stumbling Blocks in Empirical Legal Research: Case Study 
Research’, Law and Method (October, 2016), 1-21. 
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motives to begin a lawsuit and who they involved. Despite being initiated by members of 
the same family, lawsuits did not always imply a profound fracture within the kinship group. 
As Renata Ago argued, resorting to a court could often be interpreted as a way to remedy a 
defective situation, and not necessarily as a sign of strong discord.43 It thus highlights the 
way people perceived their world and their everyday relations.  
The court transcripts in question concerned roughly 300 lawsuits. The choice to 
include in this study only a selection of the documents collected has been driven not only 
by practical reasons, but also by the desire to focus on the peculiarity of the cases, on their 
protagonists and on how they managed to manipulate the law to their own ends. In 
particular, the aim was to offer a picture of nineteenth-century ordinary people, from 
different socio-economic backgrounds, in front of the law.  
A third type of primary sources that were examined are legal journals. The 
nineteenth century offers the first examples of journals of jurisprudence published across 
the Italian peninsula. This is an extremely significant source, which has been not yet 
attracted the scholarly attention it deserves, especially considering that these legal journals 
are a rich source of information as they were meant to guide judges, lawyers and jurists in 
approaching and understanding the ratio behind the decisions made by courts, and to help 
them handle similar cases. They dealt with civil, criminal and commercial law, and the 
selection of lawsuits and debates that were included in their pages mirrored the questions to 
which authorities paid special attention and which they considered worthy of an in-depth 
discussion. 
With an intended readership of legal experts, these journals were edited by renowned 
jurists such as the lawyers Giovanni Francesco Zini, who edited Giurisprudenza pratica 
secondo la legislazione austriaca, a legal journal of the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia 
published from 1817 up to 1845, and Cristoforo Mantelli, editor of Giurisprudenza del 
codice civile e delle altre leggi dei regii stati, one of the two journals of the Kingdom of 
Sardinia, which was published from 1839 to 1847. The other was Annali di giurisprudenza: 
it was published in Turin from 1838 to 1845 and was compiled by a group of prominent 
legal experts, among whom Urbano Rattazzi. These journals were usually published yearly, 
even though Giornale di giurisprudenza pratica (1846-1862), for example, was fortnightly 
                                                 




(but its issues are now collected in yearly volumes).  
Cases concerning seduction, extramarital relations, adultery and separation are few: 
for instance, in the twelve volumes of Giurisprudenza degli Stati Sardi (previously called 
Giurisprudenza del codice civile e delle altre leggi dei regj stati) published between 1848 
and 1859, there are only twenty cases of separation, one case of adultery, two cases of 
seduction and one case dealing with extramarital relations. Similar data can be inferred with 
regards to Giurisprudenza teorico-pratica secondo la legislazione austriaca.  
Instead, lawsuits dealing with dowry and other inheritance issues are more 
numerous: the same volumes of Giurisprudenza degli Stati Sardi reported 156 disputes 
concerning dowry and 92 cases regarding wills. Again, data are similar for Lombardy-
Venetia legal journals. 
Legal journals also enable to infer how uncertainties and incongruities of the law 
were confronted and elaborated by courts to produce consistent outcomes. The way cases 
are described in these journals is very significant too. With regard to cases concerning 
adultery, for example, particular attention was paid to the protection of the protagonists’ 
honour by not mentioning their names, and by limiting the information given in order to 
prevent the exposure of their identity.  
The case studies examined concerned litigations that underwent several stages and 
give a clear insight into the law in action. These are valuable because they reconstruct the 
social, moral and cultural issues behind the claims, convey authorities’ position regarding 
the matters analysed and show how commonplaces and stereotypes influenced judicial 
outcomes.  
Legal acts and judicial proceedings alone, however, do not allow us to fully 
understand a society; therefore, the works of scientists, moralists, theorists and jurists, who 
contributed to shape ideas about women, have also been considered. These works addressed 
both men and women, and often asserted that their goal was to make women correctly assess 
their position in society and the role they had to stick to. The study of this kind of writings 
helps to better comprehend the way the law in action moved, altered the outcomes of judicial 
proceedings and entered people’s minds.  
The multiple sources of investigation used in this study helped to infer the very 
essence of the law in action with all its inherent ‘perceptions of processes and how they 
influence behaviour [so] to understand how laws are understood, and how and why they are 
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applied and misapplied, subverted, complied with or rejected’.44  
This study trespasses the boundary of legal history and analyses not only the courts 
and their behaviours, but the people: it does not intend to offer a cold analysis of legal 
proceedings, but rather shed light on the real life of men and women, with their bias, 
expectations and ambitions, before the law, and on how law and society interacted and 
intertwined to constitute a mutual and binary extension of each another. Reducing the scale 
of the analysis to the individual and her/his family within the real-life context allows to 
identify some of the patterns of behaviours and thoughts that shaped and defined the 
mentality of the Ottocento. In this way the relation between law and society emerges and 





By studying this material and taking into account all these issues, this work, which is not 
intended to be an exhaustive study, aims to propose an alternative interpretation of 
nineteenth-century image of womanhood. The picture which emerges shows women 
questioning obedience and challenging authority: they did not hesitate to go before a court 
to ask for their rights to be enforced, and initiated lawsuits for several reasons. For example, 
they asked for an addition to their dowries, or wanted the dissolution of their marriage 
because they claimed that their husbands had passed a disease on them. Although they were 
formally in a subordinate position, some women envisioned themselves as worthy members 
of the society, fully entitled to ask for justice.  
This work is divided into two parts, each composed of three chapters. The first part 
describes the Ottocento context, the ideals promulgated about women in public discourse 
and the legal framework of the Italian peninsula; the second part consists of case studies. In 
Chapter one, the social, political and economic context of the nineteenth-century Italian 
peninsula is examined. This approach allows for a stronger focus on the Italian society and 
on the meaning of the family in this context, and, within this framework, women’s role and 
contribution to both the family and society. Chapter two provides a picture of ideas about 
women. To this end, the discussion explores contemporary views about women by 
                                                 
44 Webley, ‘Stumbling Blocks’, pp. 2-3.  
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scientists, theorists, moralists and jurists. Chapter three is dedicated to the law in force in 
the pre-unification states with regard to women, which also includes an analysis of the roots 
of institutions such as the dowry.  
The second part of my work presents and discusses a selection of case studies that 
cast light on the relations between men and women before and outside wedlock, during 
marriage and at the time of its dissolution. In particular, Chapter four deals with a selection 
of case studies concerning marriage promises, seduction, and extramarital relations. As we 
shall see, both ecclesiastical and civil authorities aimed at circumscribing relations, 
especially sexual intercourse, within the boundaries of wedlock, thus ensuring their desired 
social ‘order’ as a way to convey their powers and prerogatives within the very depth of 
society. If people’s intimate life was a major concern to authorities, the transmission of 
wealth was an equally important matter: Chapter five is concerned with the study of dowries 
and wills, two crucial instruments that put the continuity of a family’s patrimony at stake. 
Several lawsuits were initiated by women, and their analysis showed in practice the efforts 
families made to preserve their patrimony in famiglia. Finally, Chapter six analyses 
widowhood and separation, two possible moments in a woman’s existence that had 
important implications in terms of both their intimate sphere and the transmission of wealth. 
In particular, the chapter traces widows’ actual access to inheritance, and women’s requests 
for separation, focusing on the reasons that drove them before a court to relate issues 
pertaining to their very intimate lives. Courts aimed to ensure both social order and meet 
people’s needs, however, the outcomes of these cases were sometimes unexpected and 
frustrating.    
Through the analysis of the law in action and women’s use of the law itself, this 
study aims to offer a contribution towards the recovery of the forgotten voices and 
experiences of those ordinary women, who, in their everyday life, reacted against the 
constraints imposed upon them by society and decided not to passively accept their status. 









Note to the reader   
 
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century primary sources have been transcribed adopting 
conservative criteria and following as closely as possible the original. Some changes have 
been made, however, for ease of reading. They are as follows:  
(a) u and v have been distinguished according to modern usage; 
(b) ampersands have been expanded to et; 
(c) other abbreviations have also been expanded; 
(d) accents follow modern usage; 
(e) some minor changes have been introduced in terms of punctuation and the use of 
apostrophes to aid comprehension; 
(f) uppercases are left as in the original text. 
Any apparent incongruities in spelling and morphology that have been preserved are 
part of the original text. The original spelling of titles in the body of the text and the 
bibliography has been preserved as far as possible. Translations are my own, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
Throughout this study, names of tribunals have been left in Italian. The Italian words 
for currencies (e.g. scudi, lire) have been preserved as well. I deliberately avoided any 
comparison with the present-day value of money and goods, because the economy, the 
physical means of production and the perception of the value of an asset in the period under 
consideration were too different from the present to give a consistent equivalence. A table 
of nineteenth-century coinage and a glossary are included at the end of this study. Words 
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Chapter 1  
 
Building the nation-state: Italian society between old prerogatives and 
modernity 
 
In the late nineteenth century, the Italian peninsula was fragmented into a number of 
different states. Regardless of their size, these were all economically backwards and mainly 
agrarian territories, with industrialisation having developed only in some areas, located 
mostly in the north of the peninsula. The male-dominated structure of family and society 
reflected this backwardness, and would inform social dynamics for a long time to come. In 
this context, women had strictly defined roles within the household, even if, as we shall see, 
their involvement in the Risorgimento process brought them outside their homes. Although 
this led to a redefinition of women’s self-consciousness, their active participation did not 
challenge their place in society and their subordinate status with respect to men.   
This chapter analyses the political, economic and social context of the Italian 
peninsula within which women’s legal status will be assessed. The new settlement 
established by the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) left several issues unsolved, and 
eventually gave way to the upheavals that led to the Unification of Italy. After analysing the 
Ottocento context, the attention is focused on the family unit and on society, pointing out 
the efforts of monarchs and families to keep society unchanged, for example, by endorsing 
same-class marriages. In the last section, I also discuss women’s contribution to the 
Risorgimento, both as a means to participate in the fight against the oppressors, and as a 
way to carve out a corner enabling them to claim a voice in society.  
  
 
1. The political and economic context 
 
After Napoleon’s defeat and his exile to Saint Helena (1815), monarchs and diplomats 
gathered at the Congress of Vienna to elaborate a new political configuration aimed to 
ensure long-lasting peace through the balance of powers and the criterion of legitimacy. 
However, the latter was neglected in favour of the former, as in the case of the Republics of 
Genoa and Venice, which had been incorporated into the Kingdoms of Sardinia and 
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Lombardy-Venetia, respectively.1 The Austrian Empire became the hegemonic power in the 
Italian peninsula at large: it ruled over Lombardy-Venetia, which was formally a single 
kingdom but in personal union with the Empire, and exerted its influence over other states 
through kinship links. While the Duchy of Parma and Piacenza and the Duchy of Lucca 
were given to Maria Luigia of Habsburg-Lorraine and to Maria Luisa of Bourbon, 
respectively, the overthrown kings were reinstated in all other territories formerly occupied 
by Napoleon.2 If, on the one hand, the new order of the Italian peninsula left an intense 
sentiment of dissatisfaction among the people, on the other, it helped to build a shared sense 
of identity and, consequently, find the common enemy to turn against during the 
Risorgimento. The assumption that Italy did in fact exist as a political entity was leveraged 
by an interiorised and longstanding tradition, which, as suggested by Francesco Bruni, 
converged in the ‘coscienza di un orizzonte unico, che ha molte vite virtuali e nessuna 
istituzionale […] la cui esistenza è garantita dal fatto stesso che tutti la danno per scontata’.3 
The construction of the imagined Italian community found its meaning in the rhetoric of the 
oppression, in which the proud Italian identity fought against the oppressors, identified with 
the Austrian Empire, the Pope or other monarchs, who hindered Italy from becoming a 
nation, united and under the rule of the Piedmontese king.4 
                                                 
1 A.M. Banti, Il Risorgimento italiano (Rome: Laterza, 2004), pp. 38-41. On the pre-revolutionary set-up, see 
M. Soresina, L’età della Restaurazione, 1815-1860: gli Stati italiani dal Congresso di Vienna al crollo (Milan: 
Mimesis, 2015), pp. 11-13. 
2 For a detailed analysis of borders and states after the Congress of Vienna, see Soresina, L’età della 
Restaurazione, pp. 15-19.  
3 F. Bruni, Italia: vita e avventure di un’idea (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010), pp. 490-91. See also, pp. 69-103. 
4 On the construction of the Italian identity, see also R. Martucci, L’invenzione dell’Italia unita: 1855-1864 
(Milan: Sansoni, 1999); A.M. Banti, La nazione del risorgimento: parentela, santità e onore alle origini 
dell'Italia unita (Turin: Einaudi, 2000); A.M. Banti and R. Bizzocchi, eds, Immagini della nazione nell’Italia 
del Risorgimento (Rome: Carocci, 2002); Banti, Il Risorgimento italiano, in particular, pp. 53-73; S. Patriarca, 
Italianità: la costruzione del carattere nazionale (Rome: Laterza, 2010); S. Patriarca, ‘Italiani/Italiane’, in 
A.M. Banti, A. Chiavistelli, L. Mannori, M. Meriggi, eds, Atlante culturale del Risorgimento: lessico del 
linguaggio politico dal Settecento all’unità (Rome: Laterza, 2011), pp. 199-213, in particular, pp. 200-01; D. 
Balestracci, Medioevo e Risorgimento: l’invenzione dell’identità italiana nell’Ottocento (Bologna: Il Mulino, 
2015), in particular, pp. 7-10. On the sense of nation and imagined community, see B.R. Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 
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In the age of the Restoration, the Italian peninsula – like much of Southern Europe 
– was still a largely agrarian territory.5 For a long time the main characteristic of 
demographic and socio-economic evolution remained that of a fast-growing population in 
the countryside.6  
In his 1854 study, the economist and politician Stefano Jacini, author of several 
works analysing the economic fabric of the peninsula, estimated that investments in 
agriculture were six times higher than those in commerce and industry taken together.7 From 
the Restoration onwards, in almost the entire peninsula, landowners, politicians, economists 
and agronomists aimed at, and firmly believed in, modernising agriculture and enhancing it 
as an economic driver. In the nineteenth century, sericulture acquired importance, and, amid 
the debates on how to improve it, there was a great demand for more advanced techniques 
in every sector of agriculture.8 Education of farmers and a prompt response to the demands 
of the market were the key themes with which various investigations and professional 
journals were concerned. From the 1840s onwards, prices of agricultural products began to 
rise in international markets, leading to the idea that, even though commerce and industry 
                                                 
5 Several nineteenth-century surveys highlighted this point. See, for example, G. Devincenzi, ‘Relazione 
sull’agricoltura dell’Alto e del Basso Milanese’, Annali universali di statistica, 81 (1844), 329-38; S. Jacini, 
La proprietà fondiaria e le popolazioni agricole in Lombardia (Milan: Borroni and Scotti, 1854), pp. 52-71. 
On Lombardy see K.R. Greenfield, Economia e liberalismo nel Risorgimento: il movimento nazionale in 
Lombardia dal 1814 al 1848 (Bari: Laterza, 1964), pp. 11-12. With regard to the Po Valley see also A.M. 
Banti, Terra e denaro: una borghesia padana dell’Ottocento (Venice: Marsilio, 1989), pp. 21-34. 
6 During the nineteenth century, the population growth was affected by several factors such as bad harvests 
and epidemics, hence, recording a lower increase than the European average. See A. Bellettini, La popolazione 
italiana dall’inizio dell’era volgare ai giorni nostri. Valutazioni e tendenze, in R. Romano and C. Vivanti, 
eds, Storia d’Italia, 6 vols (Turin: Einaudi, 1973), V, I documenti, pp. 489-532 (p. 517); G. Pescosolido, 
‘L’economia e la vita materiale’, in G. Sabbatucci and V. Vidotto, eds, Storia d’Italia, 1. Le premesse 
dell’unità, 3 vols (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1994), I, pp. 3-118; Soresina, L’età della Restaurazione, pp. 168-
70. See also, G. Delille, Agricoltura e demografia nel Regno di Napoli nei secoli XVIII e XIX (Naples: Guida, 
1977), in particular pp. 12-38; L. Del Panta, Evoluzione demografica e popolamento nell’Italia dell’Ottocento: 
1796-1914 (Bologna: CLUEB, 1984).  
7 Jacini, La proprietà fondiaria e le popolazioni agricole in Lombardia, p. 139; Greenfield, Economia e 
liberalismo, p. 79. On agriculture in the Italian peninsula, see also C. Cattaneo, D’alcune instituzioni agrarie 
dell’alta Italia applicabili a sollievo dell’Irlanda (Milan: Bernardoni di Giovanni, 1847). 
8 Greenfield, Economia e liberalismo, pp. 64-70. See also L. Serristori, ‘Dell’attuale condizione dell’industria 
in Italia’, Annali universali di statistica, 85 (1845), 9-19 (pp. 11-16). 
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(metallurgical and textile) should be taken into account, the economy of the Italian northern 
areas could also grow without focusing on industrialisation.9  
In the Italian peninsula, industrialisation began developing in the 1830s, and was 
characterised by strong regional disproportion between the North and the South in 
particular, with infrastructures having a very low impact on the territory.10  
 
 
2. Family and society 
 
The strong economic backwardness of the Italian peninsula reflected in social and cultural 
dynamics,11 but its fabric, poised between the past and the future, began to testify to a slow 
change particularly affecting family structure. Since the end of the eighteenth century, the 
image of large patriarchal families gathered around a householder had begun to fade and 
give way to different ‘kinds’ of families, such as the bourgeois family, the workers’ family, 
and the various peasants’ families.12 Several factors contributed to these changes, resulting 
in a reduction of their size: this could be explained by the transition towards modern 
companionate marriages, which were ‘small parental families characterized by love 
                                                 
9 Pescosolido, ‘L’economia e la vita materiale’, pp. 64-65. See also Greenfield, Economia e liberalismo, pp. 
79-190; G. Luzzatto, Per una storia economica d’Italia: progressi e lacune (Bari: Laterza, 1957), pp. 83-84; 
M. Petrusewicz, ‘Agronomia: innovatori agrari nelle periferie europee dell’Ottocento’, in P. Bevilacqua, ed., 
Storia dell’agricoltura italiana in età contemporanea, 3 vols (Venice: Marsilio, 1992), III, pp. 295-344.  
10 V. Zamagni, Industrializzazione e squilibri regionali in Italia: bilancio dell’età giolittiana (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 1978), pp. 197 and 200. See also L. Cafagna, The Industrial Revolution in Italy, 1830-1914 (London: 
Collins, 1971), pp. 48-49.  
11 Several studies of the time focused on this point. See, for example, E. Pani Rossi, La Basilicata libri tre. 
Studi politici, amministrativi e di economia pubblica (Verona: Civelli, 1868); G. Finali, Le Marche: 
ricordanze (Ancona: Morelli, 1896); A. Niceforo, L’Italia barbara contemporanea: studi e appunti (Milan: 
Sandron, 1898). 
12 See P. Laslett, ‘Family and Household as Work Group and Kin Group: Areas of Traditional Europe 
Compared’, in R. Wall, J. Robin and P. Laslett, eds, Family Forms in Historic Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), pp. 513-64; P. Melograni and L. Scaraffia, eds, La famiglia italiana dall’Ottocento a 
oggi (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1988); M. Barbagli and D.I. Kertzer, eds, Storia della famiglia italiana, 1750-
1950 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1992); G. Vecchio, Profilo storico della famiglia: la famiglia italiana tra Ottocento 
e Novecento (Cinisello Balsamo: San Paolo, 1999), pp. 5-8. 
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between spouses, as well as between parents and children’.13 Edward Shorter believes that 
this transition was also due to a new sense of personal autonomy of women, who actively 
decided to reduce the numerical size of their families.14 In particular, statistics on Milanese 
and Florentine upper classes show a change of attitude towards celibacy and spinsterhood. 
In Dante Zanetti’s demographic survey on the Milanese aristocracy, for example, the 
percentage of unmarried men and women in the period 1600-1647 was 49% and 75% 
respectively, while in 1850-1899 the percentage went down to 11.5% and 25%.15 The 
increase in the number of marriages did not, however, lead to an analogous increase in the 
number of children per couple, thus witnessing a voluntary control of births.16 Although 
statistics and data samples are not sufficiently large and reliable, demographers explained 
that the decline of fertility was due to a combination of factors, including the reduction in 
the size of land plots which led to a sort of ‘proletarianisation’ of the rural areas. This meant 
that the number of farm workers increased, and, consequently, the size of their families 
became smaller.17  
In the Italian peninsula, many large towns already existed before industrialisation 
set in: urbanisation was not a ‘sinonimo di deruralizzazione della popolazione’.18 
Nevertheless, the industrialisation process played an important role in altering the social 
                                                 
13 J. Goody, ‘Dowry and the Rights of Women to Property’, in C. M. Hann, ed., Property Relations: Renewing 
the Anthropological Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 201-13 (p. 209). See also 
E. Badinter, L’Amour en plus: histoire de l’amour maternel (XVIIe-XXe siècle) (Paris: Flammarion, 1981). 
14 On companionate marriages, see E. Shorter, ‘Emancipazione femminile, controllo delle nascite e fecondità 
nella storia europea’, in Barbagli, ed., Famiglia e mutamento sociale, pp. 317-59 (pp. 344-46); K. Fisher, 
‘Marriage and Companionate Ideals since 1750’, in S. Toulalan and K. Fisher, eds, The Routledge History of 
Sex and the Body: 1500 to the Present (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 328-48 (p. 329). 
Breastfeeding also impacted in the reduction of family size. On this point, see M. Livi-Bacci, A History of 
Italian Fertility during the Last Two Centuries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. pp. 35-48 
and 285-86. 
15 D. Zanetti, La demografia del patriziato milanese nei secoli XVII, XVIII, XIX (Pavia: Università di Pavia, 
1972), p. 84. 
16 Ibid., pp. 144-45. Similar decline was recorded among Florentine patricians. See, R.B. Litchfield, 
‘Caratteristiche demografiche delle famiglie patrizie fiorentine dal sedicesimo al diciannovesimo secolo’, in 
C.A. Corsini, ed., Saggi di demografia storica (Florence: Università di Firenze, 1969), pp. 17-34 (p. 25). 
17 See Barbagli, Sotto lo stesso tetto, pp. 45-138. 
18 A. De Bernardi, ‘Città e campagna nella storia contemporanea’, in R. Romano, ed., Storia dell’economia 
italiana. L’età contemporanea: un paese nuovo (Turin: Einaudi, 1991), III, pp. 252-78 (p. 253). 
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fabric of the Italian peninsula, leading simultaneously to the rise of the bourgeoisie as a new 
class of entrepreneurs, and the decline of the nobility.19 This combination of factors 
administered the coup de grace to a world that had been exposed to erosion for several 
decades, and in which the large patriarchal family struggled to resist. As the Milanese jurist 
Giovanni Carcano observed: 
 
un notevole cambiamento parmi verificato nel corso di non molti anni nelle abitudini della nostra famiglia 
[…]. A memoria d’uomini ancor freschi fu tempo in cui era comune tipo fra noi la famiglia patriarcale […] 
nella quale i figli maritavano presso i padri, menando loro donne nella casa dei padri […]. Ora lo sperperarsi 
e il dividersi […] è il costume dell’epoca nostra.20 
 
The same concerns regarding the disintegration of the large patriarchal family were 
expressed in an interesting portrait of nineteenth-century Lombard society drawn up by the 
Milanese writer Carlo Ravizza (1811-1848).21 His novel Un curato di campagna: schizzi 
morali featured a country priest trying to persuade families to remain together:  
 
le grandi famiglie tendevano più che mai a scomporsi [...] o per l’insubordinazione di un figliuolo, o per 
l’inerzia di un altro, o per l’invidia gelosa di qualche donna [...] e allora non so dire quanto il buon parroco si 
sforzasse d’impedire queste scomposizioni [...], “figliuoli miei, abitate una sola casa, fate bollire un sol 
pentolo, lavorate tutti ed insieme, chè riunendo le vostre forze, riuscirete a quello che disuniti non farete 
mai”.22 
 
                                                 
19 See A.M. Banti, ‘Ricchezza e potere. Le dinamiche patrimoniali nella società lucchese del XIX secolo’, 
Quaderni Storici, 50 (1982), 629-61 (pp. 646-49); G. Biagioli, ‘Patrimoni e congiuntura: crescita, crisi e 
ripresa di una famiglia nobile toscana fra Sette e Ottocento’, in E. Luttazzi Gregori et al., eds, Ricerche di 
storia moderna. 2, aziende e patrimoni di grandi famiglie (sec. XV-XIX) (Pisa: Pacini, 1979), pp. 297-377 (p. 
332-35). See also J.C. Davis, The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1962).  
20 G. Carcano, Il codice civile austriaco ed i suoi caratteri (Milan: Manini, 1860), p. 27. 
21 The journal Guida dell’educatore, directed by Raffaello Lambruschini, reported that Carlo Ravizza’s best 
known book Un curato di campagna: schizzi morali was a valuable moral essay and was to ‘riuscir grata ad 
ogn’Italiano, che desideri veder diffusa ne’ più umili tugurj una sana morale’. See Guida dell’educatore, 7 
(1842), 116-22 (p. 122). 
22 C. Ravizza, Un curato di campagna: schizzi morali (Milan: Pirola, 1841), p. 30 
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The curato di campagna considered staying united a strength for families, a value to pursue 
in face of the pressures of modernity. The patriarchal family, symbol of a fading world, had 
its own rules and customs, which were questioned by new ideals introduced since the 
Enlightenment (I shall come back to this point in the following chapters). In this context, 
the ‘insubordinazione di un figliuolo’ was a major concern for the family, and for society, 
which rested on a rigid hierarchical structure.  
Although Carlo Ravizza referred to the large patriarchal peasants’ families, which 
owned or rented small plots of land for cultivation, social dynamics among its members 
presented traits similar to those characterising other kinds of families, such as those 
belonging to the upper classes. The key in this regard was the possession of goods, and the 
most sensitive issue to a family was the transmission of this wealth: be it a latifundium or a 
small plot of land, a large sum of money, or just a piece of furniture. In broader terms, a 
family could be described as a moral body, led by men and composed of several members 
who recognised themselves as sharing a common name and identity, and resided in a 
family’s property.23 ‘Un’area vasta anche se poco strutturata’, Cesarina Casanova argued, 
in which ‘i confini della solidarietà o dell’indifferenza si possono cogliere solo chiedendosi 
in quali occasioni per un individuo potere o non potere attivare una rete di sostegno fosse 
determinante per il suo successo e quali rapporti in queste occasioni risultassero 
preferenziali’.24 Hence, the idea of family, and the mutual support it implied, had blurred 
boundaries, which were also defined by the sense of shared identity and behaviours, and, in 
time, loosened to allow new members to enter through marriages and births. Over the 
centuries, this large moral body became a smaller and more intimate group, and its 
                                                 
23 On the notion of family, see also G. Vismara, L’unità della famiglia nella storia del diritto in Italia (Rome: 
Apollinaris, 1956); J.C. Davis, A Venetian Family and Its Fortune, 1500-1900: The Donà and the 
Conservation of Their Wealth (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1975), pp. 1-4; T.J. Kuehn, 
‘Household and Family in Ius Commune and Ius Proprium’, in M. Carlier and T. Soens, eds, The Household 
in Late Medieval Cities: Italy and Northwestern Europe Compared (Leuven: Garant, 2001), pp. 37-50; V. 
Crescenzi, ‘Per una semantica della famiglia (ovvero: di cosa si parla, quando si parla di famiglia?)’, in A. 
Bixio and G. Crifò, eds, Il giurista e il diritto: studi per Federico Spantigati (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2010), pp. 
3-31; T.J. Kuehn, Family and Gender in Renaissance Italy, 1300-1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), pp. 33-52. 
24 C. Casanova, La famiglia italiana in età moderna: ricerche e modelli (Rome: Carocci, 2000), p. 63. 
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hierarchical structure faced a progressive evolution towards a sort of ‘verticalization’, with 
the power usually held in one male hand.25  
The social, economic and political strength of the family coincided with the strength 
of its assets, to the extent that the possession of goods made the difference between having, 
or not having, significance before the law. If the medieval jurist Albericus of Rosciate 
(1290-1360) maintained that ‘familia id est substantia’ (the family is its wealth),26 and 
Bartolus of Saxoferrato (1313-1357) confirmed that ‘familia accipitur in iure pro substantia’ 
(the family is taken in law for its wealth),27 in nineteenth-century society, the family was 
still considered in a similar way: this also implied that its members were only those who 
were entitled to benefit from its substancia, and, in the words of Thomas Kuehn, ‘property 
was an ingredient in identity’.28 In this familia, ideas about name, honour and prestige were 
a legacy of ancient times, and were transmitted through the male line only. From the Middle 
Ages up to the Ottocento, this ideal of familia continued to be characterised by behaviours 
and customs shared by other familiae of similar wealth. Their customs had legal value, and 
formed a bulk of customary laws enforceable and existent beyond the written law (this point 
will be analysed in Chapter 3).  
 
 
3. Women and the family 
 
In a family, the most prominent figure was represented by the paterfamilias, whose personal 
supremacy enabled him to be also dominus of the patrimonium of the familia. He was a 
male adult, head of the family, and holder of an almost endless potestas over his children 
                                                 
25 On family structure in Middle Ages, see R.A. Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence: A 
Study of Four Families (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968); D. Herlihy, ‘Family Solidarity in 
Medieval Italian History’, Exploration in Economic History, 7 (1969), 173-84; F.W. Kent, Household and 
Lineage in Renaissance Florence: The Family Life of the Capponi, Ginori, and Rucellai (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1977), pp. 21-62; Romano, Famiglia, successioni e patrimonio, pp. 60-85; V. Neri and B. 
Girotti, eds, La famiglia tardoantica: società, diritto, religione (Milan: LED, 2016). 
26 Albericus of Rosciate, Dictionarium iuri tam civilis quam canonici (Venice: [n. pub.], 1581), s.v. Familia. 
27 Bartolus of Saxoferrato, Commentaria in primam infortiati (Lyon: [n. pub.], 1552), p. 112. On this point, 
see also Kuehn, Family and Gender, pp. 48-51. 
28 Kuehn, Family and Gender, p. 49. 
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and grandchildren.29 The ambiguous limits of the potestas were also extended to wives, 
who, from being under the authority of their fathers or grandfathers, after marriage fell under 
that of their husbands.  
Since classical times, women were perceived as not being fully part of the family. 
For example, only grandchildren ex filio – and not those ex filia – were subject to the 
potestas of the paterfamilias. A woman could not have any person subject to her potestas,30 
and was considered as if she were the only component of her family. A woman was ‘familiae 
suae et caput et finis est’, ‘the beginning and the end of her family’, as the Roman jurist 
Ulpian wrote in the third century.31 Even though Ulpian described the family of his time, 
Carla Fayer noted that the characteristics of the Roman household were similar to those of 
the extended patriarchal peasant families existing in several areas of the nineteenth-century 
Italian peninsula.32 One might suggest that the parallels between Roman and peasant 
families could also be found in other extended patriarchal families, such as those of the 
nobility, the points in common being the possession of some wealth, the concerns for its 
                                                 
29 The jurist Ulpian described the familia as ‘plures personae, quae sunt sub unius potestate aut naturae aut 
iure subiectae’ (several people, who are subjected to the authority of one either by nature or by law, Digest, 
50.16.195.2 Ulpianus libro 46 ad edictum). The potestas (authority) is a major characteristic of the familia 
and is defined as the power to command and dispose of people and goods. This authority over family members 
implied the economic dependence on the paterfamilias, which meant ‘head of a family’. The paterfamilias 
was not subjected to any potestas and was sui juris (of his own right, autonomous, independent). For the 
paterfamilias in Roman law, see C. Fayer, La familia romana: aspetti giuridici ed antiquari, 3 vols (Rome: 
“L’Erma” di Bretschneider, 1994), I, pp. 18-19; J.F. Gardner, Family and Familia in Roman Law and Life 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), pp. 6-10. See also Romano, Famiglia, successioni e patrimonio. On paternal 
authority, see P. Ariès, Padri e figli nell’Europa medievale e moderna (Bari: Laterza, 1968); G. Lobrano, 
Pater et filius eadem persona: per lo studio della ‘patria potestas’ (Milan: Giuffrè, 1984), in particular, pp. 
25-27; Cavina, Il padre spodestato. On the role of the paterfamilias, see also Pellizer, Zorzetti and Maffi, eds, 
La paura dei padri.  
30 Fayer, La familia romana, I, p. 19. 
31 Digest, 50.16.195.5. Among the major works of Gnaeus Domitius Annius Ulpianus (170?–228) were the 
two commentaries Ad edictum and Ad Sabinum which supplied to Justinian’s Digest about a third of its 
contents. The Law of Citations (Lex citationum), issued by the Emperor Valentinian III in 426 and later 
absorbed in the Codex Theodosianus (438), stated that judges were able to use only the doctrines of the five 
outstanding jurists Ulpian, Papinianus, Gaius, Modestinus and Paulus to interpret law and reach a decision. 
See also Albericus of Rosciate, Dictionarium, s.v. Familia, who maintained that ‘mulier non habet familiam’ 
(a woman does not have a family).   
32 On this point see, Fayer, La familia romana, I, pp. 17-21. 
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transmission, and the potestas a paterfamilias exercised over people and goods. Yet in the 
Ottocento, the Turinese lawyer Francesco Concone drawing on Ulpian’s words explained 
that,  
 
dovendo le femmine onde lasciar discendenti da sé, passare a marito, che appartiene ad altra famiglia, e con 
ciò assumere nome diverso, si avevano a considerare, come se cessassero di far parte della famiglia del padre, 
o almeno ne fossero l’ultimo anello.33 
 
Women were destined to marry and give birth to children, who would perpetuate their 
husband’s lineage.34 By becoming part of another familia, women were excluded from 
substantial parts of the wealth of their family of origin, because this was to be assigned to 
the men who would bear the family’s name. More importantly, as argued by the jurist 
Giovanni Maria Negri,  
 
[c]essa [...] nei padri medesimi il fomite di accumular sostanze, allorché sanno, che queste devono già 
pervenire col mezzo delle femmine ad altre ignote famiglie. [Infatti] si veggono […] sussistere de’ secoli, col 
mezzo de’ maschj, li più illustri casati, che ritennero colle loro sostanze lo splendor del loro cognome ad 
ornamento di queste contrade. I maschj sono quelli che conservano le proprie famiglie, e colle loro cure lo 
stato e la dovizia di esse.35 
 
The sole reason that would drive the paterfamilias to acquire wealth was the pursuit of 
honour and prestige for the familia that would bear his name. Amassing wealth for women, 
who would then give birth to children bearing someone else’s name, was pointless. In a 
world characterised by power relations, hierarchy, authority and obedience, property was 
key and made status, real or vaunted.  
In this context, when Napoleon extended the French civil code to the conquered 
regions, its family law and inheritance rules were a major challenge to the very foundation 
of Italian society. Along with the opportunity given to all children to succeed regardless of 
                                                 
33 F. Concone, Giurisprudenza femminile (Turin: Fumero Maggiore, 1839), p. 144. 
34 Kuehn, Law, Family and Women, p. 199. 
35 G.M. Negri, Dei difetti del Codice Civile Italico, che porta il titolo di Codice Napoleone e dei pregj del 
Codice Civile Austriaco (Vicenza: Parise, 1815), p. 77. 
32 
 
their sex,36 Napoleon’s Code Civil des Français,37 – or in its Italian version, the Codice 
Civile di Napoleone il Grande pel Regno d’Italia38 – excluded the principle paterna 
paternis, materna maternis, which was used to identify the origin of assets to regulate 
inheritance.39 These two principles were real novelties for the pre-unification legal systems, 
in which the predominance of sons and the regime of separation of property between 
spouses were broadly accepted. The strong resistance to Napoleon’s family law, which also 
challenged parental authority,40 was not just a fight against the law implemented by the 
conqueror: it reflected the concerns of the paterfamilias, who strove to keep his small 
‘monarchy’ unchanged.41 Indeed, allowing all children – sons and daughters – to receive 
                                                 
36 Art. 745, in Codice Civile del Regno d’Italia, in Collezione Completa dei Moderni Codici Civili (Turin: 
Minerva Subalpina, 1845), p. 43. 
37 The code, which was the work of a committee of jurists appointed by Napoleon and led by Jean-Étienne-
Marie Portalis, consisted of 2281 articles, had the tripartite division of the Roman law (personae, res, actiones) 
and was strongly influenced by the Roman law in force in the south of the country. Its Italian translation was 
applied to the Italian territories by decree on 30 March 1806, and came into force the following day. The code 
unified the legal régime of the entire peninsula, with the exception of Sicily, Sardinia and some territories of 
the Venetia.  
38 Despite jurists and politicians demanding to include changes that would be more suitable to the juridical 
tradition of the Italian peninsula, Napoleon’s will have prevailed, and prevented the introduction of codes 
other than a direct translation of the Code Civil des Français. See C. Ghisalberti, Unità nazionale e 
unificazione giuridica in Italia (Rome: Laterza, 1988), p. 135. 
39 Art. 732, in Codice Civile del Regno d’Italia, in Collezione completa, p. 42. The expression paterna paternis, 
materna maternis was used to signify those goods coming from the father of a deceased person descended to 
his paternal relations and those from the mother to the maternal side. As we shall see in Chapter 3, for example, 
the dowry, which was usually given by fathers, in case of a woman dying without children, returned to her 
line.    
40 Art. 488, in Codice Civile del Regno d’Italia, in Collezione completa, p. 29. In the Napoleonic code, paternal 
authority ended with the coming of age with individual becoming emancipated. This entailed that he or she 
was able to undertake juridical acts. Up to the enactment of the French code and, after the Congress of Vienna, 
with the recall into force of the Ancien Régime law, the coming of age did not lead automatically to 
emancipation, as on the basis of Roman law a person could be emancipated only by a formal act or after the 
death of his or her father. However, in many areas of the Italian peninsula, a son was considered emancipated 
when he attained the age of majority, was married and lived in a household different from that of his father.  
41 The parallelism between family and monarchy could be drawn up from the words of Cesare Beccaria. He 
argued that ‘vi siano cento mila uomini, o sia venti mila famiglie, ciascuna delle quali è composta da cinque 
persone, compresovi il capo che la rappresenta; se l’associazione è fatta per le famiglie, vi saranno venti mila 
uomini, e ottanta mila schiavi; se l’associazione è di uomini, vi saranno cento mila cittadini, e nessuno schiavo. 
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the same portion of inheritance meant that properties would be divided into small shares, 
causing families a loss in status and prestige. This was a situation to be avoided for a society 
that perpetuated itself and its prerogatives by locking up its assets. The Code Napoléon, 
which was influenced by natural law and inspired by individuals’ equality, regardless of 
social class, attacked this equilibrium, this immobility and this inequality.  
From this perspective, it is easy to understand the advice given by Ravizza’s country 
priest, who tried to persuade small landowners’ families not to send their children to study 
Latin and, instead, ‘bellamente li consigliava a mandar piuttosto i figli in qualche collegio 
dove fossero instituite le scuole di commercio, e più volentieri li avrebbe indirizzati a quello 
che avesse anche una scuola d’agricoltura e delle industrie affini’.42  
In the static Ottocento, staying within the boundaries of one’s own social class was 
praised, and also strongly recommended. Attempts to improve the family trade were 
welcomed, but this should not lead to transitions from one social class to another. New 
relations and kinship links were usually created through marriages among people of similar 
wealth and status. Unlike the Napoleonic Code, which did not recognise class privileges, 
Italian society firmly discouraged and even punished any attempt at breaking down class 
barriers, and any aspiration to climb the social ladder. Thus, the Costituzioni Estensi of 
1771,43 which, except for the short Napoleonic period, remained in force in the Duchy of 
Modena until the advent of its 1851 Codice Estense,44 condemned the marriage of 
‘disparaggio’, that is, a marriage between a man and a woman of different social status. In 
                                                 
Nel primo caso vi sarà una repubblica, e venti mila piccole monarchie, che la compongono; nel secondo, lo 
spirito repubblicano non solo spirerà nelle piazze e nelle adunanze della nazione, ma anche nelle domestiche 
mura, dove sta gran parte della felicità o della miseria degli uomini’. Therefore, considering society as a 
gathering of families instead of people meant that some individuals were deemed to be subordinated to others. 
See, C. Beccaria, Dei Delitti e delle pene (Paris: Cazin, 1786), p. 144. 
42 Ravizza, Un curato di campagna, p. 45. 
43 The Costituzioni Estensi were promulgated by Francesco III, Duke of Modena, in 1771. All statutes and 
municipal laws in force before their approval were abolished, but the use of Roman law was permitted for 
topics not covered by these Costituzioni. 
44 The Civil Code of Modena was promulgated by Francesco V on 1851. The code was enacted to reform and 
attune the law in force in the Duchy. This code, too, recognised the possibility to use other sources of law, 
such as the Roman law, to decide on topics not covered. 
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this act, Duke Francesco III declared that it was for the ‘importante oggetto del decoro delle 
famiglie, e del pubblico, e privato interesse’,45 that: 
 
qualunque nobile si accaserà con persona, il cui matrimonio per la di lei vile, e bassa condizione apporti 
disonore, e vitupero a sé, ed alla sua famiglia, non solamente tale nobile incontrerà la Nostra disapprovazione, 
ma inoltre ci riserviamo a dare contro di lui quei provvedimenti, che secondo le circostanze de’ casi crederemo 
opportuni, e convenienti.46 
 
A marriage of ‘disparaggio’ was considered such a dishonour that the monarch in person 
would intervene and assess the issue, deciding which provision was appropriate in the 
specific circumstance. The Duke, who was deeply concerned with keeping the social 
structure of his Duchy unchanged, also imposed sanctions against parents of humble 
condition who had contributed, ‘col consiglio, od anche con la semplice connivenza’, to 
encourage the marriage between their children and those of higher rank.47 The importance 
of social class and the desire for society to remain static was not just a vague wish, but was 
pursued by the law itself, which contributed to perpetuate class stratification.  
However, under some circumstances exceptions were permitted: for example, in the 
case of the potential impoverishment of some ‘illustri casati’, ‘hypergamous’ marriages 
between nobles with scant patrimonies, and very wealthy non-noble people were accepted.48 
An interesting example comes from the Papal States, where Tomaso Stramigioli, a wealthy 
man from Pesaro, married Augusta Antaldi in 1854. She had a dowry of 1,500 scudi,49 quite 
meagre for a woman of her status: Augusta belonged to a family of some distinction and 
antiquity, still well regarded, despite her patrimony being hugely impoverished. To Tomaso, 
this marriage meant entering elite society. Augusta died a few months later, and Tomaso 
                                                 
45 Art. VII Tit. XIII, Codice Estense, in Collezione completa, p. 810. 
46 Ibid. 
47Art. IX Tit. XIII, Codice Estense, in Collezione completa, p. 810. 
48 Hypergamy is defined as marrying a person of higher social status. An overview of the pattern of the 
evolving definition of hypergamy, which was at first used in Indian sociology to define marriage with people 
of higher castes, can be found in C.L. Shehan, ed., The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Family Studies, 4 
vols (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), II, pp. 1085-86. For marriage between people belonging to different 
social classes, see also Meriggi, ‘Società, istituzione e ceti dirigenti’, in Sabbatucci and Vidotto, eds, Storia 
d’Italia, 1. Le premesse dell’unità, I, pp. 177-90. 
49 Pesaro, State Archive of Pesaro (SAP), Notaio Luigi Perotti, 1854. 
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married again shortly after. This time he married a woman from a wealthy but non-noble 
family. Her dowry consisted of 3,000 scudi and a trousseau.50 Since Tomaso’s wealth had 
not doubled within a few months, the difference in the amount of the two dowries tells us 
much about the customs of the time: Augusta, in addition to cash, brought to her marriage 
nobility and social status, which compensated for her limited dowry. Emilia, the second 
wife, came from a wealthy family, but could not boast a noble and ancient lineage. To be 
attractive in the marriage market, her dowry had to be higher than that of a noble, but less 
wealthy, woman.  
Other than creating alliances and acquiring a higher status, marriage was also a way 
to restore a patrimony by means of the dowry brought by the bride to the new family.51 For 
example, Anna Bonaccorsi Dolcini Tredozio was a very wealthy woman from the Romagna 
region (then part of the Papal States): accordingly, she had an opulent dowry. In 1831, she 
married Baron Bettino Ricasoli (1809-1880), the future Italian prime minister (1861-1862 
and 1866-1867).52 The marriage allowed Ricasoli to repay his family’s debts and to improve 
and modernise his farms.  
These cases suggest that monarchs and society’s upper strata of the time used a 
specific strategy: on the one hand, monarchs aimed to maintain a powerful class of allies by 
praising these kinds of marriages; on the other, nobles ensured their survival as an influential 
body against the challenges brought along by the rise of the new bourgeois class.  
                                                 
50 SAP, Notaio Luigi Perotti, 1855. 
51 On marriage strategies in the Early Modern and the Enlightenment, see also R. Merzario, Il paese stretto: 
strategie matrimoniali nella diocesi di Como, secoli XVI-XVIII (Turin: Einaudi, 1981); A. Molho, Marriage 
Alliance in Late Medieval Florence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 236-38; G. Delille, 
‘Strategie di alleanza e demografia del matrimonio’, and M. De Giorgio, ‘Raccontare un matrimonio 
moderno’, in M. Beer, C. Klapisch-Zuber and M. De Giorgio, eds, Storia del matrimonio (Rome: Laterza, 
1996), respectively pp. 283-306 and 307-90.  
52 For further details on Ricasoli’s marriage and his wife’s dowry, see D. Bronzuoli, Matrimoni e patrimoni. 
La dote di Anna Bonaccorsi e la strategia imprenditoriale di Bettino Ricasoli (Florence: Polistampa, 2013). 
See also A. Moroni, ‘Antica gente e subiti guadagni: patrimoni aristocratici fiorentini nell’800’, Biblioteca di 
storia toscana moderna e contemporanea, 44 (1997), 1-364 (p. 143); Biagioli, ‘Patrimoni e congiuntura’, p. 
343. See also the marriages of princes Errico Antonio and Massimo Montalto di Lequile from the Kingdom 
of the Two Sicilies. The dowries of their wives were explicitly mentioned as paying off several mortgages 
they had over their properties (P. Macry, Ottocento: famiglia, élites e patrimoni a Napoli (Turin: Einaudi, 
1988), p. 52). See also the marriage strategies of the Barraco family (M. Petrusewicz, Latifondo: economia 
morale e vita materiale in una periferia dell’Ottocento (Venice: Marsilio, 1990), pp. 13-16). 
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Moreover, these cases show that the choice of the bride and groom was rarely driven 
by love: marriage was ‘un fatto più che mai “razionale”, concertato a tavolino dai genitori 
o dai membri più influenti della famiglia’.53 In this context, as Lucetta Scaraffia observed, 
‘la categoria dell’utile dominava i parametri estetici’.54 Among the classes of proprietors, 
marriage complied with families’ aspirations to preserve their importance in society by 
becoming related to families of similar status and wealth, or to improve their status; among 
lower classes, marriage was contracted for similar, functional reasons. The ability to work, 
together with having a small dowry, which, for lower classes could consist of some pieces 
of furniture such as a bed or a wardrobe, made a woman desirable in the marriage market.  
Scaraffia suggested that social dynamics in the countryside adhered to a model that 
always required the presence of a male and a female in the household. This also meant that, 
‘la donna che entra nella famiglia come moglie e che si prepara a sostituire la madre serve 
a compensare la sorella che se ne esce’:55 when one member of the couple was missing, he 
or she was replaced by another person, that is to say that, for example, the daughter-in-law 
replaced the sister, who relocated to another house after her marriage.56 One might argue 
that similar behaviour could be inferred not only in contexts where labour force was crucial: 
men and women had fundamental and complementary roles in the upper strata of society as 
well, a point testified by the incidence of remarriage.57 Indeed, the high mortality rate often 
                                                 
53 G. Cozzi, La società veneta e il suo diritto: saggi su questioni matrimoniali, giustizia penale, politica del 
diritto, sopravvivenza del diritto veneto nell’Ottocento (Venice: Marsilio, 2000), p. 41.   
54 L. Scaraffia, ‘Essere uomo, essere donna’, in Melograni and Scaraffia, eds, La famiglia italiana, pp. 193-
258 (p. 205).  
55 Ibid., p. 195.  
56 Ibid., pp. 203-07. A similar behaviour is also described in E. De Marchi, Dai campi alle filande: famiglia, 
matrimonio e lavoro nella “pianura dell’Olona” 1750-1850 (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2009), pp. 178-82.  
57 Although the lack of sufficiently large and reliable data did not allow to propose a consistent model, some 
studies analyse the demographics of remarriage for limited areas. See, for example, A. Bellettini, ‘Les 
Remariages dans la ville et dans la campagne de Bologne au dix-neuvième siècle’, in J. Dupâquier et al., 
Marriage and Remarriage in Populations of the Past (London: Academic Press, 1981), pp. 259-72; M. Livi-
Bacci, ‘On the Frequency of Remarriage in Nineteenth Century Italy: Methods and Results’, in Ibid., pp. 347-
61; A. Schiaffino, ‘Quelques données sur le remariage dans un milieu urbain: Bologne aux dix-neuvième et 
vingtième siècles’, in Ibid., pp. 397-409; M. Breschi, La popolazione della Toscana dal 1640 al 1940. 
Un’ipotesi di ricostruzione (Florence: Dipartimento Statistico, 1990), M. Breschi, A. Fornasin, M. Manfredini, 
and M. Zacchigna, ‘Family Composition and Remarriage in Pre-Transitional Italy: A Comparative 
Study’, European Journal of Population, 25/3 (2009), 277-96  
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resulted in an early end of marriages, and, subsequently, remarriages. As Trevor Dean and 
Kate Lowe explained, ‘the question of what the other spouse should do with regard to 
remarrying was [an] especially severe [dilemma] for women, who were supposed not to be 
able to function effectively without being married’.58 On the male side, instead, ‘il existe un 
véritable tabou dans le domaine des travaux domestiques [...] les veufs ne peuvent pas rester 
sans femme, pas plus que les vieux célibataires qui gardent avec eux une vieille soeur 
destinée à leur entretien’.59 Both men’s and women’s lives were imagined mainly as part of 
a marriage and a family. 
 
 
4. Women and political participation: the Risorgimento 
 
Leveraged by the ideals of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, from the 
beginning of the Ottocento, the family began to be loaded with expectations. It was 
considered the place in which citizens were to be educated with a sense of motherland, and 
civic values were to be instilled.60 Other than acquiring dignity and self-fulfilment through 
marriage, women were also asked to transmit patriotic values to their children, even though 
they were not included in the notion of citizenship. This notion was explained and developed 
by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who argued that only active 
participation in the political community provided an individual with the status of citizen and 
guaranteed the power to vote. Those who did not have such power could be treated 
according to natural law, but they could not be considered active members of the State. The 
major characteristic needed to be a citizen and to participate in the legislative power was 
                                                 
58 Dean and Lowe, ‘Introduction: Issues in the History of Marriage’, p. 21. 
59 M. Segalen, ‘Mentalité populaire et remariage en Europe occidentale’, in Dupâquier et al., Marriage and 
Remarriage, pp. 67-76 (p. 67). See also C.A. Corsini, ‘Why is Remarriage a Male Affair? Some Evidence 
from Tuscan Villages during the Eighteenth Century’, in Ibid., pp. 385-95. 
60 I. Porciani, ‘Famiglia e nazione nel lungo Ottocento’, in I. Porciani, ed., Famiglia e nazione nel lungo 
Ottocento italiano: modelli, strategie, reti di relazioni (Rome: Viella, 2006), pp. 15-54 (p. 50); R. Bizzocchi, 
‘Una nuova morale per la donna e la famiglia’, in A.M. Banti and P. Ginsborg, eds, Storia d’Italia. Annali 22. 
Il Risorgimento (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. 69-96; I. Porciani, ‘Disciplinamento nazionale e modelli domestici 
nel lungo Ottocento: Germania e Italia a confronto’, in Ibid., pp. 97-125. On the idea of family and nation, see 
A.M. Banti, Sublime madre nostra: la nazione italiana dal Risorgimento al fascismo (Rome: Laterza, 2011).  
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the ‘sibisufficientia’ (independence).61 The concept of independence was further explored 
by the French theorist and politician Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (1748-1836). He argued that 
‘il est constant qu’un vagabond, un mendiant ne peuvent être chargés de la confiance 
politique des Peuples’,62 and raised some doubts about a servant, a person employed by a 
master, or a foreigner could be accepted as representatives of a nation. Accordingly, a 
woman could not be counted among those having the independence needed to be citizens, 
because, as we shall see in the following chapters, she enjoyed fewer rights than men and 
depended on them.63 The works of Kant and Sieyès analysed and translated into Italian from 
the early decades of the nineteenth century,64 contributed to forge the idea of the ‘domestic’ 
woman. Lacking the independence and firmness of mind required to actively participate in 
public life, she was to remain secluded in the private sphere, the place nature had chosen 
for her.  
At the time of the French Revolution, however, the patriotic impulse spread among 
women as well, and the target of a female citoyenneté slowly emerged.65 The revolution led 
to the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (1789), which considered only men 
as citizens: the Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne (1791) by Olympe de 
Gouges, as well as Condorcet’s work Sur l’admission des femmes au droit de cité (1790), 
firmly challenged women’s exclusion from civil rights.66 With reference to the Italian 
peninsula, since the late eighteenth century, journalists such as Elisabetta Caminer Turra 
                                                 
61 I. Kant, On the Old Saw: That May Be Right in Theory but it Won’t Work in Practice (Berlin, Boston: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013 [1793]), pp. 62-65. See also P. Costa, Cittadinanza (Rome and Bari: 
Laterza, 2005), p. 48; J. Weinrib, ‘Kant on Citizenship and Universal Independence’, Australian Journal of 
Legal Philosophy, 33 (2008), 1-25 (pp. 2-4). 
62 E.J. Sieyès, Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-État? (Paris: [n. pub.], 1789), p. 38. 
63 Ibid., pp. 37-38; see also E.J. Sieyès, Observations sur le rapport du Comité de constitution concernant la 
nouvelle organisation de la France (Versailles: Baudouin, 1789). 
64 For example, the Pisan jurist Giovanni Carmignani studied Kant’s works and described him as having 
‘immenso ingegno’. See, G. Carmignani, Teoria delle leggi della sicurezza sociale, 3 vols (Pisa: Nistri, 1831), 
I, p. 142. 
65 G. Bock, Le donne nella storia europea. Dal Medioevo ai giorni nostri (Rome: Laterza, 2001), p. 59 
66 O. de Gouges, Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne, E. Gaulier, ed. (Paris: Mille et une 
nuits, 2003), p. 17; N. Condorcet, Sur l’Admission des femmes au droit de cité (Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 
1847), pp. 5-6. On women and the French revolution, see also E.G. Sledziewski, ‘Rivoluzione e rapporti fra i 
sessi. La svolta francese’, in G. Duby and M. Perrot, Storia delle donne. L’Ottocento (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 
1991), pp. 34-50.    
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(1751-1796) and Eleonora Fonseca Pimentel (1752-1799) had attempted to carve out a 
space that would allow them to contribute to public discourse. Elisabetta Caminer Turra 
began working as a journalist for her father’s journal Europa letteraria in 1768. She 
addressed several topics without neglecting women’s issues, such as the need for education, 
or forced monachization.67 Eleonora Fonseca Pimentel, who Verina Jones defined as ‘the 
journalist and opinion-maker of the Repubblica Partenopea’, was in charge of Il monitore 
napoletano from its very foundation on 2 February 1799. She was executed with the 
reestablishing of the Bourbon monarchy a few months later.68 
The attempts of these few women to make their voices heard did not mean that 
women asked for the droit de cité:69 for example, in Pensieri della libera cittadina I. P. M. 
alle sue concittadine, a pamphlet printed in 1797, the anonymous writer argued that,  
 
se il mezzo più eloquente alla modificazione negl’uomini è la susta del cuore, sarà incontrastabile la grande 
influenza del nostro sesso, per ridestare dal sonno de’ buoni Cittadini, che poi l’amore della libertà, la forza 
dell’opinione, l’abbitudini, l’esempio renderanno ben presto perfetti. Una buona Cittadina non dovrebbe 
stimar il suo attinente, il suo amico, che in proporzione alla di lui attività per meritare dalla patria.70 
                                                 
67 V.R. Jones, ‘Journalism, 1750-1860’, L. Panizza and S. Wood, eds, A History of Women’s Writing in Italy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 120-34 (pp. 122-24). 
68 Ibid., pp. 128-30. See also B. Bertolo, Donne del Risorgimento. Le eroine invisibili dell’Unità d’Italia 
(Rome: Ananke, 2011), pp. 351-54. 
69 An analysis of women’s participation to the eighteenth-century events of the Italian peninsula can be found 
in Evans, The Feminists, pp. 136-37; A. Buttafuoco, ‘Straniere in patria. Temi e momenti dell’emancipazione 
femminile italiana dale Repubbliche giacobine al fascismo’, in A.M. Crispino, ed., Esperienza storica 
femminile nell’età moderna e contemporanea: Atti del seminario, 2 vols (Rome: Unione donne italiane circolo 
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cultura e la politica delle donne in onore di Elvira Badaracco (Bologna: EM, 1991), pp. 79-106; G. Bonacchi 
and A. Groppi, Il dilemma della cittadinanza: diritti e doveri delle donne (Rome: Laterza, 1993); M.T. Guerra 
Medici, La cittadinanza difficile (Camerino: Università di Camerino, 2000); N.M. Filippini, ‘Donne sulla 
scena politica: dalle Municipalità del 1797 al Risorgimento’, in N.M. Filippini, ed., Donne sulla scena 
pubblica: società e politica in Veneto tra Sette e Ottocento (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2006), pp. 81-137 (in 
particular, pp. 85-123); G.L. Fruci, ‘Cittadine senza cittadinanza. La mobilitazione femminile nei plebisciti 
del Risorgimento (1848-1870)’, Genesis, 5/2, (2006), 21-55. See also P. Costa, ‘Diritti/Doveri’ and A. 
Chiavistelli, ‘Rappresentanza’, in Banti, Chiavistelli, Mannori, Meriggi, eds, Atlante culturale del 
Risorgimento, pp. 270-84 and pp. 343-58. 




Although the writer defined herself as a female citizen, she confined herself to merely 
describing the influence women could have on male citizens. Similarly, in her Breve difesa 
dei diritti delle donne (1794), Rosa Califronia, a self-styled Roman countess, set out to 
defend women’s rights, which she described as ‘l’autorità legittima di fare, e di avere, o di 
ricuperare ciò che è proprio’.71 With this aim, she attempted to refute the ‘accusations’ 
against women as being ‘prive di ragione’, ‘pazze’, ‘piene di vizi [e] causa d’ogni male’.72 
Califronia, too, did not go further than responding to commonplaces on women, and did not 
make any explicit claim of rights.  
In her Schiavitù delle donne (1797), Carolina Arienti Lattanzi (1771-1818) went  
slightly further and addressed women’s inferior status. She also pointed out that the 
‘istituzione delle doti ci divenne pregiudicievole da che fossimo escluse dall’avere 
un’eguale diritto coi maschi alla distribuzione della paterna eredità’.73 Her arguments, 
however, were not echoed and did not have any other consequences. 
With the Restoration, the overthrown monarchs made a strong effort to return to the 
past by reinforcing the Ancien Régime’s legal framework, even if several articles from 
Napoleon’s code (e.g. those on mortgages and contracts) were left unchanged. However, 
the ideals of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution had a significant impact on the 
Italian peninsula, and, from the very first years of the French conquests, testified to a 
‘dilatazione degli spazi del dibattito politico’.74 This led to the active participation of several 
strata of the population, not only in public debate but also in the Risorgimento process as a 
whole.75  
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Alongside the political redefinition of states’ boundaries, the Risorgimento was a 
movement that saw people from different social classes experiencing a sense of unity and 
sharing the common aim of fighting against the oppressors. Women, too, participated in this 
process.76 They served the cause in different ways, and their participation was not only 
limited to what society considered to be respectable for a woman, such as the organisation 
of hospitals and charities, as in the case of Cristina Belgiojoso.77 An important contribution 
to the process of the Risorgimento also came from various salons, where people gathered, 
discussed and shared their ideals of patriotism. Among the most famous salons, there were 
those of Clara Carrara Spinelli Maffei in Milan and Bianca Rebizzo in Genoa.78 Other 
women, such as countess Teresa Casati Confalonieri, Metilde Viscontini Dembowski, 
Maria Gambarana Frecavalli, Bianca Milesi, Camilla Besana Fé and Teresa Sopranzi 
Agazzini, played a meaningful role in secret revolutionary societies, among which the 
Società delle Giardiniere, the female branch of the Carbonari movement.79 In particular, in 
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Risorgimento, pp. 65-94; S. Wood, ‘Murder in the Harem: Cristina di Belgiojoso’, in Mitchell and Sanson, 
eds, Women and Gender in post-Unification Italy, pp. 135-52. 
78 M.T. Mori, Salotti: la sociabilità delle élite nell’Italia dell’Ottocento (Rome: Carocci, 2000); C. Gastel 
Chiarelli, Niente zucchero nel calamajo: lettere di Giuseppe Verdi a Clara Maffei (Milan: Archinto, 2005); 
Bertolo, Donne del Risorgimento, pp. 41-45 and 62-64; M. Serri, ‘La piccola grande tessitrice. Clara Maffei’, 
in Doni et al., Donne del Risorgimento, pp. 111-22. 
79 See Doni et al., Donne del Risorgimento. 
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1822, the frequent trips to Turin by Teresa Sopranzi Agazzini raised suspicions among 
Milanese authorities. She was brought before the special committee that dealt with political 
crimes, and questioned about her relations with Federico Confalonieri.80 The high level of 
her relations emerges from the short transcript of her interrogation: 
 
Commissione: Ha mai ricevuto pieghi da consegnare a Confalonieri? 
Teresa: No.  
Commissione: Un piego che doveva essere trasmesso al principe di Carignano? 
Teresa: No.  
Commissione: Sicura?  
Teresa: Non ho ricevuto alcun piego diretto al principe di Carignano né il mio onore permette che io 
esponga ciò che non è.81 
 
Teresa Sopranzi Agazzini not only had close relations with Confalonieri, but was also 
deemed to be capable of handling messages to the Prince of Carignano, the King of Sardinia. 
It is worth noting the way she put into play her social status by suggesting that things were 
as she reported them, and that questioning her words would besmirch her honour.  
Some women became protagonists of other crucial subversive activities and crimes 
in the name of Italy.82 For example, in the Papal States, by 1851, there were many political 
offences pending before courts. These related to the period 1848-1849 and were 
differentiated between crimes considered as ‘simply political’, or as ‘political accompanied 
by a common crime’. Many women who were to be prosecuted were aged between 17 and 
53, and belonged to different social classes. In addition to individual ‘subversive’ episodes, 
the participation of some women was more decisive. A case in point was that of Caterina 
Baracchini, a woman from Rome, who distributed clandestine prints, hid several people 
who were sought by the Papal police, and played a crucial role among the conspirators in 
general at the time of the 1849 Roman Republic. The sentence, which condemned her to 
fifteen years in prison, described her as a ‘fiera mazziniana, era socia e con essa non si 
faceva alcun mistero delle cose della Società. Aveva un ruolo rilevante nella direzione della 
Società’.83  
                                                 
80 Milan, State Archive of Milan (SAM), Processi Politici, 43, 1112 and 1127.  
81 SAM, Processi Politici, 43, 1127. 
82 See also Stato degli inquisiti dalla S. Consulta per la rivoluzione del 1849 (Rome: Vittoriano, 1937), p. 8. 
83 Ibid., p. 103. 
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Many women also served the cause through the fervent dissemination of ideas (e.g. 
Sara Nathan or Jessie White Mario),84 while others fought, and were killed, on the 
barricades.85 Some women, finally, also became involved in illicit activities as part of the 
phenomenon of brigandage in Southern Italy.86 
In sum, women’s presence in the Risorgimento was significant: they conspired and 
fought side by side with men, carried tricolour cockades and showed their support for the 
cause.87 Rather than seeking emancipation, though, they primarily aimed at contributing to 
the liberation from foreign oppressors and to national unification. Despite being a sign of 
women’s desire to actively participate in society and have roles beyond the household, their 
participation did not lead to a clear redefinition of ideas on women.88 Once peace was 
reached, most women returned to play their traditional role of angel of the hearth. As we 
shall see in the next chapter, their subordinate status was indisputable: notions about women 
were rooted in ancient beliefs and often also shared by the women themselves. 
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Ideals of women in men’s and women’s writings 
 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the vision of women was strictly standardised 
and categorised. The legacy of traditional views, which had pervaded earlier times and 
depicted women as pious, virginal and obedient or temptresses and ianua diaboli, still 
persisted and influenced mindsets. Even if it was no longer to the same extreme degree, 
theorists and moralists, as well as physicians and jurists, still considered women different 
to men. Starting from the scientific assumption that weaker female bodies entailed that 
women were less able to develop rational and consistent ideas, they justified their different 
role and position within society, and elaborated many works of conduct literature aimed at 
helping them to deal with everyday life. A number of tracts also addressed men and were 
written to inform and give means to understand female and male perspectives, as well as to 
correctly assess their different status.  
In this chapter, I shall analyse the different theories and points of view elaborated to 
assert women’s subjugation to men. As we shall see, these ideas were also shared by some 
women educationalists, who endorsed the common-place of the domestic woman, ideally a 
wife and mother,1 whose life was to be spent within her home, where womanly virtues were 
more useful. However, the events of the Risorgimento brought women outside their homes 
and led them to redefine their self-consciousness, also questioning the boundaries of the 
private and public sphere.  
 
 
1. The ideology on women 
 
The analysis of differences between the sexes served the goal of asserting women’s 
incapacity, and, as explained by Ian Maclean, was considered ‘a feature of higher animals, 
[…] postulated in plants and even metals by alchemists, and essential to mystical 
understandings of the universe’.2 For centuries, women’s alleged incapacity and their 
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45 
 
infirmitas, imbecillitas and levitas were explained by considering their different body 
temperature and humours. Hippocratic physicians considered women hotter than men, but, 
as they were imagined absorbing liquids like a sponge, their need to excrete these excess 
fluids resulted in them being more unstable.3 Aristotle and Galen, instead, claimed that men 
were hotter and drier than women and thus more perfect, as hotness and dryness were 
considered characteristics of perfection. The female principle was cold, wet, passive, 
deprived, ‘the result of a generative event not carried through to its final conclusion’, 
requiring the male principle to complete itself.4 According to Galen, women and men had 
similar organs, but, as those of women were internal, this implied they were imperfect and, 
even, mutilated.5  
The Greco-Roman theories of bodily humours and female imperfection persisted for 
centuries, and, still in the fifteenth century, Aquinas claimed that a woman was a mas 
occasionatus, a defective male, for whom nature’s intentions had not been fully 
accomplished.6 In the sixteenth century, although physicians’ observationes contributed to 
a better understanding of the human body – see for example Gabriele Falloppio’s (1523?-
1562) Observationes anatomicae (1561) – women were still considered inferior to men 
because their weaker body was deemed to have an impact on ther mind.  
The comparison between men’s and women’s body and their impact on minds would 
affect the elaboration of theories for a long time still. At the end of the eighteenth century, 
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the Swiss physiognomist Johann Kaspar Lavater (1741-1801), who was inspired by the 
Neapolitan scholar Giambattista Della Porta (1535-1615) and by the British philosopher 
Thomas Browne (1605-1682), explained that the physical characteristics of women, ‘tender, 
yielding, easily wounded, sensible, and receptible’,7 were manifest also in their mind. In 
particular, the tenderness of female organs meant that women were ‘formed to maternal 
mildness and affection’,8 a weakness which strongly contrasted with men’s mental and 
physical strength. A woman, who in the words of Thomas Browne in Religio Medici (1643) 
was ‘the Rib and crooked Piece of Man’,9 had the function to comfort man ‘like angels, and 
to lighten his cares’.10 Women were the ‘counterpart of man, taken out of man, to be subject 
to man, [the] light texture of their fibres and organs, [the] volatility of feeling, render them 
so easy to conduct and to tempt; so ready of submission to the enterprise and power of the 
man’.11 Despite the softness and tenderness of their bodies, Della Porta had already warned 
in his De humana physiognomonia (1586) that women were ‘ladr[e] e pien[e] d’inganni’.12 
Based on his study of physiognomy, he pointed out how close observation of people’s 
physical features could explain their personality traits. For example, Della Porta asserted 
that women have features similar to those of leopards, and consequently were just as 
treacherous.13 Lavater’s works on physiognomy, as well as those of Della Porta and Browne, 
were later taken into account by Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909), who, towards the end of 
the nineteenth century, elaborated his theories on the correspondence between 
physiognomic characteristics and the inclination to commit a crime.14 
                                                 
7 J.K. Lavater, Physiognomy: Or the Corresponding Analogy between the Conformation of the Features, and 
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10 Lavater, Physiognomy, pp. 181-82.   
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13 Ibid., pp. 87-90. 
14 See for example C. Lombroso, L’uomo delinquente (Milan: Hoepli, 1876); C. Lombroso and G. Ferrero, La 
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Based on these ideas, men of letters and educationalists believed that women were 
inferior to men and, therefore, needed to be treated differently. Alongside more traditionally 
misogynistic views, women were usually described as having a vivid imagination and 
bodies that strongly affected their minds. As the Genoese philosopher Paolo Mattia D’Oria 
explained in his Ragionamenti (1716), the ‘prevalere della fantasia sulla potenza 
dell’intelletto’ prevented women from being able to restrain themselves and reach real 
virtue.15 Despite having some similarities to men, and perhaps even the ability to build 
empires and states, women were ‘incapaci del grande officio di legislatore’, because this 
required a level of wisdom which they simply did not, and could not, have.16  
With the Enlightenment, new ideas and values began to take form: ‘education was 
at the hearth of the Enlightenment project’.17 As Ann Hallamore Caesar explains, it radiated 
out ‘not only in ground-breaking works that specifically addressed the subject, but also 
indirectly by infiltrating and informing the growing volume of printed matter directed at an 
emergent literate middle class with secular and worldly ambitions’.18 This led also to new 
attitudes towards women and motherhood, and to lively debates on their education and their 
potential contribution as a ‘madre educatrice’ to the well-being of families and society. Even 
though female identity was ‘il riflesso di un immaginario maschile […] nella cultura scritta, 
ma anche […] di una serie di modelli comportamentali, espressione anche di una 
determinata rappresentazione dell’ordine sociale’,19 the importance of women’s role for the 
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development and upbringing of children was particularly highlighted.20 Women’s education 
became an issue to be broadly discussed and deeply analysed in tracts and conduct books. 
The point was that women who began to study were ‘una realtà che andava assumendo 
un’inusitata e inquietante ampiezza di dimensioni’.21 They also attained some success to the 
extent that, in 1723, the famous Accademia dei Ricovrati of Padua held a disputation 
intended to address the question of whether or not women were to be admitted to the study 
of sciences and of the noble arts,22 with Giovanni Antonio Volpi insisting that women 
should not study in order to avoid the risk of endangering the good order of family and 
society.23  
Yet, if not a ‘mutamento di ruolo, non mancarono le istanze a favore di un 
mutamento nel ruolo’:24 the rise of the idea of the ‘madre educatrice’ implied that ‘women 
themselves required a better education, to ensure that they, in turn, would be able to better 
educate their own children’.25 As we shall see further on, the future success of children came 
to be seen as conditional on their mothers, since, as the Neapolitan jurist and philosopher 
Gaetano Filangieri (1753-1788) argued, ‘esse gli nudriscono e gli educano ne’ primi anni 
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della vita; esse spargono i primi semi del vizio o della virtù ne’ loro teneri cuori’.26 
Therefore, women’s role within the household was increasingly regarded as a matter of great 
importance, and, alongside the function of nourishing their children, they were also 
entrusted with the task of educating them. In particular, they were charged with educating 
children about the moral values which upheld civil society.27  
The rise of the idea of the ‘madre educatrice’ meant that emphasis was placed on 
women’s function as educators of their children, but, at the same time, the role of the father, 
who took decisions regarding education, was still upheld. Mothers therefore provided their 
children with a very first education which was normally first approved and endorsed by 
fathers.28 The premise that quality of mind was contingent on the strength of one’s body 
remained unquestioned, and, consequently, it was men, not women, who debated the degree 
to which women should and could study in order to fulfil this new role.  
In the Italian peninsula, various works published during the Enlightenment in 
France, such as Émile ou De l’éducation published in 1762, were known and influenced this 
debate.29 In this work, Jean-Jacques Rousseau explained that women were created for men, 
and, therefore, ‘toutes les réflexions des femmes en ce qui ne tient pas immédiatement à 
leurs devoirs, doivent tendre à l’étude des hommes ou aux connaissances agréables qui n’ont 
que le goût pour objet’.30 He conceded that women and men depended on each other, but 
argued that their dependence was not equal,31 as women were made ‘pour plaire et pour être 
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subjuguée’.32 Rousseau believed that women’s minds were not strong enough to bear 
prolonged reflection and high concepts, as ‘la femme a plus d’esprit, et l’homme plus de 
génie’.33 The search for abstract and speculative truths, principles and axioms of sciences 
was not suitable for them, as they did not have the ability to concentrate and their mind was 
mainly practically oriented. This is why their education also had to relate to practicalities.34 
Rousseau pointed out that women’s minds would never develop and be able to reach the 
same high level of concentration as men.35 
For this reason, it was useless to force women’s nature, since the impact of their 
bodies on their minds could not be avoided, and, as the Bolognese physician Petronio 
Ignazio Zecchini (1739-1793) maintained in his Dì geniali della dialettica delle donne 
ridotto al suo vero principio (1771),36 they were not able to overcome physical constraints 
in the same way that men were.37 Because of their ‘perpetuo irritamento dell’utero’, women 
were destined to remain ‘prigioniere del loro “materiale macchinamento” e non 
abbandonare mai la femminil debolezza per acquistare la viril costanza e risolutezza’.38 
Various writers criticised these theories:39 in his Lana caprina. Epistola di un licantropo 
(1772), for example, Giacomo Casanova (1725-1798), deriving his ideas from René 
Descartes’s ‘mind-body dualism’,40 maintained that women were able to think and reason 
like men and that their education, and not their uterus, was the cause of their apparent 
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2. ‘L’irrequieto desio di piacere agli uomini’: women, their world and their education 
 
Even if most scholars were convinced that women lacked a firm stance and were not able 
to grasp high mental concepts, some also argued that this condition should not be 
stigmatising. The French physician Pierre Roussel (1742-1802), in his major study Système 
physique et moral de la femme (1775), which was widely known at the end of eighteenth 
century and later translated into Italian in Naples in 1829,42 stated that, on account of their 
own weaknesses, women were more inclined to empathise with unfortunate people. This 
natural piety could form the foundation of social virtues. Therefore, Roussel argued that 
women’s qualities, even if they were not as brilliant as the talents of men, were more useful 
in society.43  
The precise nature of these female traits thus continued to be the subject of sustained 
attention from those who were interested in proving the scientific rationale for women’s 
subordinate status. The French physiologist Pierre Jean George Cabanis (1757-1808), for 
example, endorsed the idea of the domestic woman. In his works, which were translated 
into Italian from 1802, he argued that women’s ‘mollesse’ of the ‘pulpe cérébrale’ allowed 
their physical movements to be ‘plus prompte’.44 This ‘promptitude’ had an impact on their 
‘sensibilité générale’ and made them feel insecure and powerless, and, consequently, 
women pursued the attention of others in order to fortify their existence by means of those 
(i.e. the men) whom they considered able to protect them.45 This repeated behaviour 
exacerbated women’s already weak nature and caused them to become even weaker and 
more insecure than they originally were. Cabanis, too, proposed a model with women 
performing their roles within the household, and men governing the public sphere: this was 
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because women paid great attention to things pertaining to everyday life, that is, small 
things, while men’s minds were destined for the great challenges the public sphere 
entailed.46 Cabanis argued, however, that women’s motivation in attending to small 
domestic matters was their desire to make a positive impression on men, because their world 
developed entirely in relation to men, on whom they completely depended, even in relation 
to their own happiness.47 
Similar ideas had already been expressed by the Ligurian moralist Gaspare Morardo 
(1738-1817), who, in his L’arte di conservare e accrescere la bellezza delle donne (1800-
1801), argued that women always had the ‘irrequieto desio di piacere agli uomini di attirarsi 
la loro stima e i loro cuori’. This intense desire to be appreciated by men had always been 
‘l’energica molla di tutte le donnesche operazioni [...] l’oggetto di tutti i pensieri e di tutte 
le cure delle donne’, and even their imagination, which was ready, vibrant and vivid, led 
them ‘in ogni tempo alle virtù più ardue e alle più strepitose azioni’.48 These actions were 
carried out solely to please and gain the admiration of men since ‘questa essendo 
l’invincibile lor passione’.49 For this reason, men considered marriage to be a major 
achievement for women: through it, they were redeemed, given value and the privilege of 
being guided throughout life by their husband.50  
As Luciano Guerci argued, ‘giustificare la subordinazione e l’obbedienza della 
moglie non costituì un particolare problema: la naturale debolezza – di corpo e di spirito – 
della donna provava che la condizione della moglie non poteva che essere una condizione 
di inferiorità’.51 On this point, for example, the abbot Alessandro Maria Tassoni, in his La 
religione, dimostrata e difesa (1805), maintained that nature gave men a manifest 
superiority over women, ‘o si risguardi la robustezza, forza e coraggio, che ordinariamente 
ha più l’uomo, o si consideri anche la penetrazione, intendimento e giudizio, di cui più 
generalmente è dotato’.52 This meant that a husband and wife had equal rights in marriage, 
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but ‘il marito è superiore, ma la superiorità è di preminenza, di ordine, di governo, non un 
potere tirannico ed assoluto’.53  
A similar line of thought was also developed in a pamphlet published in Milan in 
1819 and signed by an ‘avvocato Leopold’, who defined himself ‘il mentore dei mariti’. The 
author claimed that marriage provided ‘il marito di tutta la matrimoniale autorità, della 
paterna potenza, e di tutto il reggimento della famiglia: alla moglie conferisce il nome, il 
domicilio e tutto il patrocinio del marito’.54 Since nature provided men ‘di un vigore fisico, 
di una penetrazione, di una intelligenza, di un iudizio, di una riflessione di molto alla donna 
superiori’, it followed that women were to be subject to them. He nevertheless conceded 
that women were to be considered their husbands’ other halves.55  
These works dealing with marriage and the way women had to behave towards their 
husbands began to flourish from the eighteenth century. They focused on obedience, and 
responded to the ‘preoccupazioni legate a fenomeni sociali in cui si scorgeva una crisi 
dell’obbedienza che minacciava la stabilità delle gerarchie esistenti’.56 Women, Luciano 
Guerci observed, ‘tendevano a sfuggire […] al controllo del marito [e] non obbedivano più 
con la stessa docilità e prontezza con cui avevano obbedito in passato’.57 Therefore, these 
writings were also a means to steer unobedient women back on course and help them to 
correctly understand the role nature had destined them for. 
Although women were considered subject to men and all their world was imagined 
revolving around the impression they wanted to make on them, their sweet feelings, their 
aptitude to empathise and their natural piety were attributes which would allow them to fit 
into the role of first educators of their offspring. The continued emphasis on seclusion and 
small things played an important role in the understanding of women as educators, since 
young children required the concentrated attention within the home that only women could 
give. 
However, even if most of these features were natural, women needed to work on 
themselves to become good mothers and educators. In particular, as the Venetian abbot 
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Giovanni Bellomo, in his Saggio sopra il più conveniente sistema di femminile educazione 
(1832), maintained, women ‘moralmente forman gli uomini’ and were crucial to obtain 
domestic happiness.58 This meant that if they carefully focused on their deeds, ‘ne viene di 
conseguenza che a un tempo stesso si migliori il pubblico costume’.59   
A few years later, this view was also endorsed by the educationalist and linguist 
Raffaello Lambruschini (1788-1873), who believed that motherhood and the ability to take 
care of children was a skill that women naturally had, but some training was needed. As 
‘fanciulli accorti e ardimentosi […] scuotendo un giogo sì lieve signoreggiano le loro timide 
educatrici’, women should get a ‘ragionata educazione dell’infanzia’.60 Later, the education 
of young boys was to be entrusted to male educators.61 Lambruschini also focused on the 
distinction between ‘educazione’, which was ‘educazione del cuore, educazione della 
mano’, and, therefore, embedded with moral values, and ‘istruzione’, which had an 
intellectual connotation.62 In his Guida dell’Educatore, Lambruschini criticised women who 
‘o sono poco istruite [...] o pretendono d’essere letterate’,63 and in reply to one of his readers, 
a woman who pointed out that Lambruschini wanted to almost remove ‘il titolo e le facoltà 
di madre a una donna che si occupi dello studio delle lettere’, he explained that he blamed 
only those women who claimed to be cultured and neglected their duties to dedicate 
themselves to the study of literature.64 Lambruschini, like the great majority of nineteenth-
century moralists and theorists, believed that women’s primary duties were being a mother 
and a good wife, therefore studying and gaining some culture were to be considered only a 
secondary goal. A woman within the family was in the place where God wanted her to be, 
and, from there, she could do her best for society, because she could do the best for her 
family, both as a wife and mother. Mothers should be the first educators of children and 
their behaviour was crucial as it was considered ‘educazione indiretta’.65 If men had 
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‘robustezza ed ardimento’, women easily outmatched them in virtues naturally carried in 
their hearts, such as love and patience.66 Instead, men, who had the strength to bear ‘i 
patimenti e le fatiche’, were not able to stand the boredom of looking after babies, as ‘solo 
l’inesauribile capacità di abnegare sé stessa, di cui è dotata la figlia del dolore, resiste a 
prove sì lunghe e sì difficili’.67 
Lambruschini argued that ‘l’incremento della civiltà europea, la piega che han presa 
i nostri costumi’ allowed women to go beyond the role of mere guardians of household order 
and welfare, and to acquire an indirect social power. This power was to be valued and 
directed to enable women to ‘conspire’ ‘con bell’armonia all’ordine e al lustro della città’.68 
Conversely, if ‘la dimenticheremo, l’abbandoneremo a sé medesima [...] ella sarà una forza 
perturbatrice, un principio di collisione, di scompiglio, di morte’.69 The root of this power 
was to be found in a sort of inspiration and influence that women could put in place to 
improve society and its values. 
 
 
3. Women and motherhood 
 
Alongside treatises, the journalism of the time, too, promoted the ideal virtues of the good 
woman, mother and wife.70 Women’s education and behaviour was to be taken into account 
even before the birth of their children. In a journal addressing women, Studii per le donne 
italiane, published in Milan from 1837 to 1838, great attention was paid to values such as 
morality, sacrifice and modesty. In one of its articles, for example, the Milanese writer and 
journalist Giovan Battista De Cristoforis prescribed that mothers’ thoughts and deeds were 
to be calm and sober, as ‘pensieri ed opere non concordanti col dovere [...] sono infausti 
preludi alla sanità del nascituro’.71 
Later, as children became older, the education of males and females should 
necessarily be diversified. As highlighted by the French theorist Jeanne Louise Henriette 
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Genet, known as Madame Campan, in her treatise De l’Education, translated into Italian in 
1827 as Dell’educazione, a boy should be educated by his mother only until the age of seven. 
Since women, due to their temperament, were not able to stand challenging situations, after 
that age, ‘l’austerità degli studj, la violenza dei giuochi, quella degli esercizj, tutto quello 
insomma che far si deve per l’educazione degli uomini, per dare una forte tempra al loro 
animo, troppo urterebbe la sensibilità squisita d’una madre’.72  
The different role and status that men and women had in society meant that the 
destinies of males and females changed at the time when their education needed to be 
differentiated. Girls were to be well-educated for their pre-established duties as good wives 
and mothers: good results were a source of pride for their whole family, even after their 
marriage.73 Girls’ education had to be carried out within the household and was primarily 
entrusted to mothers, who were required to attentively watch over them.74 Mothers were 
encouraged to consider every aspect of life, and not disregard the importance of 
entertainment and making friends. In the essay La buona madre, translated into Italian in 
1846, the French Jesuit Firmin Pouget related the story of three ‘wise’ mothers, who wanted 
to ‘preservare le loro figlie dal contagio del secolo e dalle cattive compagnie, senza 
condannarle alla solitudine ed all’isolamento’.75 These mothers, together with their young 
daughters, often met at one of their houses, but only ‘dopo i divini ufficii [e] dopo aver 
compiti i domestici lor doveri’.76 Pouget stressed the importance of their mothers’ presence, 
which never made them feel under close surveillance but, instead, they felt comforted. He 
regarded these girls as an example of total obedience and abnegation, to be praised and 
followed by every woman who wanted to conveniently fit in the place that nature and society 
had assigned her.77  
If educationalists and men of letters agreed that an educated woman would be a 
better mother, particularly to her daughter,78 they also shared the idea that her education was 
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to be limited, because, as Anna Ascenzi observed, ‘la donna colta era destinata a rimanere 
una figura potenzialmente eversiva, destabilizzante, e comunque scomoda’.79 The 
Piedmontese man of letters and politician Cesare Balbo (1789-1853) believed that, since 
women carried out their roles in the domestic realm, because ‘il regno delle donne è in 
casa’,80 they would benefit from an education focused on a secluded life, on loneliness, 
quiet, and activities related to managing a house.81 This kind of education would reflect their 
future lives. Men, on the other hand, would benefit from a multitude of companions and a 
certain degree of roughness, which would be the image of the world in which they would 
live.82  
Balbo, strongly influenced by Rousseau and Cabanis, argued that women’s main 
role was to comfort men. Along with activities related to their domestic realm, he conceded 
that women could be further educated, they could ‘abbellire l’ingegno, che è la parte più 
amabile di esse’, but they should never demonstrate that they were very well educated, and 
everything they said had to appear spontaneous, as a different, but always simple, expression 
of their affections.83 Women’s education should be aimed, above all, to enable them to 
provide good company for men, because a woman’s charm ‘sta nella sua dipendenza; la sua 
forza, nella sua debolezza; la sua potenza, nel suo diritto di aver protezione’.84 He suggested 
not intellectually stimulating women too much, because many activities ‘se non nocciono 
al dovere, nocciono alla grazia femminile, che sta sopra ogni cosa nella moderazione, nella 
dolcezza, nella tranquillità’.85 Balbo deplored the ‘vice’ of exaggerating women’s education 
and industriousness, and claimed that ‘quelle professore di matematica, di lingua greca, di 
legale, e peggio di chirurgia, che furono già all’Università di Bologna, mi paiono più mostri 
che miracoli’.86  
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The man of letters and educationalist Niccolò Tommaseo (1802-1874) had a similar 
vision of women’s roles in society and stressed that their life was sacred in two major 
functions, obedience and love.87 Their education did not need to go further than giving them 
the possibility to say ‘con proprietà e con chiarezza parte di quel che sentono in cuore’; and, 
if they would like to improve themselves a little more, they could learn ‘a fare interi i 
concetti proprii, non a rubacchiare gli altrui, o a ripeterli infiacchiti e rimpiccoliti’.88 
Tommaseo, similarly to many other theorists of his time, was convinced that women were 
not born to be learned,89 and pointed out that ‘real education’ started when the educators’ 
role finished: for men this was at the time of their graduation or when they began a job, 
while for women it was at the time of marriage.90 Culture acquired by women was 
understood as a corruption of their spirit to the extent that he added that in a learned woman 
it was even difficult to find true love and generosity. Conversely, a woman, who would read 
‘libri semplici di religione, di morale di storia [...] educherà il proprio ingegno a fin 
d’educare i figli proprii, o, se di proprii non n’ha, quelli de’ congiunti e de’ poveri’, and, by 
doing so, she would fulfill herself.91 To this kind of woman, studies would not be ‘balocco 
o pericolo, ma dovere e salvezza’.92 Moreover, when literature, gallantry, politics or 
disbelief extinguished in the female soul the flame that created candid words and sudden 
feelings, a woman ‘per dotta e arguta che sia’ would become something ‘di schifoso da 
mettere ribrezzo e pietà: peggio che cadavere, mostro’.93 
Learned women had ‘misunderstood’ their role in society. Acquiring a high degree 
of education was pointless for them and they were not considered able to reach the same 
level as men in terms of culture and knowledge. Along with entering an unnatural condition, 
if they diverted from the role society and nature assigned them, women would even run the 
risk of harming their health. Marriage and, especially, motherhood was their ‘natural’ 
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condition, and this status was the only one that permitted them to enjoy good health and to 
reach old age. The French doctor Alexis Delacoux (1792-1860), in his Hygiène des femmes, 
ou Préceptes de santé à leur usage dans la vie privée (1829), translated into Italian in the 
following year with the title Igiene delle donne, ossia Precetti di salute all’uso loro nella 
vita privata, argued that no institution was more edifying to women than marriage. 
Therefore, from the ‘duplice condizione di sposa e di madre deriva una sequela 
d’obbligazioni’ enough to fill every moment of women’s lives. Every job that could be done 
outside women’s domestic realm, that is, the home, was a ‘ver[a] depravazion[e] moral[e]; 
imperocché la donna non è chiamata a condurre l’aratro, ed a tenere lo scettro delle nazioni, 
più che l’uomo non sia fatto per tener l’ago ed il fuso’.94 As women were ‘dotate di mente 
fina e dilicata’, and could learn easily, they could better profit from observing and following 
examples than from hard studies.95 He maintained that evidence demonstrated that the study 
of geography, history, and languages was more harmful than beneficial, and society would 
then suffer a number of premature losses: ‘Quante giovinette, quante donne giovani 
succumbono, sia a malattie di petto, a affezioni cerebrali qui pressoché endemiche’.96 
Education for women was thus to be limited to simply enabling them to be aware of 
their duties. In the eyes of these theorists, women whose education had gone too far would 
not accomplish any long-lasting achievement.97 In Un curato di campagna mentioned 
earlier, Carlo Ravizza gave some practical examples of the various risks that women who 
devoted too much time to their education might incur. The country priest related the cases 
of Gaetana Agnesi (1718-1799), the renowned Milanese mathematician and philosopher, 
and Maria Pellegrina Amoretti (1756-1787), from Oneglia, near Genoa, the first woman to 
earn a degree in ‘ragion civile’, in Pavia in 1777:98 they both studied hard but this deeply 
affected their lives and brought them suffering or premature death. Gaetana Agnesi, ‘dopo 
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poch’anni di festeggiamento e di gloria, fu vista tutt’a un tratto comparire a Milano trista e 
dimessamente vestita’,99 while the fate of Maria Pellegrina Amoretti had been even worse. 
He described in detail the story of Amoretti as a prodigious case, who went to Pavia to take 
two very difficult exams at the faculty of law: ten professors, ‘increduli della sua scienza e 
disdegnosi d’un femminile addottoramento, le proposero le più sottili questioni, finché, 
maravigliati, unanimamente la dichiararono degnissima d’approvazione’.100 Amoretti’s 
performance was certainly deemed to be ‘unnatural’ for a woman, and all these efforts of 
mind compromised her weak health.101 Moreover, these triumphs ‘le pesavano sul cuore 
quasi un rimorso’, and after a few years she died. Ravizza’s priest explained that the task of 
women was to educate and do charitable acts, and whoever turned their talents to other tasks 
denied humankind many occasions for happiness and improvement.102 Ravizza’s country-
priest claimed that women should not look to improve their dignity with great achievements 
and education, because Christianity already redeemed and ennobled them through the 
indissolubility of marriage and monogamy.103  
As Luciano Guerci explained, ‘gli scrittori devoti [dicevano che] Dio medesimo 
aveva assegnato alla donna un ruolo subalterno’,104 and entrusted men with a sort of 
‘délégation des pouvoirs de Dieu’.105 For example, Giacomo Polatti, a priest from Vicenza, 
in his Della protezione accordata alla donna dal cristianesimo (1844), a pamphlet written 
for the marriage of one of his parishioner, the noble Ottaviano Mocenigo from Venice, 
argued that in places where ‘è impedita o distolta la salutare influenza del Cristianesimo’, 
women fatally fell under the yoke of slavery, and soon entered the dirty world of 
licentiousness.106 Marriage, particularly a Christian marriage, was a considerable benefit for 
women, and they should be content with this achievement. 
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The link between women and Christianity was particularly emphasised in the 
nineteenth century. In particular, the Catholic Church acknowledged the importance of 
‘rinvigorire il sentimento religioso femminile e di far maturare nella donna cattolica una più 
salda consapevolezza del proprio ruolo e dei propri compiti familiari’.107 To this end, ‘il tipo 
di formazione degli educandati di antico regime non era più sufficiente e adatta alla 
condizione mutata dei tempi’.108 Alongside improving the quality of education given by 
those schools run by nuns, a number of new ‘educandati’ were founded to provide education 
to girls from the middle and upper classes.109 These ‘educandati’ also began to be led by 
laywomen, and were destined to prepare girls for their future domestic duties and to be good 
wives and mothers, educated to understand their role within the family, and society more 
broadly, through ‘l’interiorizzazione dei valori proposti come esemplari’.110 
Moralists repeatedly stressed the importance of domesticity. Women’s values were 
primarily to be put in practice into the private sphere, where they had the crucial task of 
running their household. The treatise by the French abbot Frédéric-Edouard Chassay, I 
doveri delle donne nella famiglia (1852), was translated by the Florentine poet Isabella 
Rossi Gabardi Brocchi, who considered this work ‘piena di luminose verità, di profonda 
conoscenza del mondo e del cuore femmineo’.111 Chassay warned women that ‘una casa 
mal diretta allontana tutti coloro che dovrebbero compiacersene’, including their husbands 
who would certainly look for ‘costose distrazioni’ elsewhere.112 Women needed help in 
correctly assessing the importance of their duties, because they were not intelligent enough 
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to do it by themselves. Indeed, women’s nature was ‘più viva che attiva, più agitata che 
intraprendente, e credono d’aver mosso delle montagne quando hanno mutato di luogo 
qualche frammento di paglia’.113  
Many female moralists themselves complied with this commonly accepted prejudice 
of female inferiority, and also wrote essays and books to explain how to tackle their 
condition. The Bolognese Anna Pepoli Sampieri (1783-1844), for example, was 
‘intimamente persuasa che le donne non siano destinate a partecipare dei pubblici affari’, 
and, therefore, believed that their education had to focus on and be limited to the role and 
duties nature had created them for.114 Obedient angels of the hearth, they were defined by 
their domestic duties and depended on their husbands, who, in turn, were required to treat 
‘dolcemente le mogli, e loro comandino con buon modo’.115 This hierarchy within the 
family was the natural order, given that men were ‘in intelligenza e in altezza di senno 
[…] di lungo spazio superiori’ to women.116 For this reason, sons and daughters were to be 
educated in different ways, and women could provide a crucial contribution in this regard. 
Pepoli Sampieri endorsed the ideas already proposed by male theorists and educationalists 
according to which women’s nature was not adequate to educate sons for their adult roles 
in society. They could be in charge of the education of sons in their early years, but not 
beyond.117 This was because 
 
lo spirito loro è bene acconcio ad acquistare molte nozioni di cose speciali; ch’esse mirabilmente riescono 
nello stile epistolare, se sono nel raccontare avvenimenti o novelle, nel descrivere usi e costumi, di leggiadra 
vivacità spirano tutte le osservazioni loro sugli oggetti particolari, ma che piuttosto si fermano agli effetti che 
alla ricerca delle cause. Dal che nasce che nelle scienze e nelle arti di rado sono prime, essendo cosa 
manifestamente provata che, quante volte trattisi di considerazione di sottili ragionamenti di grandi 
combinazioni, dove sia necessità di stabilire principii o leggi, le donne sono sempre state trovate inferiori agli 
uomini.118 
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On the contrary, as far as daughters were concerned, mothers could and should be in charge 
of their education until they married, avoiding, first of all, anything that would ‘ispirare alla 
sua figliola amore per le cose frivole e dispendiose’.119  
The typical female virtues such as sweetness and meekness were widely transposed 
and reproposed by women,120 and shaped the idea of model women and wives, who were 
above all submissive and obedient. As explained by the Turinese writer Giulia Molino-
Colombini (1812-1879) in her Sulla educazione della donna, women’s lives had to lean on 
men’s sturdiness ‘come viti al pioppo’, because they were ‘collocate sulla terra per essere 
guidate, anziché per reggere altrui’.121 Despite arguing that women were created to depend 
on men, Molino-Colombini valued the importance of education, mainly as a means to 
‘recare rimedio alla leggerezza femminile’.122 In addition, if studying the sciences would 
help women’s minds to acquire ‘nerbo e dirittura’, ‘l’educazione del cuore e della mente’ 
was pivotal.123 Moreover, when providing girls with education, mothers had to lead by 
example.  
The role of mothers was also emphasised by Caterina Franceschi Ferrucci (1803-
1887), who, in her Degli studii delle donne (1853), stressed that a mother, who was worthy 
of that name, ‘non ommetterà cosa alcuna per conservare l’ordine stabilito dalla natura, e la 
misura prescritta dalla religione e dalla morale, nella mente e nel cuore delle sue figlie’.124 
Despite giving importance to education, complying with the role established by nature was 
the focus to keep in mind when preparing a girl for adulthood. In a letter to Raffaello 
Lambruschini dated 1871 and included in her Epistolario (published posthumously in Turin 
in 1910), Franceschi Ferrucci reasserted this idea by arguing that  
 
Stoltissima [è] l’opinione di quelli, i quali vorrebbero che le donne avessero in comune cogli uomini gli uffici, 
e gli onori: sicché in luogo di attendere ai casalinghi lavori, e ad allevare i loro figlioli perdessero in gare 
ambiziose la pace dell’animo, la verecondia, e la dignità della vita.125  
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Women had to be content with carrying out ‘casalinghi lavori’ and going beyond this natural 
order would also mean that their lives would lose dignity. Women, as Carmela Covato 
observes, ‘sono state educate a non istruirsi, ma ad apprendere rigide regole di 
comportamento finalizzate ad interiorizzare un destino quasi sempre esclusivamente 
domestico’.126 This is why Franceschi Ferrucci explained that a woman, when looking at 
her son’s cradle, ‘già vede e onora l’uomo’.127 Their different destiny and the hierarchical 
set-up of nineteenth-century society is clear from her son’s very first days: in this context, 
mothers could do their best to provide their sons with care, honour and respect, a role to be 
fulfilled within the household, in the domestic realm, in which they could also appropriately 
express their subjectivities enhanced through a good education. 
This view of the ‘domestic woman’, whose world revolved entirely around her 
husband and her family, was also shared by the Milanese educationalist Luisa Amalia 
Paladini (1810-1872). In her Manuale per le giovinette italiane (1851), she explained how 
to become a good wife and mother, and, therefore, a good and fulfilled woman. Despite 
considering women as companions to men, Paladini stressed that their main task was to 
ensure that ‘lo stanco padre di famiglia trovi in casa sua tutto ordinato, tutto piacevole 
all’occhio, tutto ridente [e] che la casa sia per esso un tempio di sicuro riposo e di affetti 
dolcissimi che lo ristorino delle sue tante cure e fatiche’.128 A woman was allowed to gain 
some culture, as this ‘anziché distoglierla dall’adempimento di un tal dovere glielo rende 
più facile ed aggradevole’ and would enable her to be considered a reliable companion by 
her husband, who could then even ask her opinion ‘ne’ casi dubbi e difficili’.129 Women 
could also acquire some rough knowledge of the law, as this would help them to better 
educate their children to comply with it.130 On the contrary, studying sciences was neither 
necessary nor useful to women. She allowed that studying some botany or natural history 
could help, but the deep study of one science was to be avoided, as it would hinder them 
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from carrying out their duties.131 In Paladini’s view too, women were, first of all, mothers 
and wives: their education had to be functional to the exterior and superior tasks of men.  
 
 
3. Jurists on women’s status 
 
Following the path of physicians and moralists, jurists, too, endorsed the idea that women 
were inferior to men. The views of jurists in pre-Unification Italy (and beyond) continued 
to reflect the same misogynistic views and prejudices that were expounded in the discourses 
of moralists and men of letters. Alongside their general infirmitas and levitas animi, women 
would be misled from correctly assessing the value of objects because of their imbecillitas. 
For this reason, they were deemed to lack the ability to understand and conclude a legal 
transaction and were to be prevented from undertaking any contract. In particular, because 
of these characteristics that were assumed to be peculiar to women, they were imagined to 
be wasting all their money on superfluous things. As we shall see in the next chapter, in 
almost the entire Italian peninsula, women could not administer their goods and this was 
considered a sort of protection for both women and society.  
In this regard, the Pisan criminalist Giovanni Carmignani, in his Teoria delle leggi 
della sicurezza sociale (1831), observed that ‘la tutela perpetua, alla quale in altre età fu 
sottoposta la donna può essere considerata come una guarentigia pubblica contro le offese, 
di cui la debolezza del sesso cedendo alle malvage altrui suggestioni può essere ragione’.132 
Women needed to be protected against scams, because their softer and weaker spinal brain, 
the cerebralis medulla,133 hindered them from developing ideas and left them some steps 
behind men in achieving full maturity.134 Women also lacked the firm mind needed to 
understand civil law and to undertake obligations.135  
Contracts by women were valid only with the approval of a male relative and a 
judge. It was a sort of ‘guarentigia pubblica’, because, according to the Neapolitan jurist 
Domenicantonio Galdi, ‘ordinariamente gli uomini sono più capaci delle donne di ben 
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governare gli affari particolari’.136  
These ideas were taken into account by the law of many states of the Italian 
peninsula, where, as we shall see in Chapter 3, several legal norms limited women’s 
administration of their assets. In areas such as the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, women 
did not need any authorisation, and particularly not the marital one, and this led several 
voices to criticise what was considered a real hazard for a family’s assets and public order. 
Scholars and jurists broadly discussed whether women’s minds were able to properly 
administer their patrimony and compared their legal status emerging from this code with 
others in force in the Italian peninsula. The key point in the debate was again the possibility 
that women might spend their whole patrimony on frivolities. The jurist Giovanni Carcano, 
for example, in his commentary to the Austrian code in force in Lombardy-Venetia, 
described its results with these words: ‘padre senza maestà, madre senza onore, donne senza 
freno’, because, by enforcing ‘una comune misura, l’individuo, la persona, tutti li eguaglia, 
e quindi tutti li sposta e li abbassa’.137 Thanks to this code, a woman  
 
commercia, compera, vende, giuoca alla borsa, s’impegna nel cambio, dona agli amanti, riceve il prezzo 
dell’adulterio, fomenta gli scialaqui e le insubordinazioni dei figli, disperde il proprio patrimonio, e ciò tutto 
senza che sappia, senza che abbia diritto di divieto il marito.138  
 
Carcano, as well as other jurists, did not consider the possibility that women could 
appropriately use their money, but rather focused on the fact that the lack of marital 
authorisation would unavoidably lead to misuse.  
Other than being convinced that women’s objective was to spend their patrimony on 
whims, jurists also insisted on the need to take into consideration their morality. In his 
posthumous work Trattati inediti di giurisprudenza (1854), the Tuscan jurist Francesco 
Forti believed that ‘la frivolezza ed il puttanesimo del sesso’ were such that, in the Italian 
peninsula, no wise legislator would ever provide a regime of common property of goods 
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between spouses.139 Forti endorsed the ‘Quintus Mucius presumption’ according to which 
all assets belonging to women had to be assumed to have been purchased with their 
husbands’s money, in order to ‘escludere il sospetto che se li sieno guadagnati facendo 
commercio del proprio corpo’.140 This presumption was deemed to guarantee women’s 
reputation and to avoid any inquiry over the origin of money. 
Only according to very few jurists could women be favoured by the alleged unstable 
nature of their minds. Women’s nature and their difficulties in understanding the law were 
to be taken into consideration when indicting them for a crime. In this regard, Carmignani, 
mentioned earlier, assumed that it was almost impossible to imagine in the heart of a woman 
the hateful force necessary to commit a crime.141 However, if this happened, women’s minds 
and their inconstant feelings were to be considered, and those who committed crimes had 
to be judged in a milder way than men. This was especially aimed at not exacerbating the 
contradiction with civil laws.142 The same thought was expressed by Antonio Stella, a 
Roman lawyer, who, in an article published in the journal Archivio Giuridico in 1869,143 
explained that two ‘anomalies’ persisted in women: a perpetual childhood and a permanent 
infirmity. He argued that women’s imbecillitas made them easily change and go from being 
enthusiastic to disheartened; these feelings combined with menstruation, pregnancy and 
childbirth were alterations that disrupted the normal state of life. Therefore, their childish 
spirits and the great vitality and instability of their feelings did not allow criminal law to 
persist in women’s memories. In particular, Stella pointed out that they obeyed the law 
without understanding its essence and this was to be considered.144  
Carmignani and Stella were rare exceptions in a context in which the great majority 
thought that women should be debarred from undertaking any act of civil life, but that there 
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was no general reason that could justify or excuse a woman committing crimes. For 
example, Pellegrino Rossi, a jurist and diplomat who served as prime minister of the Papal 
States in 1848, in his Trattato di diritto penale (1832), wrote that there were crimes, or law 
infringements, that were more excusable if committed by women, such as political crimes, 
the importance and immorality of which could be unknown to a woman. However, he 
explained that it was impossible to establish general rules in this regard, and women were 
to be treated the same as men with regard to crimes.145 Lawmakers also shared this point of 
view. For example, the Regolamento sui delitti e sulle pene (1832), the criminal code of the 
Papal States, explicitly reported that ‘non dispensa dalla pena né la condizione né il 
sesso’.146 Nineteenth-century women were not deemed to understand the law, but they were 
subjected to it as men were. 
The debate on women’s legal status that took place in the Ottocento could be 
attributed to the fast changes that took place in the Italian legal framework. As we shall see, 
some norms, especially those included in the Napoleonic code stating that men and women 
had equal inheritance rights, were a major challenge to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
society and its legal system. The many works regarding women’s legal status could be 
interpreted as a way to make public people’s concerns, and to resist changes that the legal 
system did and would undergo.   
Some theorists maintained that women were to be given greater importance in 
society, even though still under the guidance of men. Gian Domenico Romagnosi (1761-
1835), a jurist and philosopher from the Duchy of Parma, stressed that even if ‘le leggi 
vogliano favorire l’equo trattamento delle donne, esso non deve giungere al punto 
d’intieramente abbandonarle a loro stesse’.147 He reported the experience of ‘viaggiatori 
filosofi, che hanno attentamente esaminata la parte morale delle popolazioni del globo’,148 
and drew on the general opinion that the heart was the organ that prevailed in women, 
whereas in men it was the mind that prevailed. In his Istituzioni di civile filosofia ossia di 
Giurisprudenza Teorica (1825), he pointed out that, both for their own best interests and for 
the preservation of order within families, women should be given only a ‘libertà protetta e 
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specialmente sostenuta dall’autorità sociale’.149 He compared women to a ‘fanciullo ignaro 
dei pericoli o imprudente’, for whom economic freedom would be a ‘barbarie palliata’.150 
Indeed, ‘la natura ha disposto che il consiglio sia unito alla forza, e l’affetto alla 
debolezza’.151 This would explain the hierarchical structure of marriage which, as the 
Roman jurist Filippo Maria Renazzi (1747-1808) claimed, was ‘divina legem sancitum’ 
(sanctioned by divine law).152  
If theorists and jurists stressed that women were important, they also highlighted and 
insisted on a vague concept of importance in society without any further specification. This 
point could also be inferred from the words of Carcano, who argued that ‘grandi parole 
furono fatte per emancipare la donna’ and suggested doing even better: ‘eleviamola, 
coordinandola’.153 Alongside this vague argument, there was no suggestion on how to 
implement this ‘elevation’. Backing the usual view that attributed reason to men and 
liveliness of imagination and exquisiteness of feelings to women, he claimed that all these 
faculties had an important value, but reason was the one that governed things. Women 
should be ‘socially’ valued but, above all, guided through life by men; for this reason, 
women should in turn honour men ‘con fiducia ed affetto, poiché [loro] guardia e tutela’.154  
  
 
5. Acknowledging women’s participation  
 
These views on women remained unquestioned even during the Risorgimento, when 
women’s participation in the Italian cause was strong and noticed by many people. The 
Turinese man of letters and philosopher Vincenzo Gioberti, in his Delle condizioni presenti 
e future d’Italia (1848), described women’s participation in the cause as a phenomenon that 
needed to be ‘specialmente avvertito; perché esso è al parer mio uno dei sintomi più atti a 
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dimostrare che siam giunti a maturità civile, e a pieno essere di coscienza come nazione’.155 
This idea, however, did not lead to a challenge to women’s status. The description of 
women’s features provided an insight into his views:  
 
il carattere essenziale della virilità consiste nell’autonomia, per cui l’uomo [...] non dipende che da sé stesso; 
onde a sé solo si appoggia, in sé solo confida, sostiene senza essere sostenuto, protegge senza esser protetto, 
e ha una piena coscienza delle proprie forze, come quelle che sono svolte e maturate compitamente; giacché 
la coscienza non è altro che l’intelligenza adulta, esplicata, messa in atto e avente il possesso di sé medesima. 
L’indole opposta, cioé la femminilità, risiede per contro in una coscienza incoata e confusa, che non erompe 
in riflessione, e non si estrinseca che sotto la forma istintiva del sentimento; onde la donna si sente debole, 
bisognosa di appoggio e di aiuto: il suo amore è un abbandono, che ella fa di sé medesima a un essere più forte 
che la protegge.156 
 
Women’s presumed ‘coscienza incoata e confusa’ was still the main excuse for preventing 
women from engaging in activities that were imagined implying excessive intellectual 
efforts for the weak female mind, such as the study of abstract sciences or politics.157  
Participation in the public sphere was an exclusive prerogative of men, because 
women were ‘l’angelo della famiglia’, and had ‘diversità di tendenze, di vocazioni 
speciali’,158 as the patriot Giuseppe Mazzini wrote in Doveri dell’Uomo (1860). He was 
convinced that even if men were not superior to women, the two sexes had ‘funzioni distinte 
nell’Umanità’.159 Mazzini claimed that their qualities were very ‘useful’ in society: women 
could help with charity work, volunteering at hospitals and orphanages, and could collect 
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and distribute alms and also funds for the Italian cause. These ‘funzioni distinte’ did not 
seem to include political participation. In the Italian peninsula, where most men did not have 
the right to vote either, women were not even taken into consideration in this regard. 
Mazzini explained that,  
 
oggi, la metà della famiglia umana, la metà dalla quale noi cerchiamo ispirazioni e conforti, la metà che ha in 
cura la prima educazione dei nostri figli, è per singolare contraddizione, dichiarata civilmente, politicamente, 
socialmente ineguale, esclusa da quell’Unità. A voi che cercate, in nome d’una verità religiosa, la vostra 
emancipazione, spetta di protestare in ogni modo, in ogni occasione, contro quella negazione dell’Unità. 
L’emancipazione della donna dovrebbe essere continuamente accoppiata per voi coll’emancipazione 
dell’operaio, e darà al vostro lavoro la consacrazione d’una verità universale.160 
 
Alongside a clear acknowledgement of the different status of women and men, Mazzini’s 
use of the term ‘emancipation’ could be interpreted as a need for a more inclusive society, 
which would neglect neither workers nor women. As Paolo Passaniti argued, the ‘discorso 
sulla famiglia e sulla donna come titolare di diritti negati dalla storia che i proletari dovranno 
riscrivere secondo giustizia’ would be the ideological foundation of the first demands for 
women’s rights.161 Mazzini also stressed the need for a better education for women, intended 
both as acquiring moral values and studying. Weak-headedness, which was identified as a 
normal characteristic of women and used to assert their inferiority, was considered by 
Mazzini to be only apparent and the result of the poor and unequal education provided to 
them.162 In a letter to the member of the Italian Parliament Salvatore Morelli, dated August 
1867, he claimed that women’s emancipation ‘sancirebbe una grande verità religiosa, base 
a tutte le altre, la unità del genere umano; e associerebbe, nella ricerca del vero e del 
progresso umano comune, una somma di facoltà e di forze, isterilite in oggi da quella 
inferiorità che dimezza l’anima’.163 Mazzini’s views reflected the new sensitivity that began 
to spread among theorists and politicians, which resulted in more inclusive proposals and 
                                                 
160 Ibid., p. 148. 
161 P. Passaniti, Diritto di famiglia e ordine sociale: il percorso storico della società coniugale in Italia (Milan: 
Giuffrè, 2011), pp. 208-09. 
162 Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
163 S. Morelli, La donna e la scienza, o, La soluzione del problema sociale (Naples: Società Tipografico-





As mentioned earlier, physical characteristics were imagined to be reflected in 
women’s minds and therefore used to assert women’s subjugation. But with the 
Enlightenment, the French Revolution with its novelties and expectations, and the 
Risorgimento with the changes that took place in the economic structure, as well as in the 
political order, women’s nature and role in society started to be progressively questioned. 
As a result, some timid hints about women’s status were made: as we shall see in the next 
chapter, from a strictly legal standpoint, the two acts promulgated in the Kingdom of 
Sardinia and in the Duchy of Modena, in 1837 and 1851 respectively, could be considered 
a first, important achievement. These new laws allowed women to succeed in the inheritance 
of their parents, even if not to the same extent as their brothers. Nonetheless, for women, 
the path to obtaining the same legal status as men was still very long. Ancient 
commonplaces still persisted and no substantial changes in mindsets that could lead to a 




Chapter 3  
 
Women and the law in the nineteenth-century Italian peninsula 
 
Marriage and death were the two principal stages of life at which the hierarchical structure 
and external standing of families could be challenged. Both implied changes in a family’s 
structure and opportunities for renegotiating positions, altering power relations, and 
redistributing authority within the household.1 Consequently, governments and lawmakers 
paid special attention to these events, crucial as they were to ‘maintain the hierarchical 
system on which the economy, and indeed the whole society, rested’.2 As we saw in Chapter 
1, the family ‘accipitur in iure pro substantia’, and inheritance laws were key to those who 
had a substancia to transmit. Marriage and death entailed the transfer of property, which 
was to be devolved in the correct way and to the chosen person, normally a man carrying 
forward the family name. In this context, the presence of women and the amount of goods 
they were entitled to was to be carefully assessed.  
Since assets gave status and power, families were concerned about a possible 
fragmentation of their property and their goods: this would lead to a loss of prestige for the 
family. Hence the inheritance by women of a large part of the family assets was not 
contemplated, essentially because it would hinder the continued material wellbeing of their 
natal family, and enrich other families instead. For this reason, families adopted strategies 
to minimise the risk of breaking up property. ‘The chief feature of the traditional European 
family was its instability’,3 as André Burguière and François Lebrun pointed out, and thus 
families controlled the transmission of their wealth by limiting the number of their children, 
by managing celibacy and spinsterhood, and by making a wide use of fideicommissa, 
majorats, inter vivos donations and testaments. This would ensure that property was 
transferred to the right person. Wills, in particular, were used across all social classes: even 
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Century (London: Praeger Publishers, 2004), p. 8. 
2 J. Goody, ‘Dowry and the Rights of Women to Property’, in C.M. Hann, ed., Property Relations: Renewing 
the Anthropological Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 201-13 (p. 203). 
3 A. Burguière and F. Lebrun, ‘The One Hundred and One Families of Europe’, in A. Burguière et al., eds, A 
History of the Family, 2 vols (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), II, pp. 11-94 (p. 15). 
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people belonging to lower classes bequeathed their few possessions or money through these 
means,4 in addition to arrangements for their funerals, testimonies of their faith towards God 
and the Celestial Court, and various donations to the Church.5 The law contributed to 
families’ efforts to preserve their patrimony in its entirety by excluding women from 
inheritance, and the compensation for this exclusion was the dowry, a woman’s rightful 
share of her family’s patrimony.  
 
 
1. The dowry from ancient times to the nineteenth century 
 
The dowry was a very old institution. In ancient times, its provision was a moral and social 
obligation, and not providing a daughter with a dowry brought dishonour to the family and 
was a sign of extreme poverty.6 Around the time of the Byzantine Emperor Justinian, in the 
sixth century, the dowry assumed the character of a legal obligation.7 This meant that a 
father had to give a dowry even if his daughter had her own peculio, as the wealth of a 
filiusfamilia was called. During the Early Middle Ages, the custom of constituting a dowry 
lost importance due to the presence of other institutions such as the faderfio, a marriage gift 
of negligible value given to the groom by the bride’s family, particularly in use in areas 
                                                 
4 See M. Vovelle, ‘La morte nella mentalità e nella pratica religiosa’, in C. Russo, ed. Società, Chiesa e vita 
religiosa nell’Ancien régime (Naples: Guida, 1976), pp. 231-82 (in particular, pp. 231-41); M.A. Visceglia, 
‘Corpo e sepoltura nei testamenti della nobiltà napoletana’, Quaderni Storici, 50 (1982), 583-614; M. 
Piccialuti, L’immortalità dei beni: fedecommessi e primogeniture a Roma nei secoli XVII e XVIII (Rome: 
Viella, 1999), pp. 139-63. The French historian Philippe Ariès has argued that, up to the eighteenth century, 
the will was used to express faith and decision regarding the salvation of one’s body and soul. In the second 
half of the eighteenth century, he reported a sort of secularisation in wills. Ariès attributed this behaviour not 
to a dechristianisation of society, as suggested by Michel Vovelle (see M. Vovelle, Piété baroque et 
déchristianisation en Provence au XVIIIe siècle. Les attitudes devant la mort d’après les clauses des 
testaments (Paris: Plon, 1973), pp. 608-14), but to a distinction made by the testator between the transmission 
of goods and the expression of personal feelings, which reduced the will to a mere document. See P. Ariès, 
Western Attitudes toward Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present (London: Marion Boyars, 1994), pp. 
63-65. With regard to the Italian peninsula, this did not hold completely true. Yet in the mid-nineteenth 
century, a large part of wills was dedicated to decisions concerning religious services and expressions of faith. 
5 On this point see also Macry, Ottocento: famiglia, élites e patrimoni a Napoli, pp. 69-77. 
6 See Fayer, La familia romana, II, p. 673. 
7 Ibid., pp. 717-37. 
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conquered by the Lombards.8 Over time, the value of the faderfio increased considerably 
and evolved to become a sort of compensation for women’s exclusion from inheritance.9 In 
the twelfth century, when its value became very high and the rediscovery of the Corpus 
Iuris Civilis of Justinian led to a revival of the Roman dowry, the two terms were often used 
interchangeably.10 The use of the dowry became predominant, and the faderfio was 
completely abandoned. The preference given to the Roman dowry might have been 
motivated by the right to register a mortgage to guarantee the goods that were part of it, 
while the faderfio did not give this possibility.  
From the Middle Ages, the dowry, as a custom, began to replace a daughter’s rightful 
share of paternal inheritance, and was a means to ‘dissociare le donne dall’asse maschile 
del lignaggio, in concomitanza con l’affermazione della concezione agnatizia della 
famiglia’.11 Later on, when the custom of excluding women from inheritance was 
transcribed in municipal Statutes, the exclusio propter dotem gained the force of law and 
became part of the iura propria of the communes.12 In the first statutes of the eleventh 
century, there are only traces of this provision, but, after the thirteenth century, every statute 
                                                 
8 On the faderfio, see F. Criscuolo, La donna nella storia del diritto privato italiano (Palermo: Caronna & 
Macoclin, 1885), pp. 49-50; see also M. Bellomo, Ricerche sui rapporti patrimoniali tra coniugi (Milan: 
Giuffrè, 1960), pp. 61-63. Enrico Galluppi, in his La successione dei conjugi nella storia interna del diritto 
italiano (1873), claimed that the faderfio was ‘solo un corredo di vestimenti per la propria persona’, see E. 
Galluppi, La successione dei conjugi nella storia interna del diritto italiano (Rome: Civelli, 1873), p. 58. At 
the time of the Lombards, a husband acquired also a right of guardianship over his wife known as mundium. 
Alongside the guardianship, a husband acquired the right over her properties. The mundium also implied that 
a husband was obliged to protect his wife and was responsible for her. See E. Southon, Marriage, Sex and 
Death: The Family and the Fall of the Roman West (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2017), pp. 34-
37. On the mundium, see also F. Brandileone, Saggi sulla storia della celebrazione del matrimonio in Italia 
(Milan: Hoepli, 1906), pp. 4-9; E. Cortese, ‘Per la storia del mundio in Italia’, Rivista italiana per le scienze 
giuridiche, 3/9-10 (1955-56), 323-474. 
9 M. Bellomo, ‘Dote (diritto intermedio)’, Enciclopedia del diritto, 16 vols (Milan: Giuffrè, 1958-1965), IV, 
pp. 8-32 (p. 9).   
10 Ibid., p. 9.   
11 Casanova, La famiglia italiana, p. 92.   
12 Bellomo, Ricerche sui rapporti patrimoniali, pp. 163-84. 
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across the peninsula excluded women from succession.13 Women were removed from 
inheritance, but, at the same time, they became entitled to an indisputable right to a dowry 
and its amount began to be determined by law. Dowries were often equal to the Falcidian 
quarter or to the legitima portio,14 but this equality was not always a stringent requirement: 
some statutes only provided that it was to be ‘congrua’, that is, ‘appropriate’, a case in point 
being the Statute of Parma,15 or that of Vigevano (then in Piedmont, nowadays in 
Lombardy), which did not make any reference to its amount.16 While receiving a dowry, 
women were often asked to sign a document by which they renounced any further right to 
their paternal inheritance, even though this was by law their only right. These acts were 
usually drawn up before a notary and also signed by the groom or his paterfamilias.17 
Aiming at excluding any possible interpretation of the law leading to a request of further 
money or goods, Paolo Ungari observed that, in practice women were asked to renounce 
almost every protection granted by Roman law or any municipal or state law.18 Along with 
the dowry, women were also given the corredo, called also scherpa or fardello, a trousseau 
formed by goods such as clothes, furniture, textiles, jewels. These were usually mentioned 
                                                 
13 F. Ercole, ‘L’istituto dotale nella pratica e nella legislazione statutaria dell’Italia superiore’, Rivista italiana 
di scienze giuridiche, 45 (1909), 191-302 (pp. 212-13). Up to now, to my knowledge, no provision allowing 
women to inherit has been found in any statute of the Italian peninsula.  
14 The Falcidian quarter was named after the Lex Falcidia (40 BC) that stated that a maximum of three-quarters 
of the net estate could be disposed of in wills. 
15 Decisioni del Supremo tribunale di Revisione con note ed opuscoli relativi del cavaliere Francesco 
Melegari: Dal 27 aprile al 28 dicembre 1829 (Parma: Carmignani, 1832), pp. 121-23. 
16 Giurisprudenza Italiana, 2 (1849), 671-97 (p. 694). 
17 This kind of act was called ‘cautela’ (‘precaution’) and was often referred to as ‘cautela del De Luca’, named 
after the jurist Giovanni Battista De Luca (1613?-1683). See G.B. De Luca, Il dottor volgare, ovvero Il 
compendio di tutta la legge civile, canonica, feudale e municipale, nelle cose più ricevute in pratica, 
moralizzato in lingua italiana, 6 vols, ([n.p.]: [n.pub.], 1673), VI, pp. 36-39; Ungari, Storia del diritto di 
famiglia, p. 66. In Sicily and the Mezzogiorno, this ‘cautela’ was also called ‘cautela di Maranta’, named after 
the jurist Roberto Maranta (1476-1530?). See R. Maranta, Speculum aureum et lumen aduocatorum praxis 
ciuilis (London: Symphorianum Beraud, 1573), pp. 877-95. Besides, ‘per meglio fortificare le rinunzie 
medesime, lo sposo ovvero il marito, [...] promettea rendere indenni a proprie spese coloro, a cui pro si 
rinunziava, laddove la rinunzia si rescindesse dal magistrato’ (V. Lomonaco, Storia de principii della 
legislazione (Naples: Azzolino, 1844), p. 210). 
18 Ungari, Storia del diritto di famiglia, p. 54. 
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in the dowry instruments, while other goods, which were not part of a dowry, were called 
paraphernalia.19 
In return for the dowry and the faderfio, the bride was also entitled to receive a 
marriage gift. Gifts propter nuptias provided by the groom were called tertia, morgengabe 
or quarta, and meffio or meta: these gifts were usually the third or fourth part of the groom’s 
patrimony, or were equal to half the amount of the bride’s dowry.20 Tertia, quarta and meta 
were not usually delivered to the bride herself but remained in the husband’s possession. 
Hence, the wife was considered a creditor in this regard and was able to obtain her marriage 
gift only at the time of her husband’s death.21 Both spouses were therefore originally asked 
to contribute ‘ad sustinenda onera matrimonii’, to bear the burden of marriage. Families, 
nevertheless, were reluctant to give these groom’s gifts and, from the twelfth century 
onwards, the odium quartae began to emerge.22 This aversion towards all groom’s nuptial 
gifts – not only towards the quarta – resulted at first in the promulgation of laws that reduced 
their overall amount and, eventually, in their suppression altogether.23 In the commune of 
Genoa, for instance, the tertia had already been abolished in 1143.24 From this time 
onwards, the burden of marriage began to shift completely to the bride’s side.  
This was because the dowry was given to the new family not only for the wife’s 
needs but to support the common household. Based upon Roman law, the person holding 
the dowry, usually the husband or the father-in law, had the duty to support its owner, which 
                                                 
19 Julius Kirshner argued that, during the Middle Ages, non-dotal goods were classified as parapherna or 
paraphernalia, and bona non dotalia. The former were movable goods brought by the wife to the husband’s 
household for her own or the common use of herself and her husband, while the bona non dotalia were the 
assets belonging to the wife that she did not bring into her husband’s household. He added that fourteenth- 
and fifteenth-century Florentine statutes, instead, referred only to the single category of bona non dotalia. J. 
Kirshner, ‘Materials for Gilded Cage: Non-Dotal Assets in Florence, 1300-1500’, in D.I. Kertzer and R.P. 
Saller, eds, The Family in Italy from Antiquity to the Present (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 
1991), pp. 184-207. Nineteenth-century law and jurisprudence did not make any distinction and the terms 
paraphernalia and bona non dotalia seem to coincide. 
20 Bellomo, Ricerche sui rapporti patrimoniali, pp. 2-5.  
21 For much details, Ibid., pp. 35-37. 
22 F. Brandileone, ‘Studi preliminari sullo svolgimento dei rapporti patrimoniali fra coniugi in Italia’, Archivio 
giuridico, 67 (1901), 201-81 (p. 306). 
23 Bellomo, Ricerche sui rapporti patrimoniali, pp. 5-18. 
24 D. Herlihy, ‘The Medieval Marriage Market’, Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 6/1 (1976), 3-27 (p. 8). 
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meant that ‘sustentationem sufferre et alimenta praestare et medicinae eius succurrere’ 
(sustentation, food and medicines were to be given).25 The term sustentatio also included 
clothes and jewellery for everyday display. A woman, instead, was only entitled to obtain 
the antifactum or controdote, usually a third of the dowry’s value. Similar to other marriage 
gifts, the antifactum was not delivered to the bride or to her family, but remained in the 
possession of the husband until his death: from having the right to the third or the fourth of 
their husband’s patrimony, at the time of their widowhood, women were now given only a 
sum over the amount of their dowry. 
As mentioned earlier, it was at this time that the Corpus Iuris Civilis of Justinian 
was rediscovered and studied by various jurists. As Mario Ascheri argued, these ‘jurists [...] 
persuaded the public powers that Roman-canon ius commune elaborated by them amounted 
to a kind of concentrated wisdom’.26 Through their glosses,27 this corpus of laws began to 
be known and used for cases not covered by statutes and customs. Moreover, jurists 
contributed to the formation of the law through their consilia, which were learned opinion 
concerning cases already before judges.28  
With regard to Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis, the parts in which women were 
considered inferior to men were broadly highlighted and discussed; conversely, provisions 
of equality in inheritance were ignored. The Codex expressly stated that ‘all […] 
descendants through males, whether males or females, shall be equally and alike called to 
the right of statutory succession in case of intestacy’, and the Novels echoed that no 
                                                 
25 Digest, 24, 3, 22, 8, Ulpianus libro 33 Ad Edictum. 
26 M. Ascheri, The Laws of Late Medieval Italy (1000-1500): Foundations for a European Legal System 
(Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 269. 
27 On the study of the Corpus Iuris Civilis and the glossators, see H. Kantorowicz and W.W. Buckland, Studies 
in the Glossators of the Roman Law: Newly Discovered Writings of the Twelfth Century (Cambridge: CUP, 
1938); F. Calasso, Medio Evo del diritto (Milan: Giuffrè, 1954), pp. 503-606. See also E. Cortese, Le grandi 
linee della storia giuridica medievale (Rome: Il cigno Galileo Galilei, 2001) and E. Cortese, Il Rinascimento 
giuridico medievale (Rome: Bulzoni, 1992). 
28 On this point, see T. Dean, Crime and Justice in Late Medieval Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), pp. 95-109. On consilia about disputes concerning dowry, see, for example, C. Valsecchi, 
‘L’istituto della dote nella vita del diritto del tardo Cinquecento: i Consilia di Jacopo Menochio’, Rivista di 
storia del diritto italiano, 52 (1994), 205-85. 
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difference should exist between males and females called to the inheritance.29 The exclusion 
of women came from their supposed inferiority (see Chapter 2) and from the belief that the 
familia continued through the male line. However, Cesarina Casanova argued, ‘la disparità 
o l’eguaglianza come criteri di successione non erano valori in se stessi: il valore era la 
stabilità della proprietà e le modalità di trasmissione dei beni vi si adattarono a seconda delle 
possibilità offerte dal contesto produttivo e della sua elasticità’.30 This means that the 
exclusion of those members, who a society considered the weaker and less able to contribute 
to the standing of a family, e.g. women, was only the chosen way to preserve the wealth and 
the prestige of families and not a value to pursue. 
In the Middle Ages, in the absence of sons, the estate of the deceased was inherited 
by relatives belonging to the male line, such as brothers. Male relatives from the family of 
origin were of great relevance even after a woman’s marriage. As Paolo Macry observed, 
the uncle (brother of the father) was a prominent figure to whom a woman could report in 
the event of her father’s death.31 Among wealthy families, often fideicommissa or majorats 
were established,32 or men used to manage together their patrimony in a joint proprietorship, 
known as fraterna, a kind of consortium usually led by the first-born son, where members 
lived in the same house and sat at the same table in a ‘communio ad eundem panem et 
vinum’ (sharing the same bread and wine).33 This was not only a custom but could be 
included among the ‘esigenze socio-politiche’, which Andrea Romano suggested were used 
to ‘garantire la conservazione dell’unità familiare intorno al patrimonio’,34 thus sharing not 
only ‘bread and wine’, but also the common goal of preserving the patrimony in its entirety, 
that is, avoiding the fragmentation of the substancia that gave value in iure to a family.  
                                                 
29 ‘Nullam vero esse volumus differentiam in quacumque successione aut hereditate inter eos qui ad 
hereditatem vocantur masculos ac feminas’, in Novel 118, 4; see also Codex 6, 58, 14, 1 and Novel 127, 1-2. 
30 Casanova, La famiglia italiana, pp. 109-10.  
31 On this point, see Macry, Ottocento: famiglia, élites e patrimoni a Napoli, pp. 38-41. 
32 The institution of the fideicommissum was not used before the fifteenth century. See R. Trifone, Il 
fedecommesso: storia dell’istituto in Italia (Naples: Pierro, 1914); M.C. Zorzoli, ‘Della famiglia e del suo 
patrimonio: riflessioni sull’uso del fedecommesso in Lombardia tra Cinque e Seicento’, Archivio storico 
lombardo, 115 (1989), 91-148; M. Piccialuti, L’immortalità dei beni: fedecommessi e primogeniture a Roma 
nei secoli XVII e XVIII (Rome: Viella, 1999).  
33 C. Fumagalli, Il diritto di fraterna nella giurisprudenza da Accursio alla codificazione (Turin: Bocca, 1912), 
p. 44. 
34 Romano, Famiglia, successioni e patrimonio, p. 11. 
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The dowry of a woman could include real estate, but was mainly and preferably 
given in cash. By giving cash, families avoided devolving properties that could represent a 
symbol of the family’s strength to other individuals, and, at the same time, money could be 
more easily used by the husband as an investment.35  
During the Middle Ages, the ownership of properties was a crucial concern also to 
lawmakers: many statutes provided norms to avoid properties being given to people from 
other communes. These norms tried to limit marriages of women to men of other communes 
by imposing several restrictions. To discourage these marriages, the statutes of Pesaro and 
Senigallia, for example, provided that wealthy women who wanted to marry outside the 
commune had to pay a huge tax; whereas men could not have any right over dowries if they 
did not relocate into the commune of origin of their wives.36 The 1255 Statute of Parma 
prohibited the constitution of dowries with properties existing in the territory of the 
commune, especially with ‘case e castella’ (houses and castles).37 Along with preventing a 
loss of status for the family, the aim was to avoid these properties being owned by people 
from a different commune, who might be rivals or even enemies. If a family could not 
provide a daughter with a dowry other than real estate, the statutes did not permit their sale. 
In towns such as Camerino, instead, women from the contado, who married people from 
inside the commune, were allowed to bring dowries of double the amount that women from 
the commune who married husbands from the countryside could bring.38 In this case, this 
rule could have been mainly aimed to allow capital to pour in to the commune in order to 
favour trade.  
During the twelfth century, the value of dowries was still affordable to a family. An 
example often cited is Canto XV of the Paradiso, in which Dante wrote that, at the time of 
his ancestor Cacciaguida, the birth of a daughter did not cause fear to her father, because it 
                                                 
35 A dowry could also include rights to goods, release of debts, or movables. See J. Kirshner, ‘Pursuing Honor 
While Avoiding Sin: The ‘Monte Delle Doti’ of Florence’, Quaderni di studi senesi, 41 (1978), 1-82 (p. 2). 
36 A. Pertile, Storia del diritto italiano: dalla caduta dell’Impero Romano alla codificazione, 8 vols (Turin: 
Unione tipografico-editrice, 1892), III, p. 323. 
37 Ibid. 
38 For example, the Statute of Camerino (1578), cit. in Pertile, Storia del diritto italiano, p. 324. See also F. 
Criscuolo, La donna nella storia del diritto privato italiano (Palermo: Carini, Caronna and Macoclin, 1885), 
pp. 63-64; M.T. Guerra Medici, ‘Diritto statutario e condizione della donna nella città medievale dei secc. 
XII-XIV’, Rivista di storia del diritto italiano, 65 (1992), 319-36 (pp. 321-22); Ungari, Storia del diritto di 
famiglia, pp. 68-69. 
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did not imbalance the proper measure.39 In the Renaissance, as society changed, the value 
of dowries increased considerably and even became ostentatious. The value of a dowry was 
an indicator of social prestige and ‘poteva portare in più occasioni la famiglia della donna a 
compromettere il suo equilibrio economico impegnandosi a versare somme troppo elevate 
per le sue possibilità’.40 Conversely, having only sons meant that the family ‘fortune was 
safe from devastating daughters whose need for dowries might compel withdrawal from 
capital’, as argued by Frederic Lane when describing the Venetian Barbarigo family.41 
To this increase in the value of dowries, some towns responded by establishing strict 
limits by law. For example, in Venice (in 1420), women could have a 1,600-ducato dowry 
at the most;42 in Rome (in 1400), 800 fiorini, plus a trousseau worth 600 fiorini, were 
allowed; in Foligno (in 1589), 1,200 scudi was the maximum permitted dowry in the town 
itself and 200 in the countryside.43 
The amount of a dowry was also framed by local customs. In the Kingdom of Naples, 
for example, dowries could be constituted on the basis of the ‘uso di Proceri e Magnati’. 
This custom was in force only among the ‘Proceri’ and ‘Magnati’, namely the ancient 
nobility that exercised jurisdictional powers within their fiefs.44 Alongside this custom, 
                                                 
39 Dante, Paradiso, XV, 103-105: ‘Non faceva, nascendo, ancor paura/la figlia al padre, ché ’l tempo e la 
dote/non fuggien quinci e quindi la misura’, in La Divina Commedia, ed. by G. Petrocchi (Turin: Einaudi, 
1975), p. 339. 
40 Casanova, La famiglia italiana, p. 90.  
41 F.C. Lane, Andrea Barbarigo: Merchant of Venice, 1418-1449 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1944), p. 39. On 
dowries in Venice, see S. Chojnacki, ‘Dowries and Kinsmen in Early Renaissance Venice’, The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, 5/4 (Spring, 1975), 571-600 (pp. 571-72). On dowries in Florence, see L. Martines, 
The Social World of the Florentine Humanists, 1390-1460 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 
37-38 and p. 200; V. Cox, ‘The Single Self: Feminist Thought and the Marriage Market in Early-Modern 
Venice’, Renaissance Quarterly, 48/3 (1995), 513-81. See also A. Tenenti, L’Italia del Quattrocento. 
Economia e società (Rome: Laterza, 1996), pp. 123-24.  
42 S. Chojnacki, Women and Men in Renaissance Venice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 
pp. 56-57. 
43 Pertile, Storia del diritto italiano, p. 322. For a study of the amount of dowries among the Neapolitan nobles, 
see M.A. Visceglia, ‘Linee per uno studio unitario dei testamenti e dei contratti matrimoniali dell’aristocrazia 
feudale napoletana tra fine Quattrocento e Settecento’, Mélanges de l’Ecole française de Rome. Moyen-Âge, 
Temps modernes, 95 (1983), 393-470 (in particular, pp. 447-59). 
44 Visceglia, ‘Linee per uno studio unitario’, p. 459. 
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there was the ‘Patto di Capuana e Nido’,45 a pact that could be signed at the time of the 
marriage agreement also by non-nobles and by those not belonging to the ‘sedili’ of 
Capuana or Nido.46 
After this period of augmentation in the value of dowries, their amount became more 
restrained, once again equal to the legitime or even less. However, as constituting a dowry 
implied a great financial commitment, during the fifteenth century, various Monti delle Doti 
or Monti di Maritaggi were created among families or at municipal level. These Monti were 
a sort of tontines aimed at providing dowries for subscribers’ female relatives, thus allowing 
a delay in a family’s economic effort.47 Moreover, some families destined female members 
to convent life as a way to avoid spending a large part of the family’s patrimony for a dowry. 
Even though nunneries, too, required a dowry (called also ‘elemosina’), its amount was 
much lower than the one required for a marriage.48 Yet in the eighteenth century, sending 
                                                 
45 The origin of the pact of Capuana and Nido in unknown. At the beginning of the XIV century, King Charles 
II (1248-1309) ordered to collect the custom of Naples and confirmed the use of the principle paterna paternis, 
materna maternis to settle an inheritance. King Ferdinand the Catholic (1452-1516), then, formally conceded 
the possibility to enter into the ‘patto di Capuana e Nido’. See B. Winspeare, Del patto di Capuana e Nido, e 
de’ suoi effetti. Dissertazione (Naples: Trani, 1823), pp. 42-50.  
46 The Sedili, or Seggi or Piazze, were administrative institutions of the Kingdom of Naples, formed by 
families of high standing. They were named after the area to which they pertained, and had different 
prerogatives. See C. Tutini, Dell’origine e fundazione de’ seggi di Napoli, del tempo in che furono istituiti 
(Naples: Gessari, 1754); A. Di Letizia and G. Doria, Degli usi de’ proceri, e magnati e di Capuana, e Nido 
(Naples: Perger, 1786); C. Marini, Lezioni di dritto civile novissimo, 4 vols (Naples: Osservatore medico, 
1830), I, pp. 390-91; N. Del Forno, La storia civile del Regno di Napoli in compendio (Naples: De Dominicis, 
1841), p. 85; Visceglia, ‘Linee per uno studio unitario’, in particular, pp. 459-70.  
47 Tontines are investment plans by which several subscribers pay an agreed sum into the fund, and receive an 
annuity that increases as members die. See F. Luise, ‘Famiglia e società a Solofra tra il 1640 e il 1676 nei 
capitoli matrimoniali e nei testamenti’, Mélanges de l’Ecole française de Rome. Moyen-Age, Temps modernes, 
95 (1983), 299-338 (pp. 316-20); G. Delille, ‘Un esempio di assistenza privata: i monti di maritaggio del 
Regno di Napoli (secoli XVI–XVIII)’, in G. Politi, M. Rosa and F. Della Peruta, eds, Timore e carità: i poveri 
nell’Italia moderna (Cremona: Libreria del Convegno, 1982), pp. 227-81; A. Molho, Marriage Alliance in 
Late Medieval Florence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 27-179; I. Chabot and M. 
Fornasari, eds, L’economia della carità: le doti del Monte di pietà di Bologna (secoli XVI-XX) (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 1997). 
48 On this point, see Vismara, L’unità della famiglia nella storia del diritto in Italia, pp. 259-61; Ungari, Storia 
del diritto di famiglia, p. 57. Giovanni Battista De Luca explained also that ‘la regola, la quale così dispone, 
in maniera che se la figlia d’un Principe, ovvero di un signore grande, alla quale, volendosi maritare convenisse 
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women to a nunnery without a true vocation was regarded with some criticism; in this 
regard, the man of letters Ludovico Antonio Muratori commented: 
 
molte Nobili ma povere Zittelle, le quali o non v’è maniera di maritarle, o altro ripiego non v’ha per isgravarne 
la Casa, [sono confinate] in un Monistero, dove son fortunate, se con vera vocazione rinunziano al Mondo: 
infelici, se il contrario.49  
  
The expression ‘isgravarne la Casa’, used by Muratori, clearly underlines the problem with 
dowering a daughter: a dowry was a significant financial commitment, and a family, if not 
wealthy enough, had to look for solutions to keep its economic strength without challenging 
its honour. However, if the case of Arcangela Tarabotti provides us with a clear depiction 
of a forced monachization,50 it should be pointed out that convents were not always 
experienced by nuns as a prison. Gabriella Zarri, in particular, observes that nunneries were 
often ‘una estensione della famiglia patriarcale, un contenitore per l’eccedenza demografica, 
ma anche un solido centro di potere e di possibilità di autorealizzazione per le donne, [un] 
luogo privilegiato per affermare e accrescere l’onore della famiglia’.51  
                                                 
una dote di cento, e più mila scudi, elegga di farsi monaca, in tal caso a sua dote congrua, e di paraggio, sarà 
quella ch’è solita darsi al Monastero, ancorché fosse di scudi mille, e meno’. De Luca, Il dottor volgare, III, 
p. 111. 
49 L.A. Muratori, Della pubblica felicità, oggetto de’ buoni principi (Lucca: [n.pub.], 1749), p. 279. On 
nunneries, see also G. Zarri, ‘Monasteri femminili e città (secoli XV-XVIII)’, in G. Chittolini and G. Miccoli, 
Storia d’Italia. Annali 9. La Chiesa e il potere politico dal Medioevo all’età contemporanea (Turin: Einaudi, 
1986), pp. 357-429 (in particular, pp. 420-29); G. Zarri, Recinti: donne, clausura e matrimonio nella prima 
età moderna (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2000), pp. 203-49. See also K.J.P. Lowe, Nuns’ Chronicles and Convent 
Culture in Renaissance and Counter-Reformation Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). On 
forced monachization, see also G. Marchetto, ‘Il volto terribile del padre. ‘Metus reverentialis’ e matrimonio 
nell’opera di Tomás Sánchez’, in Seidel Menchi and Quaglioni, eds, I tribunali del matrimonio, pp. 269-88; 
A.J. Schutte, By Force and Fear: Taking and Breaking Monastic Vows in Early Modern Europe (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2011); A.J. Schutte, ‘Genitori, figli e moncazione forzata: norme ecclesiastiche 
versus patria potestà (secc. XVII-XVIII)’, in G. Ciappelli, S. Luzzi, M. Rospocher, eds, Famiglia e religione 
in Europa nell’età moderna: studi in onore di Silvana Seidel Menchi (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 
2011), pp. 147-59. 
50 See A. Tarabotti, L’Inferno monacale di Arcangela Tarabotti, ed. by F. Medioli (Turin: Rosenberg and 
Sellier, 1990); J.G. Sperling, Convents and the Body Politic in Late Renaissance Venice (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 31-36. 
51 G. Zarri, ‘Presentazione’, in A. Tarabotti, Lettere familiari e di complimento, ed. by M. Ray and L.L. 
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From a formal point of view, the institution of the dowry did not undergo any 
substantial changes for centuries. The new role of educator assigned to women in the 
eighteenth century did not lead by any means to a corresponding improvement in their legal 
status.  
In force since the Middle Ages, the ius commune, together with customary law and 
municipal statutes, remained basically unchanged until the Enlightenment, when some 
states of the Italian peninsula issued their Costituzioni.52 The enactment of these acts was 
part of a broader process driven by the need to create a coherent legal and jurisprudential 
framework: from the sixteenth century onwards, several collections of the communes 
opiniones doctorum (the opinions of leading jurists),53 courts’ decisions and legal acts were 
published.54 With regard to the law, the enactment of the Leggi e costituzioni di S. M. il Re 
di Sardegna in 1723 was a first attempt to systematically organise the legal framework. 
Another similar act was produced in the Duchy of Modena, namely the Costituzioni Estensi 
of 1771.55 Despite aiming to progressively repeal all the existing law sources, the use of the 
ius commune was still possible.56 These Costituzioni were mainly collections of acts already 
in force to which very few additions were made, and did not introduce any improvement to 
women’s condition.57  
                                                 
Westwater (Turin: Rosenberg and Sellier, 2005), pp. 7-17 (pp. 9-11). 
52 See also Ungari, Storia del diritto di famiglia, pp. 39-40.  
53 On the communis opinio doctorum, see A. Padoa-Schioppa, A History of Law in Europe: From the Early 
Middle Ages to the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 297-99. 
54 On this point, see A. Cavanna, Storia del diritto moderno in Europa, 2 vols (Milan: Giuffrè, 1979), I, pp. 
258-69.  
55 An overview can be find in Cavanna, Storia del diritto moderno in Europa, I, pp. 278-92.  
56 Ibid., pp. 278-82, 287-93. 
57 The sole source of law which granted equal rights to every individual was the Statute of San Leucio, 
promulgated by Ferdinand IV of the Bourbon in 1789 and limited to the silk weavers’ colony of San Leucio, 
a village 30 km from Naples. The Statute given by the king provided equal inheritance rights for males and 
females, the dowry was abolished and the making of wills was forbidden. See V. Marcadé, Spiegazione 
teorico-pratica del Codice Napoleone contenente l’analisi critica degli autori e della giurisprudenza, 5 vols 
(Naples: Marghieri, Giachetti, 1874), V, p. 94; C. Nardi, ‘Una legislazione egualitaria d’un re assolutista: il 
codice della colonia di S. Leucio’, L’Eloquenza, 49 (1959), 96-111; G. Vismara, Il diritto di famiglia in Italia 
dalle riforme ai codici: appunti (Milan: Giuffrè, 1978), p. 8; Ungari, Storia del diritto di famiglia, pp. 61-62; 





2. The French Revolution: the Jacobin Constitutions and the Napoleonic Code 
 
The eighteenth-century French conquests led to the founding of the Sister Republics.58 At 
first, in the territories of these republics, the decrees issued by the French revolutionaries 
were enforced. Each republic began to elaborate its own Costituzione. During the period 
from 1789 up to 1795, the legislation which emerged from the French revolution was driven 
by a bourgeois and secular conception of the family and the state. This resulted in canon 
law, for example, being replaced by a secular law on marriage.59 Other than abolishing 
fideicommissa and the feudal hierarchy of persons, these laws considered women and later-
born sons as individuals with equal rights to inherit from their parents. With the 
Thermidorian Reaction, and later with the enactment of the Napoleonic code, many 
principles that inspired the revolution were put aside.60 The French code, applied in the 
                                                 
Verdile, ‘Tra leggi illuminate e lettere private: il 1789 di Maria Carolina d’Asburgo’, Archivio per la Storia 
delle Donne, 5 (2008), 71-106.  
58 The Sister or Jacobins Republics were founded as a result of French conquests in various areas of Europe. 
In the Italian peninsula, too, several republics were founded. The largest ones were the Cisalpine, the 
Cispadane, the Roman and the Parthenopean Republics. See M. Roberti, Milano capitale napoleonica: la 
formazione di uno stato moderno, 1796-1814 (Milan: Fondazione Treccani, 1946); C. Ghisalberti, Le 
costituzioni giacobine (1796-1799) (Milan: Giuffrè, 1973); C. Ghisalberti, Dall’antico regime al 1848: le 
origini costituzionali dell’Italia moderna (Rome: Laterza, 1974), pp. 61-85; S.J. Woolf, Napoleon’s 
Integration of Europe (London: Routledge, 1991); C. Ghisalberti, Istituzioni e società civile nell'età del 
Risorgimento (Rome: Laterza, 2005), pp. 16-41; M. Lenci, ‘The Battle over ‘Democracy’ in Italian Political 
Thought during the Revolutionary Triennio, 1796-1799’, in J. Oddens, E. Jacobs, M. Rutjes, eds, The Political 
Culture of the Sister Republics, 1794-1806 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), pp. 97-106. 
59 Vismara, Il diritto di famiglia, p. 25. 
60 The law promulgated in the areas conquered by the French was called droit intermédiaire, which refers to 
those laws enacted between 1789 and 1804, namely from the time the Assemblée Nationale proclaimed itself 
Assemblée Nationale Constituante (9 July 1789) up to the promulgation of the Napoleonic code (21 March 
1804). It is called intermédiaire to evoke the idea of a transition period between the Ancien Régime and the 
Napoleonic Code. The French legal historian Eric de Mari argued that the term intermédiaire did not reflect 
the disruptive context in which the droit was promulgated. He instead suggested that révolutionnaire would 
be more appropriate. E. de Mari, ‘Le Droit intermédiaire. Posture juridique, imposture politique et vacuité 
d’une convention’, La Révolution française, Rupture(s) en Révolution, 5 (2011), <http://lrf.revues.org/340> 
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Italian peninsula under the name of Codice Civile di Napoleone il Grande pel Regno 
d’Italia, reintroduced some peculiarities of the Ancien Régime’s legal framework, such as 
the punishment of adultery or the parents’ consent to marriage.61  
Although scholars consider family law provisions of the Napoleonic code 
reactionary in comparison to the Constitutions of the Sister Republics of Italy and to what 
the Revolutionaries had envisioned, to the Italian peninsula, this code ‘appariva l’immagine 
stessa della rivoluzione [e] uno standard giuridico che ancora per molti decenni si presenterà 
come una meta’.62 The chance given to all children to inherit from their parents, regardless 
of their sex,63 was a disruptive novelty for the nineteenth-century legal system.64 Marriage 
became a pact between individuals and susceptible, therefore, to divorce. Even though it 
reconfirmed the primacy of man over woman and enforced marital authorisation as a legal 
requirement for any act of a wife’s civil life, the Napoleonic code was not welcomed in the 
Italian peninsula. In fact, the French emperor challenged a centuries-long equilibrium 
founded on the consolidation of a family’s fortune in its entirety through fideicommissa and 
majorats, on strong land immobilisation, and on a rigidly patriarchal and authoritarian 
family structure, implemented through the management of marriage, celibacy and 
spinsterhood.65 By proclaiming that all heirs were to be treated equally,66 the Napoleonic 
                                                 
[accessed 22 September 2017]. However, it should be noted that, on 12 June 1795, the decree 21 prairial year 
III abolished the word révolutionnaire. See J. Hardman, The French Revolution: The Fall of the Ancien Régime 
to the Thermidorian Reaction, 1785-1795 (London: Arnold, 1981), pp. 220-21. On the reactionary shift of the 
French Revolution, see also N.C. Shusterman, The French Revolution: Faith, Desire, and Politics (London: 
Routledge, 2014); I. Davidson, The French Revolution: From Enlightenment to Tyranny (London: Profile 
Books, 2016).  
61 Vismara, Il diritto di famiglia, pp. 32-39. See also Ghisalberti, Istituzione e società civile nell’età del 
Risorgimento, pp. 42-59. 
62 Ungari, Storia del diritto di famiglia, p. 104, see also pp. 93-124, and Vismara, Il diritto di famiglia, pp. 25-
51. For a discussion on the reactionary nature of the Napoleonic code see J.L. Halpérin, L’Impossible Code 
Civil (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1992), pp. 276-77. See also J. Gordley, ‘Myths of the French 
Civil Code’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 42/3 (Summer, 1994), 459-505. 
63Art. 745, in Codice Civile del Regno d’Italia, in Collezione Completa dei Moderni Codici Civili (Turin: 
Minerva Subalpina, 1845), p. 43. 
64 Vismara, Il diritto di famiglia, pp. 47-52; Ungari, Storia del diritto di famiglia, pp. 93-124. 
65 A.M. Banti, ‘I proprietari terrieri nell’Italia centro-settentrionale’, in Bevilacqua, ed., Storia dell’agricoltura 
italiana in età contemporanea, III, pp. 55-56. 
66 As pointed out by Jean-Louis Halpérin, despite being considered egalitarian, ‘il y a dans le Code civil des 
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code threatened the familia of the Ancien Régime, a body which ‘accipitur in iure pro 
substantia’ and accipitur in society for the role and the prestige it had and represented.67  
Along with the code’s disrupting and unpopular regulations, the most significant 
legacy of the Napoleonic conquests was codification. During the Ancien Régime, jurists, 
judges and other scholars helped to shape the law with their interpretatio, in addition to the 
several sources that concurred in the formation of the legal framework.68 With codification, 
on the contrary, the legislative power assumed the exclusive right to make laws,69 and, 
henceforth, the state became the only existing authority; legal privileges of particular groups 
were no longer recognised;70 and the feudal legacy of the ‘soggezione di persona a persona’ 
was abolished.71 
Mario Enrico Viora argued that laws before the enactment of the Napoleonic code 
were qualified as ‘consolidazioni’ rather than codes, namely compilations and collections 
of various decrees and acts already in force.72 A code, by contrast, is an autonomous source 
                                                 
personnes plus égales que d’autres: les maris par rapport aux femmes’, Halpérin, L’Impossible Code Civil, p. 
276. 
67 See also Vismara, Il diritto di famiglia, p. 46. 
68 By assuming that they did not cover every aspect of life, laws had to be interpreted. From ancient Roman 
jurisconsults through medieval glossators to modern jurists, laws have been interpreted, unfolded and 
explained. For further discussion, see E. Betti, Teoria generale della interpretazione, 2 vols (Milan: Giuffrè, 
1955), II, pp. 789-866. See also V. Crescenzi, ‘Problemi dell’interpretatio nel diritto comune classico’, in A.I. 
Ferreiròs, ed., El Dret Comù i Catalunya, Actes del II Simposi Internacional, Barcelona, 31 maig 1 juny del 
1991 (Barcelona: [n. pub.], 1992), pp. 167-206; M. Stolleis, ‘Judicial Interpretation in Transition from the 
Ancien Régime to Constitutionalism’, in Y. Morigiwa, M. Stolleis and J.L. Halpérin, eds, Interpretation of 
Law in the Age of Enlightenment: From the Rule of the King to the Rule of Law (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 
pp. 3-17. 
69 P. Grossi, ‘Assolutismo giuridico e diritto privato nel secolo XIX’, Rivista di storia del diritto italiano, 64 
(1991), 5-17 (pp. 6-7); P. Costa and D. Zolo, eds, The Rule of Law History, Theory and Criticism (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2007), p. 325. 
70 Banti, ‘I proprietari terrieri nell’Italia centro-settentrionale’, p. 47. 
71 Raccolta degli atti del governo di S. M. il Re di Sardegna dall’anno 1814 a tutto il 1832, 22 vols (Turin: 
Pignetti and Carena, 1842), VI, p. 389. 
72 For a further discussion of the term ‘consolidations’, see M.E. Viora, Consolidazioni e codificazioni: 
contributo alla storia della codificazione (Turin: Giappichelli, 1967); N. Irti and F. Santoro-Passarelli, 
‘Consolidazioni e codificazioni delle leggi civili’, Atti dei Convegni Lincei, 106 (1994), 245-52 (pp. 245-47). 
A different point of view is expressed by U. Petronio, ‘Una categoria storiografica da rivedere’, Quaderni 
fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, 13 (1984), 705-17. 
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of law.73 Applied to almost the entire Italian peninsula (albeit formally under different 
governments), Napoleon’s code – which is considered the first code of law of the modern 
era – was therefore the sole law and excluded the resort to any other source. It was complete 
and exhaustive, and served as a regulatory framework for the development of codes in the 
nineteenth century.  
 
 
3. Women and the law during the Restoration 
 
With Napoleon’s defeat and the Congress of Vienna, the deposed monarchs were restored 
to power in their own states. The Codice Civile pel Regno d’Italia was repealed and the 
previous legal system was reinstated with the exception of some norms that simplified 
matters related to private contracts or mortgages.74 As Paolo Ungari wrote, with regard to 
family law, the Restoration resulted in a ‘vera e propria reazione politico-morale 
inflessibile’.75 Reverting to the previous legal system meant that a subsidiary recourse to 
Roman law, customary law and municipal statutes for topics not covered in the acts issued 
by monarchs was again possible, and canon law was still complementary to the iura propria 
of the pre-unification Italian states.76  
The Restoration reconfirmed the Catholic Church’s jurisdiction on non-patrimonial 
matters related to marriage, such as its dissolution for example. Marriage was in fact 
regulated by the formalities prescribed by the Catholic Church;77 ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
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77 Marriage was to be celebrated according to the formalities enshrined by the Catholic Church. This provision 
was included in the Codice per gli Stati di Parma, Piacenza e Guastalla (art. 34), the Costituzioni Estensi (art. 
74), the Civil Code of the Kingdom of Sardinia (art. 108), and the Codice per lo Regno delle Due Sicilie (art. 
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and canonical impediments were recalled into force, and often canon law rules were 
integrated by stricter prescriptions from the state. With regard to marriage, for example, 
parental consent was not needed according to canon law. In the Duchy of Modena, however, 
it was formally required by the Costituzioni Estensi, and people marrying without this 
approval were put under sanctions. This had the following implications: 
 
per porre qualche ritegno ai disordini, agl’inconvenienti, e alle dissensioni, che producono nelle famiglie i 
matrimonii, che si contraggono da’ figli senza saputa, o consenso de’ loro padri [gli alimenti che gli ascendenti 
dovranno prestare saranno] i frutti della metà della legittima da calcolarsi di tempo in tempo su le forze del 
loro patrimonio, nella quale metà sola della legittima sarà in arbitrio degli stessi ascendenti d’istituirlo, 
privandolo di tutto il resto della loro successione.78 
 
This behaviour could be interpreted as a way to complement paternal authority: as Marco 
Cavina pointed out, while ‘i sommovimenti sociali e bellici scompaginavano l’ordine 
domestico[,] il Duca [si faceva] carico dei compiti paterni mal praticati, indossando le vesti 
di padre supplente’.79 Children born from marriages contracted without parental consent, as 
well as their mothers, were not entitled to any alimony or asset from inheritance.80 These 
rules were provided with the intent of limiting marriages between people belonging to 
different social classes. Nevertheless, as we shall see in Chapter 4, a marriage – being a 
lifelong bond sanctified by God – was considered indissoluble and valid even if contracted 
without the parents’ consent.     
Whereas jurisdiction on personal matters related to marriage was handled by the 
Church, acts undertaken by the restored monarchs and related to family law had the main 
purpose of maintaining the ‘pietrificazione della società italiana e [l’]irrigidimento 
programmatico delle sue frontiere di classe’.81 Secular laws were driven by an agnatic 
conception of the family which gave preference to the descendants in the male line.  
Soon after the Congress of Vienna, an edict issued in the Kingdom of Sardinia on 
18 November 1817 enabled the introduction of fideicommissa and majorats, which had been 
                                                 
law, see J. Gaudemet, Sociétés et marriage (Strasbourg: Cerdic, 1980); Gaudemet, Le Mariage en Occident.   
78 Art. I Tit. XIII, Codice Estense, in Collezione completa, p. 809. 
79 Cavina, Il padre spodestato, pp. 153-54. 
80 Art. II Tit. XIII, Codice Estense, in Collezione completa, p. 809.  
81 Ungari, Storia del diritto di famiglia, p. 125. 
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abolished with the Regio Editto on 29 July 1797.82 These two institutions were considered 
particularly important for the wealth of the state as well as for that of the families 
themselves. As stated in the Codice Estense, for example, their objective was ‘la 
conservazione, e il sostegno delle principali famiglie degli Stati’.83 The Pope’s Regolamento 
Legislativo e Giudiziario per gli affari civili allowed majorats, too.84 Despite rulers being 
eager to reintroduce these institutions, probably driven by the desire to meet the élite’s 
expectations, jurists and theorists had not been favourable to them well before the winds of 
revolutions started blowing. In particular, in 1742, Ludovico Antonio Muratori claimed that: 
‘chiamo io superbia quella di una creatura [...] che voglia far da padrone [...] non solamente 
allorché spira l’ultimo fiato, ma per moltissimi anni anche dopo la morte sua’.85 The critique 
against institutions such as fideicommissa could be explained by the fact that, other than 
favouring only one member of a family and neglecting others, they also hindered the 
possibility of dividing the goods and using them freely and more efficiently. 
In addition to these acts, immediately after the Restoration, the monarchs of the 
Italian peninsula started developing new legal codes. The ideals of the Enlightenment and 
the French Revolution, along with nearly twenty years of domination, had introduced 
institutional and juridical innovations that were settled into people’s minds, and could no 
longer be anachronistically deleted; they could possibly be adapted to the new order.86 As 
previously mentioned, while many legal institutions such as those of commercial law were 
maintained as they were in the Napoleonic Code, in terms of family law it was a tout court 
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return to the past. The repeal of the Napoleonic Code and the return to the previous legal 
system implied the reintroduction of the separation of property between spouses. There were 
a few exceptions to this rule, as for example in the island of Sardinia, where a marriage 
custom to celebrate weddings known as a sa sardisca existed. Conversely to what happened 
in other parts of the Italian peninsula, according to this custom, goods acquired by spouses 
were part of a property in common between them.87  
The return to the law in force during the Ancien Régime also meant that, in most 
states of the Italian peninsula, daughters were again excluded propter dotem (because of the 
dowry) from inheriting, and sometimes did not even have the right to obtain an amount 
equal to the portio legitima. In varying manners and degrees, families from all social classes 
used to constitute dowries to their daughters even during the Napoleonic period. Their 
provision was considered to be essential for their ‘collocamento’, literally their ‘placement’. 
Given that women were able to inherit from their parents, the dowry was just meant to be 
an advance on their inheritance, but, as we shall see in more detail in Chapter 5, in practice 
this norm was overridden by acts signed to renounce further rights.  
Marriage was a matter of public and private interest. Having a dowry enabled a 
woman to join society as a subject worthy of respect. Not having a dowry was considered a 
dreadful situation across all social classes, to the extent that charities drew dowries for poor 
but deserving girls.88 In nineteenth-century jurisprudence, the term ‘collocamento’ occurred 
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and M.G. Cubeddu, Diritto della famiglia (Milan: Giuffrè, 2011), pp. 1-48 (p. 10). The regime of common 
property of goods was also used in other areas of the Italian peninsula, such as Sicily. In this island, this custom 
was called more Latinorum. See Ungari, Storia del diritto di famiglia, pp. 70-71. 
88 See, for example, Art. XVIII, Costituzioni di Modena, in Collezione completa, p. 798, in which these 
institutions, aimed at giving a dowry to poor girls, are mentioned. See also Fano, Archivio della Biblioteca 
Federiciana, 1846, Documenti vari, where documents showed that many dowries were drawn to celebrate the 
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frequently. The ‘collocamento’ of a woman was fundamental to her family and a safeguard 
for society. Reaching a ‘collocamento onesto e decente’ was a mission giving prestige to 
the family, as well as being a real economic deal. As explained in a judicial proceeding from 
1855, ‘onestà’ in a juridical sense meant honour, dignity and comfort:89 a ‘collocamento 
onesto’ was the one having these characteristics. The ‘collocamento’ was important among 
all social classes, and often women who worked saved their money to constitute a dowry 
for themselves. The act of constitution of a dowry allowed women to be attractive on the 
marriage market and, at the same time, to keep safe the goods that were part of it, given that 
a dowry could not be freely spent – neither by their husbands nor by the women themselves 
– without the authorisation of a judge.90 
                                                 
election to the papacy of pope Pius IX. See also D.I. Kertzer and W. Sigle, ‘The Marriage of Female 
Foundlings in Nineteenth-Century Italy’, Continuity and Change, 13/2 (1998), 201-20. In some cases, state 
lotteries were aimed at providing dowries, see M.C. Marcucci, ‘Le “zitelle” e il gioco del lotto a Fano (1857-
1860), Nuovi Studi Fanesi, 10 (1995), 169-94. Dowries were sometimes constituted from the legacies of 
noblewomen, see L. Ferrante, M. Palazzi and G. Pomata, eds, Ragnatele di rapporti. Patronage e reti di 
relazione nella storia delle donne (Turin: Rosenberg and Sellier, 1988), in particular the chapters by L. 
Ferrante, ‘Patronesse e patroni in un’istituzione assistenziale femminile (Bologna sec. XVII)’, pp. 59-79; A. 
Groppi, ‘Una gestione collettiva di equilibri emozionali e materiali. La reclusione delle donne nella Roma 
dell’Ottocento’, pp. 130-47 (in particular, pp. 134-38); L. Guidi, ‘La “passione governata dalla virtù”: 
benefattrici nella Napoli ottocentesca’, pp. 148-65; M. D’Amelia, ‘La conquista di una dote. Regole del gioco 
e scambi femminili alla Confraternita dell’Annunziata (secc. XVII-XVIII)’, pp. 305-43; and I. Fazio, ‘La 
Signora dell’Oro. Carità femminile, potere e controllo sociale in una comunità siciliana tra Sette e Ottocento’, 
pp. 80-98. Despite its importance, a dowry was not a precondition for a woman to conclude a valid marriage. 
In this regard, the Decretum of Gratian (1075/80 –1145/47) stated that ‘nullum sine dote fiat coniugium’ (‘let 
there be no marriage without a dowry’), but, since the Middle Ages, jurists and glossators pointed out that the 
consent of the two spouses was the only condition required for a valid marriage. On marriage without dowry, 
see also Bellomo, Ricerche sui rapporti patrimoniali, p. 67; Bellomo, ‘Dote (diritto intermedio)’, Enciclopedia 
del diritto, p. 10; S. McDougall, ‘Women and Gender in Canon Law’, in J.M. Bennett and R. Mazo Karras, 
eds, The Oxford Handbook of Women and Gender in Medieval Europe (Oxford; New York: OUP, 2013), pp. 
163-80 (in particular, pp. 166-67). 
89 See Giornale del Foro ossia Raccolta di regiudicate romane e straniere, 1 (1855), p. 89. See also B.P. 
Vicat, Vocabularium juris utriusque, 3 vols ([n.p.]: Ex officina Bousquetiana, 1759), II, p. 94, in which the 
term honestum stood for ‘decorum, conveniens honorique congruum est’. 
90 On this point, see I. Fazio, ‘Valori economici e valori simbolici. Il declino della dote nell'Italia 
dell’Ottocento’, Quaderni storici, 78 (1992), 291-317. 
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The return to the previous legal system and the new acts issued after the Restoration 
returned the Italian peninsula to the fragmented legal scenario of the past. In the Papal States 
for example, with the return of Pope Pius VII to his throne, women were again excluded 
from inheritance because of the dowry. The pope issued his first motu proprio on 16 July 
1816: he explicitly affirmed that a dowry was to be equal to the legitime.91 The following 
motu proprio, that of 1824, stated that a dowry was simply to be ‘congrua’, appropriate, and 
‘la misura della congruità si determina avuto riguardo alla condizione della famiglia, alle 
forze del di lei patrimonio, all’uso vigente nella medesima, ed alla consuetudine osservata 
nel luogo dalle altre famiglie di eguale condizione’.92 Hence, the dowry went from being 
equal to the legitime to having just the legal requirement of appropriateness, something 
which was difficult to define precisely, as the term ‘appropriate’ included a broad range of 
qualities. The motu proprio, issued in 1827, and the Regolamento legislativo e giudiziario 
of 1834, reiterated this principle.93  
The measure of ‘appropriateness’ can be inferred from a 1852 case, where a woman, 
called Umbellina Livi, entered into a legal dispute against her brothers.94 In 1831 their father 
Francesco Livi died; nine years later, she asked for her dowry.95 Although the family lived 
in Rome, where the children (two sons and four daughters) of the deceased had been 
educated, they were originally from Albano, a small town near the capital city of the Papal 
States. This town was also where the family had its assets. As her brothers wanted to give 
                                                 
91 The law enacted in the nineteenth century did not describe how the legitime was calculated. As we have 
seen, Roman law was used for topics not covered by these codifications. According to Novel 18, 1 of the 
Novellae Constitutiones, enacted by the Justinian from 534 until his death in 565, the legitima portio, or the 
portion of estates that could not be bequeathed by will, was a third of the deceased’s estate if there were four 
or fewer children, and half if there were more than four children. 
92 Art. 117, Moto proprio della Santità di Nostro Signore Papa Leone XII in data dei 5 ottobre 1824 sulla 
riforma dell'amministrazione pubblica della procedura civile e delle tasse dei giudizi (Rome: Poggioli, 1824), 
pp. 22-23. 
93 Art. 20, Regolamento legislativo e giudiziario per gli affari civili, in Collezione completa, p. 876. 
94 Giornale del Foro ossia Raccolta di regiudicate romane e straniere, 2 (1853), 166-70 (p. 169). This case is 
described in more detail in S. Delmedico, ‘The Dowry in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Papal States: The Case of 
Umbellina Livi’, in E. Lung, G. Valera, C. Heath, eds, Gender and Generations: Selected Papers of the Annual 
Conference of the International Society for Cultural History (ISCH) Trieste, 2016, forthcoming. 
95 At the age of twenty-five, a woman was entitled to ask for her dowry. Art. 28, Regolamento legislativo e 
giudiziario per gli affari civili, in Collezione completa, p. 876. 
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her a 1,000-scudo dowry, as was customary in Albano, Umbellina appealed to the Sacra 
Rota, which ultimately decided that a dowry of 2,000 scudi was more appropriate.96 The 
court explained that, in order to establish the amount of a dowry, the criterion to be used 
was the town where a family lived permanently and, 
 
in tali giudizj, [...] la congruità della dote deve desumersi non da una certa misura dalla legge assegnata, per 
es. dalla legittima, ma dalle ricerche di fatto sul consueto di famiglie simili, sul decoro e sulla convenienza 
delle nozze contratte, e da altri elementi opportuni a determinare il ragionevole arbitrio dei giudici.97  
 
As the estate of their father amounted to 34,307 scudi, the legitima portio – calculated on 
the basis of Roman law – should have been roughly 3,000 scudi for each daughter. This 
means that the dowry established for Umbellina Livi was just two-thirds of the legitime. 
Another case in point is that of Serafina Bonizi Poggi, a woman from Rome who 
claimed that her dowry was not ‘congrua’.98 The daughter of a wealthy Roman merchant, 
Serafina had married an older man and had gone to live with him in Tolfa, a town in the 
countryside near Civitavecchia. She maintained that her 8,000-scudo dowry was not 
sufficient, and that as a consequence her social status had worsened. According to the court, 
‘la parità della condizione [doveva] desumersi dall’opinione del paese e non dalla materiale 
forza dei rispettivi patrimoni’.99 The Sacra Rota rejected her claim and argued that the 
daughter of a shopkeeper, although wealthy, who had married a landlord or a country 
merchant, had entered into a family of higher status than her own. She had also moved from 
Rome to the province, and this was not to be considered an unfavourable condition, as often 
even young Roman women preferred the province to a large city, because there, they were 
‘contente di vivere nella affezione dei mariti, [di] occuparsi nella educazione della prole, 
riverite e salutate da tutti, mentre in Roma, in tanta abbondanza di signorìa nostra e straniera 
sarebbero appena conosciute’.100 Hence, a scant dowry could be compensated by being 
known and greeted, intangible goods which, in the opinion of the court, would make a 
                                                 
96 On the prerogatives of the tribunal of the Sacra Rota or Ruota, see D. Bernini, Il tribunale della S. Rota 
Romana (Rome: Bernabò, 1717); K. Salonen, Papal Justice in the Late Middle Ages: The Sacra Romana Rota 
(London: Routledge, 2016). 
97 Ibid., p. 167. 
98 Giornale del Foro ossia Raccolta di regiudicate romane e straniere, 1 (1854), 136-43 (p. 136). 
99 Ibid., p. 136. 
100 Ibid., p. 139. 
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woman content and fulfilled. A man, instead, needed ‘physical’ assets of the family’s 
patrimony such as money, lands and houses to be properly rewarded. 
Another criterion to define the appropriateness of a dowry was the education that 
families gave their children and their ‘exterior display’, or how they used to dress and what 
their lifestyle was. In Serafina’s case, the bride’s father – even though wealthy – was ‘alieno 
dal lusso [e] conduceva la famiglia con una esibizione molto modesta’; consequently, the 
dowry did not need to be very opulent and she was to be content with the dowry she had 
received.101  
In the Duchy of Modena, the Costituzioni Estensi of 1771, repealed at the time of 
Napoleon and again in force after his defeat, prescribed that daughters be excluded from the 
inheritance of their parents’ estate if they had brothers.102 Similar to the Papal States, they 
were entitled to an appropriate dowry and the concept of appropriateness was described as 
‘corrispondente alla qualità della dotanda, e dello sposo, alle forze del patrimonio degli 
obbligati a dotare, e all’uso, e alla pratica della famiglia, e del luogo’.103 Women’s legal 
status slightly improved with the 1851 Code, which stated that children could inherit their 
father’s and mother’s property without gender distinction. Nonetheless, the code pointed 
out that ‘se all’eredità concorrono maschi e femmine, la porzione di ciascun maschio deve 
superare della metà quella che tocca a ciascuna femmina; cosicchè la porzione del maschio 
stia a quella della femmina come tre a due’.104 
The situation in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany was similar to that of the other pre-
unification states, where women were entitled only to receive a dowry. The Grand Duke 
Ferdinand III, in Article 6 of his Legge sulle successioni intestate, issued on 18 August 
1814, ruled that daughters and other female offspring were excluded from inheriting from 
their male relatives.105 The following article specified that women were also excluded from 
inheriting from their mother.106 Although the inheritance portion of women was to be equal 
to the legitima portio of the inheritance of both parents, Article 36 allowed dowries lower 
than the legitima portio. But, in this case, other goods given to women to reach the amount 
                                                 
101 Ibid., p. 141 
102 Art. I Tit. XXXIV, Codice Estense, in Collezione completa, p. 832. 
103 Art. I Tit. XIV, Codice Estense, in Collezione completa, p. 810. 
104 Art. 911, Codice Civile per gli Stati Estensi (Modena: Eredi Tipografi Reali, 1851), p. 194. 
105 Art. 6, Legge sulle successioni intestate, in Collezione completa, p. 897. 
106 Art. 7, Legge sulle successioni intestate, in Collezione completa, p. 897. 
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of the legitime had to be considered bona extra dotalia.107 The distinction was that the 
dowry was to be secured against the husband’s properties, and could be used only after a 
judge’s authorisation; whereas the bona extra dotalia could be freely spent. In particular 
circumstances, a dowry could be higher than the legitime, without affecting the rights of 
other heirs. In a judgement delivered by the Regia Ruota Fiorentina in May 1817, for 
example, it was noted that a 3,000-scudo dowry was not overmuch if the father’s assets were 
worth 25,000 scudi.108 In this case, the children of the deceased were three sons and two 
daughters, with one of the daughters having already been dowered 37 years earlier. The 
court ruled that the dowry was not too high if ‘l’età della dotanda è avanzata, quando il 
patrimonio è capace di sopportarla, e quando concorrono altre circostanze, che la 
dimostrano giusta’.109 Given that the bride was no longer young, granting her a higher-than-
usual dowry would have made her more attractive in the marriage market, allowing her to 
marry, which, as we saw, was the natural condition and primary goal of a woman. 
In the Duchy of Lucca, the Napoleonic code remained in force also after the defeat 
of the French emperor. Yet, some parts of the code, such as those pertaining to family law 
conflicting with local customs, were modified by decrees. The Decreto relativo alle 
successioni intestate, promulgated by the Duchess Maria Luisa of Bourbon on 22 November 
1818, repealed some articles of the Napoleonic code concerning inheritance, and Articles 
55 to 71 of chapter IX, Della dote, e degli altri compensi dovuti alle Femine, stated that 
daughters were excluded from the ab intestato inheritance of their fathers, but could succeed 
to their mothers dying intestate.110 The only right to which they were entitled was a dowry 
equal to the legitime, calculated according to parameters set out in Roman law. If daughters 
had already been provided with a dowry higher than the legitime, it should not be reduced 
unless it affected the interests of other offspring; if it was lower, daughters could ask for an 
addition. 
In the Kingdom of Sardinia, King Carlo Emanuele III promulgated the Regie 
Costituzioni in 1770 and confirmed the dowry as the only right of women over parental 
                                                 
107 Artt. 32-47, Legge sulle successioni intestate, in Collezione completa, p. 897. 
108 Decisioni del Foro Toscano inedite dall’anno 1815, all’anno 1819, ed. by L. Cantini and D. Nenci, 5 vols 
(Florence: Stamperia del Giglio, 1824), III, pp. 303-13. 
109 Decisioni del Foro Toscano, p. 311. 
110 Artt. 12-22 and Artt. 55-71, Decreto relativo alle successioni, in Collezione completa, pp. 942 and 944-45. 
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inheritance.111 After the Congress of Vienna, the Regie Costituzioni were reinforced, as had 
happened with the law of other states of the Italian peninsula. Then, in 1827, King Carlo 
Felice promulgated the Leggi civili del Regno di Sardegna. This code, however, was in force 
in the isle of Sardinia only.112 In 1837, King Carlo Alberto promulgated the Civil Code of 
the Kingdom of Sardinia, which permitted all legitimate children or their descendants to 
succeed in the inheritance of their father, mother and any other relative,113 even if the 
constitution of dowry was still contemplated.114 Article 943 declared that: 
 
trattandosi di successione al padre od altro ascendente paterno maschio la porzione di successione che 
spetterebbe alla femmina o suoi discendenti, eredi e non della medesima, sarà devoluta a titolo di subingresso 
[...]. Tale subingresso non avrà però luogo che in favore di que’ fratelli e discendenti da essi, che saranno in 
grado di conservare la famiglia, e per la circostanza del proprio stato propagarla.115 
     
                                                 
111 The ‘Leggi e Costituzioni di Sua Maestà il Re di Sardegna’ were promulgated by Vittorio Amedeo II of 
Savoy in 1723 and 1729. King Carlo Emanuele III reworked these laws and promulgated a new version of 
these Regie Costituzioni in 1770. 
112 To be enforced in the isle of Sardinia, edicts of Piedmontese monarchs needed to undergo a separate 
enactment. The eighteenth-century Regie Costituzioni, too, were enforced with the edict of 15 January 1770. 
See A. Lattes, ‘Le leggi civili e criminali di Carlo Felice pel Regno di Sardegna’, in C. Sole, ed., La Sardegna 
di Carlo Felice e il problema della terra (Cagliari: Editrice sarda Fossataro, 1967), pp. 403-509 (p. 409). On 
this point see also P. Grossi, ‘Per la storia della legislazione sabauda in Sardegna: il Censore dell’agricoltura’, 
Annali della Facoltà Giuridica dell’Università di Macerata, 26 (1963), 197-240 (pp. 201-03); F. Aimerito, 
La codificazione della procedura civile nel Regno di Sardegna (Milan: Giuffrè, 2008), pp. 151-53. For an 
overview on law in the island of Sardinia, see G. Astuti, ‘Gli ordinamenti giuridici degli Stati Sabaudi’, in D. 
gribaudi, ed., Storia del Piemonte (Turin: Casanova, 1960), pp. 487-562; A. Mattone, ‘Assolutismo e 
tradizione statutaria. Il governo sabaudo e il diritto consuetudinario del Regno di Sardegna (1720-1827)’, 
Rivista storica italiana, 116/3 (2004), 926-1007.  
113Art. 931, Codice civile per gli Stati di S. M. il Re di Sardegna in Collezione completa, p. 651. The king of 
Sardinia Carlo Alberto (1798-1849) started working on codification just a month after his accession to the 
throne (1831-1849). The Civil Code of the Kingdom of Sardinia was promulgated on 1837 and incorporated 
many aspects of the Napoleonic Code. See G.S. Pene Vidari, ‘L’attesa dei codici nello Stato Sabaudo della 
Restaurazione’, Rivista di storia del diritto italiano, 68 (1995), 107-52 (p. 127). This code was extended to 
the island of Sardinia with a decree on 20 November 1847. See Soresina, L’età della Restaurazione, p. 26. 
114 Art. 1517, Codice civile per gli Stati di S. M. il Re di Sardegna in Collezione completa, p. 665. 
115 Art. 943, Codice civile per gli Stati di S. M. il Re di Sardegna, in Collezione completa, p. 673. The terms 
‘in ragione del proprio stato’ meant that if they were priests or interdicted they were not allowed to take over 
the subingresso.  
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It is worth noting the use of the terms ‘conservare’ and ‘propagare’, that is, to ‘preserve’ 
and ‘propagate’, which are substantially the same words used in the eighteenth-century 
Costituzioni of the Kingdom of Sardinia, underlying, once again, that family was crucial to 
Italian society, as was its conservation.116 I shall return to the Kingdom of Sardinia in the 
following chapters. 
Along the entire peninsula, only three codes admitted all children to succeed to their 
parents equally, regardless of gender. These were the Codice per lo Regno delle Due Sicilie, 
promulgated by Ferdinand, King of the Two Sicilies, on 26 March 1819;117 the Codice per 
gli Stati di Parma, Piacenza e Guastalla,118 promulgated by Duchess Maria Luigia in 1820; 
and the Codice civile universale austriaco pel Regno Lombardo-Veneto, the Italian version 
of the 1811 Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (ABGB),119 introduced in Lombardy-
Venetia on 1 January 1816. These three codes still provided the constitution of dowry,120 
which, however, was just to be considered as an advance on paternal inheritance. 
With the exception of Lombardy-Venetia, the law also debarred women from 
making contracts and managing their assets, hence subjecting them to men in every aspect 
of their lives. Ideas of women’s weak-headedness, as we saw in Chapter 2, contributed to 
shape the commonly held opinion according to which they were unable to deal with money 
                                                 
116 The ‘subingresso’ was the right to take over the hereditary portion from a woman, who was compensated 
with a portion of inheritance equal to the legitime. Art. 945, Codice civile per gli Stati di S. M. il Re di 
Sardegna, in Collezione completa, p. 673. 
117 Art. 667, Codice per lo Regno delle Due Sicilie, in Collezione completa, p. 274. 
118 Art. 837, Codice civile per gli stati parmensi, in Collezione completa, p. 422. 
119 Artt. 730-734, Codice civile universale austriaco pel Regno Lombardo-Veneto, in Collezione completa, p. 
187. For an overall discussion on the ABGB, see Grossi, A History of European Law, pp. 90-93. On the 
influence of the ABGB on the elaboration of other nineteenth-century laws of the Italian peninsula, see E. 
Dezza and P. Caroni, eds, L’ABGB e la codificazione asburgica in Italia e in Europa: atti del Convegno 
internazionale, Pavia, 11-12 ottobre 2002 (Padua: CEDAM, 2006); E. Dezza, Lezioni di storia della 
codificazione civile: il Code civil (1804) e l’Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (ABGB, 1812) (Turin: 
Giappichelli, 1998). For a discussion on the ABGB regarding women’s legal status, see M.R. Di Simone, ‘La 
donna nella storia del diritto austriaco: tradizione e innovazione tra medioevo e Settecento’, in A.C. Amato 
Mangiameli, ed., Donne tra storia e politica (Turin: Giappichelli, 2012), pp. 24-43; M.R. Di Simone, ‘La 
condizione giuridica della donna nell’ABGB’, Historia et ius, 9 (2016), paper 3, 1-29. 
120 Art. 1353, in Codice per lo Regno delle Due Sicilie, in Collezione completa, p. 314; Art. 1329, in Codice 
per gli Stati di Parma, Piacenza e Guastalla, in Collezione completa, p. 449; Art. 1218, Codice civile 
universale austriaco pel Regno Lombardo-Veneto, in Collezione completa, p. 214. 
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and contracts. These preconceived ideas were deeply rooted in the entire Italian peninsula 
(even in areas where women could administer their own wealth), and explained why women 
needed to be authorised if they wanted to make any kind of contract. Depending on the state 
in which it was required, this authorisation was to be given by their husband, or by their 
father, or by a male relative, and/or by the judge. This authorisation had been in force since 
ancient times and was confirmed by medieval statutes, even though with varying 
harshness.121 With the introduction of the Napoleonic code in the conquered Italian 
territories, authorisation to make contracts became merely marital, and, therefore, affected 
married women alone. As such it generally improved women’s agency for a few years.122  
By the time of the Restoration – and the consequent return to previous laws – women 
again needed an authorisation, not just from their husbands. Art. 52 of the Pope’s 
Regolamento Legislativo e Giudiziario per gli affari civili, for example, associated women 
to ‘pupilli, minori, interdetti’, and stated that their contracts were valid only after the 
approval of a judge.123 The ratio of this provision was effectively described in a judgement 
made by the tribunal of the Sacra Rota in 1859. This case was about a woman, a subject of 
the Pope, who signed a bill of exchange while she was in France. As she did not want to 
pay the sum back, she was sued by her creditor. The Roman judges ruled against the creditor 
and maintained that if women subjects of the Papal States were allowed to go abroad and 
make contracts without the due formalities,  
 
le patrie leggi, che loro vietano di contrattare, potrebbero essere assai facilmente fraudate [e per una donna 
che] voglia spendere in vanità ed in capricci tutto il suo patrimonio basterebbe andare per poco tempo 
all’estero, ed ivi contrarre tutte quelle obbligazioni che vuole, e delle quali dovrebbero i giudici del nostro 
Stato ordinare la esecuzione.124 
 
                                                 
121 See, V. Crescenzi, ‘L’autorizzazione maritale e il problema storico della capacità della donna coniugata di 
disporre dei propri beni’, in F.L. Pacheco Caballero, ed., Mujeres y derecho. Una perspectiva histórico-
jurídica. Encuentro de historiadores del derecho. Actas (Barcellona: Associació Catalana d’História del Dret, 
2015), pp. 127-85. For a nineteenth-century overview on this authorisation, see Giurisprudenza del codice 
civile, 2 (1839), 89-110.  
122 Artt. 215-223, in Codice Civile del Regno d’Italia, in Collezione completa, p. 13. 
123 Art. 52, Regolamento Legislativo e Giudiziario per gli affari civili, in Collezione completa, p. 878. 
124 Giornale del Foro, raccolta di regiudicate romane e straniere, 1 (1859), 248-50.  
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Ideas about women’s weak-headedness could also be inferred in a similar case brought 
before the court of Genoa in 1856,125 in which a woman, Clelia Massone, renounced her 
paternal inheritance.126 The case revolved around the point that formalities required for such 
an act had not been correctly fulfilled. The tribunal ordered that Clelia should ask for the 
required authorisation, because ‘i diritti, di cui la medesima pretese riservarsi lo 
esperimento, possono essere stati da una donna facilmente scambiati con quelli che le erano 
riservati dalla legge’.127 The situation was similar in the entire peninsula, with the exception 
of Lombardy-Venetia where there were no such rules, and women could freely administer 
their own assets.128 As we shall see later, when the Pisanelli code was enacted in 1865, 
marital authorisation became required in Lombardy-Venetia as well, thus considerably 
worsening the legal status of women in this area.129  
Women’s juridical status as subordinate to men was broadly accepted in most pre-
Unification states. However, Italian society was slowly changing. The French Revolution 
and the nineteenth-century upheavals of the Risorgimento led to the participation of several 
                                                 
125 Art. 1211, Codice civile per gli Stati di S. M. il Re di Sardegna (Turin: Stamperia reale, 1837), p. 328. This 
code explicitly ruled that married women needed authorisation. However, given that in the Kingdom of 
Sardinia, children were under the potestas of their father or grandfather until a formal act of emancipation was 
made, it derives that women were not freely able to undertake any legal act, even though of age. See Artt. 210-
211, Codice civile per gli Stati di S. M. il Re di Sardegna, p. 60.  
126 Giurisprudenza degli Stati Sardi, 6 (1856), 543-45. 
127 Ibid., p. 544. 
128 For nineteenth-century legal discussions over marital authorisation after Unification, see A. Vescia, ‘Se 
l’autorizzazione maritale sia necessaria alla moglie il cui marito è inabilitato’, Archivio giuridico, 38 (1887), 
33-43; A. Scevola, L’autorizzazione maritale ed il mandato conferto dalla moglie al marito (Turin: Unione 
Tipografico-Editrice, 1888); E. Bianchi, ‘La inabilitazione e l’assenza del marito in materia di autorizzazione 
maritale, osservazioni sull’art. 135 N.° 1 del Codice civile italiano’, Archivio giuridico, 40 (1888), 552-66. 
For a study on marital authorisation and the path towards its abolition, see M Fioravanzo, ‘Sull’autorizzazione 
maritale. Ricerche attorno alla condizione giuridica della donna nell’Italia unita’, Clio: rivista trimestrale di 
studi storici, 30 (1994), 641-725. See also G. Galeotti, ‘L’autorizzazione maritale nel primo codice civile 
unitario: un istituto “estraneo” alla tradizione italiana?’, Dimensioni e problemi della ricerca storica, 2 (2005), 
155-82. 
129 Against the institution of marital authorisation, the only known protest made by women was the petition of 
female citizens to extend the rights enjoyed by women of Lombardy-Venetia to all the women of the new 
Kingdom of Italy. See M. Fugazza, ‘Il lungo cammino dei diritti’, in E. Bruni, P. Foglia and M. Messina, eds, 
La donna in Italia: 1848-1914: unite per unire (Cinisello Balsamo: Silvana, 2011), pp. 67-78 (p. 67). 
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strata of society and raised the demand for more democratic and inclusive institutions. 
Moreover, women, too, got involved and their participation did not go unnoticed. The need 
for new legal norms might have somehow emerged and been strongly perceived, if, during 
the short life of the 1849 Roman Republic, the Commissione Provvisoria di Governo dello 
Stato Romano prohibited the constitution of the dowry, repealed the exclusion of women 
from ab intestato inheritance, and enabled women who were of age to make contracts 
without any formality. However, the Commissione Provvisoria also confirmed that married 
women could not enter into obligations without the permission of their husbands.130 These 
few improvements did not last long. When the Pope returned to power, he repealed these 
norms and the Papal States returned to their previous legal system, which remained 
unchanged until the Unification of Italy.  
 
 
4. Women and civil rights before Unification 
 
The codes and statutes of pre-unification Italy rarely took women into account outside the 
sphere of family law. Often women were not even mentioned as entitled to vote or not.131 
Among the various statutes issued in the 1840s, the Tuscany election law of 3 March 1848 
was the only one explicitly to exclude women.132 Conversely, Article 24 of the Albertine 
Statute stated that ‘tutti i regnicoli [...] godono ugualmente i diritti civili e politici e sono 
ammissibili alle cariche civili e militari, salvo le eccezioni determinate dalla legge’.133 The 
Statuto fondamentale pel governo temporale degli Stati della Chiesa, conceded by Pope 
Pius IX, gave subjects a weak representation indicating the amount of wealth or the 
profession required to vote, but it did not state the sex of potential voters. Similarly, the 
                                                 
130 Artt. 11, 12, 16, 58, Raccolta delle leggi, decreti, ordinanze e regolamenti del governo dello stato romano 
(Bologna: Tiocchi, 1849), pp. 67 and 70. 
131 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, providing women with civil rights was not the object of many 
debates. The common opinion was that a woman who voted, ‘non solo mostrerebbe una completa imperizia, 
ma il suo stesso decoro sarebbe in continuo contrasto con le passioni che l’agiterebbero maggiormente’ (Stella, 
‘Alcune considerazioni sulla minore responsabilità penale della donna’, p. 81). 
132 Art. 8, Raccolta delle leggi del 3 marzo e 26 aprile 1848 e successive 15 e 16 luglio 1859 per la formazione 
delle liste elettorali (Florence: Stamp. Governativa, 1859), p. 19. 
133 Art. 24, Statuto del Regno di Sardegna, 4 marzo 1848 (Padua: Salmin, 1866), p. 10. 
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Costituzione della Repubblica Romana, approved on 3 July 1849, introduced universal 
suffrage, specifying the requirement to be voters and eligible citizens.134 In particular, 
Article 17 stated that ‘ogni cittadino che gode i diritti civili e politici a 21 anni è elettore, a 
25 è eleggibile’.135 Although these three statutes made generic references to subjects and 
citizens, there was no claim or doubt that they meant to address only men:136 women, as we 
saw in Chapter 1, were not included in the notion of citizenship, and their exclusion was 
unquestionable. 
At the municipal level, Article 12 of the Decreto sull’ordinamento de’ municipj, 
issued during the Roman Republic on 31 January 1849, specified that charities were allowed 
to vote. As these bodies had an interest in the civic life of a town, they were deemed to be 
worthy of expressing their ideas. The same article, however, explicitly excluded charities 
led by women.137 Furthermore, Article 14 of the Regolamento comunale – issued in the 
Grand Duchy of Tuscany on 20 November 1849 – ordered that women, like minors and 
interdicted people, exercised their right to vote through those who represented them, either 
upon law or by mandate.138 It is difficult to understand if they effectively exercised this 
right, but this article might indicate that the male adult, namely the paterfamilias, who 
represented women, minors and interdicted people, was to abstractly exercise the vote of 
his entire family.  
In Lombardy-Venetia, women who had sufficient wealth were able to designate their 
representatives in municipalities, and could also be elected through a representative.139 The 
Patente sovrana 12 aprile 1816 N. 45 at its Article 68 ruled that: 
                                                 
134 Artt. 16-20, in C. Rusconi, La Repubblica romana del 1849, 2 vols (Turin: Cassone, 1850), II, p. 126. 
135 Costituzione della Repubblica Romana, Tit. III Art. 17, in Raccolta delle leggi, decreti, ordinanze e 
regolamenti del governo dello Stato Romano, 3 vols (Bologna: Tiocchi, 1849), I, p. 47. 
136 On this point, see also R. Romanelli, ‘Electoral Systems and Social Structures. A Comparative Perspective’, 
in R. Romanelli, ed., How Did They Become Voters? The History of Franchise in Modern European 
Representation (The Hague and London: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp. 1-36 (pp. 21-22). 
137 Art. 12, Decreto sull’ordinamento de’ municipj, 31 gennaio 1849, Tit. III, Della formazione della 
rappresentanza comunale, in Raccolta delle leggi, decreti, ordinanze e regolamenti del governo dello Stato 
Romano, I, p. 48. 
138 E. Repetti, Compendio storico della città Firenze, sua comunità, diocesi e compartimento fino all’anno 
1849 (Florence: Tofani, 1849), p. 402. 
139 N. Danelon Vasoli, Il plebiscito in Toscana nel 1860 (Florence: Olschki, 1968), pp. 109-10; M. Meriggi, 




le donne, i pupilli, i minori, gl’interdetti, come ancora i luoghi pii, collegi università ed in generale qualunque 
stabilimento pubblico intestato nelle tavole del censo [...] può essere eletto deputato, ed il procuratore od 
amministratore che lo rappresenta non debbe avere alcuna delle eccezioni personali indicate nello stesso 
capitolo primo.140 
 
It should be noted, however, that this provision was enforced in small municipalities only. 
With regard to larger towns, Article 37 of the same Patente clearly pointed out that ‘non 
sono proponibili ai consigli comunali [...] i pupilli, i minori, le donne, gl’interdetti’.141 
Women could exercise these rights when pupils, minors and interdicted were also allowed 
to do so, thus confirming that this was not an acknowledgement of women’s equality but a 
prominence given to wealth, the substancia which after five centuries still informed the 
legal system.  
In the Italian peninsula, some demands for civil rights were first made at the time of 
the plebiscite for annexation to Piedmont. Women expressed their involvement in the Italian 
cause, as well as their desire to effectively participate, through messages addressed to the 
king of Sardinia; by setting up separate ballot boxes in private homes; or by casting their 
vote at meetings of men, and even in the same polls.142 
 
                                                 
alle donne in Italia: alle radici del difficile rapporto tra donne e politica (Rome: Biblink, 2006), p. 25.  
140 Atti del governo di Lombardia. Parte prima dal 1° gennajo al 30 giugno 1816 (Milan: Imperiale Regia 
Stamperia, 1816), p. 252.  
141 Ibid., pp. 244-45.  
142 A. Alessandrini, I fatti politici delle Marche dal 1 gennaio 1859 all’epoca del plebiscito (Macerata: Libreria 
editrice Marchigiana, 1910), p. 398. See also Fruci, ‘Cittadine senza cittadinanza’; G.L. Fruci, ‘Il sacramento 
dell’unità nazionale: linguaggi, iconografia e pratiche dei plebisciti risorgimentali (1848-70)’, in Banti and 
Ginsborg, eds, Storia d’Italia, pp. 567-605. Two cases of women being allowed to vote for their merits are 
known. They were the eighteen-year-old poetess of Recanati, Maria Alinda Bonacci, who was allowed to vote 
for artistic merits, and Marianna De Crescenzo, called La Sangiovannara, a tavern-keeper of Monte Calvario 
a Napoli, who actively participated in the upheavals of 1848. See G.L. Fruci, ‘Alle origini del momento 
plebiscitario risorgimentale (1797-1870)’, in Verso l’unità: conferenze e laboratori didattici organizzati con 
la collaborazione della Domus Mazziniana: Pisa, ottobre - novembre 2010 (Ospedaletto: Pacini, 2011), pp. 
43-56 (pp. 46-47). Marc Monnier in his work on Garibaldi (1861) reported that La Sangiovannara ‘a tout un 
quartier sous ses ordres’, and, having fought as a soldier ‘[elle] a obtenu de voter comme un citoyen’. M. 
Monnier, Garibaldi: histoire de la conquête des Deux-Siciles (Paris: Lévy frères, 1861), p. 371. See also M. 
Varriale, Dizionario biografico degli italiani, 90 (Treccani), s.v. Marianna De Crescenzo, forthcoming. 
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5. The Unification of Italy  
 
The Unification of Italy under the rule of King Vittorio Emanuele II implied that the law in 
force in the Kingdom of Sardinia was extended to the entire peninsula. On 25 April 1859, 
shortly before the Unification, the Piedmontese parliament gave the government full 
legislative and executive powers, which paved the way for a new phase of legal codification 
ending with the approval and publication of three new codes on 20 November 1859: the 
criminal code, the criminal procedure code and the civil procedure code.143 On the same 
day, Law n. 3788 was approved, and stated that the government would submit to the 
parliament a bill to unify the law in new and old provinces of the kingdom.144 Immediately 
after Unification, a committee chaired by Vincenzo Miglietti began to work on a new code 
in consultation with jurists and judges. The project started with the revision of the Kingdom 
of Sardinia Civil Code, and was presented by Minister of Justice Giovan Battista Cassinis 
to Parliament in June 1860.145 A second draft was presented by Miglietti, who became the 
new Minister of Justice. In the meantime, Law n. 2248 on municipal and provincial 
government was approved on 20 March 1865: Article 26 stated that women were explicitly 
excluded from the electorate.146 Finally, the new Minister of Justice, Giuseppe Vacca, 
submitted another draft of the civil code to the parliament which, after various amendments 
by legislative committees, became law on 25 June 1865, with Decree n. 2358. The Civil 
Code for the Kingdom of Italy entered into force on 1 January 1866.147 
The path towards the drafting and promulgation of the Civil Code for the Kingdom 
of Italy, far from being a smooth process, was preceded ‘da un processo di unificazione 
giuridica in cui il discorso sulla condizione giuridica della donna non è affrontato’,148 and 
did not introduce significant innovations. The Pisanelli Code, named after Giuseppe 
                                                 
143 These three codes were promulgated with the Regi Decreti 3783, 3784, and 3786. 
144 A. Aquarone, L’unificazione legislativa e i codici del 1865 (Milan: Giuffrè, 1960), p. 3; F. Santoro-
Passarelli, Libertà e autorità nel diritto civile: altri saggi (Padua: CEDAM, 1977), pp. 13-26.  
145 See S. Solimano, Il letto di Procuste: diritto e politica nella formazione del Codice civile unitario. I progetti 
Cassinis (1860-1861) (Milan: Giuffrè, 2003); Passaniti, Diritto di famiglia, pp. 210-22. 
146 A. De Sterlich, Annotazioni alla legge sull’amministrazione comunale e provinciale del 20 marzo 1865 
(Naples: Trani, 1865), p. 170. 
147 On the path towards the promulgation of the Pisanelli code, see Passaniti, Diritto di famiglia, pp. 229-67. 
148 Ibid., p. 205. 
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Pisanelli, the Minister of Justice, who had a major role in its drafting (even though he was 
no longer serving in that office at the time of its promulgation), was largely based on the 
contents and structure of the Napoleonic Code: while it abolished the right of males to 
succeed before females in ab intestato inheritances,149 and introduced an age limit to 
parental potestas over their children, the 1865 code maintained the usual hierarchical order 
by which women were subjected to men. Moreover, marital authorisation was reinforced, 
and also extended to the former Lombardy-Venetia, where a similar institution had existed 
only before the Restoration.150  
According to the Pisanelli Code, both sons and daughters became of age at 21.151 If 
they wanted to marry, they were obliged to ask for parental consent until the age of 25 in 
the case of men, 21 in the case of women.152 One can argue that this distinction was made 
because rulers still had in mind the concept of women entering other families, ‘aliene 
famiglie’,153 and men being invested with the fundamental mission to preserve their 
famiglia: hence, for men, the choice of a marriage had to be more carefully evaluated than 
for women. The jurist Domenicantonio Galdi, in his commentary to the Codice civile del 
Regno d’Italia, explained that this was due to ‘il maggior favore col quale devonsi facilitare 
i matrimoni delle femmine […] sul riflesso che per la femmina lo stato matrimoniale è non 
solo naturale, ma in certa guisa una necessità sociale’.154 Like the Napoleonic Code, the 
Pisanelli code ruled that if parents did not share the same view about the marriage of their 
children, the father’s prevailed.155 Against denied permission, children could appeal to a 
court.156 The report of the Minister of Justice that accompanied the publication of the Civil 
Code explained that it was important to give a daughter the chance to state her case before 
a court if a denied paternal consent could ‘per avventura rapire alla figlia una propizia 
                                                 
149 Art. 736, Codice civile del Regno d’Italia: corredato della relazione del Ministro Guardasigilli fatta a S. 
M. in udienza del 25 giugno 1865 (Turin: Botta, 1865), p. 228. 
150 Artt. 134-137, Codice civile del Regno d’Italia (1865), p. 28.  
151 Art. 323, Codice civile del Regno d’Italia (1865), p. 63. 
152 Art. 63, Codice civile del Regno d’Italia (1865), p. 14. 
153 G.M. Negri, Dei difetti del Codice Civile Italico, che porta il titolo di Codice Napoleone e dei pregj del 
Codice Civile Austriaco (Vicenza: Parise, 1815), p. 77. 
154 Codice civile del Regno d’Italia, ed. by D. Galdi (Naples: Marghieri and Perrotti, 1865), pp. 148-49. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Art. 67, Codice civile del Regno d’Italia (1865), p. 14. 
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occasione’,157 highlighting, once again, the presumed importance of marriage to a woman. 
Interestingly, the report added that this opportunity was given to both sons and daughters, 
because:  
 
Riconosciuto il diritto del richiamo all’autorità giudiziaria nella figlia[,] fu equo provvedimento il parificare 
nello esercizio di questo diritto la condizione del figlio maschio, [altrimenti] non si saprebbe intendere il 
perché della differenza tra i due sessi.158  
 
As we can infer from these words, the different juridical status of men and women was not 
perceived as discrimination. Consent to marriage was considered crucial by people: in a 
1872 dissertation on parental potestas drawn up by a law student, this point is made clear: 
 
Benissimo fece il nostro legislatore a riprodurre la legge Giustinianea discostandosi così dal Diritto Canonico 
onde evitare il più possibile i matrimoni inconsiderati e perché non si addivenga ad un atto così solenne, spinto 
solo dal valore di violenta passione.159 
 
In the Napoleonic Code, before contracting marriage, children of age were also required to 
demand the advice of their parents through a respectful and formal act known as ‘atti 
rispettosi’.160 These ‘atti rispettosi’ were no longer required by the Pisanelli Code. Both in 
the Napoleonic and the Pisanelli codes, the institution of dowry was contemplated, but not 
mandatory. Given that according to these codes daughters were able to inherit in the same 
way as sons, the dowry did not replace women’s rightful share any longer. This implied that 
even though a dowry was still important, not having one slowly became socially 
acceptable.161 Moreover, as Valerio Pocar and Paola Ronfani attest, in the new civil code, 
‘la famiglia come tale non era considerata un soggetto di diritto’,162 thus giving more value 
                                                 
157 The report was written by Giuseppe Pisanelli, who, as we saw, was not justice minister anymore at the time 
of the enactment of the code. Codice civile del Regno d’Italia (1865), p. XVIII. On the debate on women’s 
legal status, see M.R. De Simone, ‘Le discussioni sui diritti delle donne per il Codice civile unitario’, in S. 
Borsacchi and G.S. Pene Vidari, eds, Avvocati protagonisti e rinnovatori del primo diritto unitario (Bologna: 
Il Mulino, 2014), pp. 95-121. 
158 Codice civile del Regno d’Italia (1865), p. XVIII. 
159 A. Galeotti, La patria potestà: tesi di laurea del dott. Amilcare Galeotti (Siena: Lazzeri, 1872), p. 56. 
160 Art. 151, in Codice Civile del Regno d’Italia, p. 10. 
161 See Fazio, ‘Valori economici e valori simbolici. Il declino della dote nell’Italia dell’Ottocento’. 
162 V. Pocar and P. Ronfani, La famiglia e il diritto (Rome: Laterza, 1998), p. 14. 
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to the individual. Nevertheless, the idea that the family had influence as a body was still 
considered in the 1889 criminal code, Il codice penale per il Regno d’Italia, when dealing 
with crimes against ‘il buon costume e dell’ordine delle famiglie’, such as adultery and 
infanticide.163  
The Pisanelli Code, while refining the uncertainties and contradictions of the 
existing bulk of laws, did not take into account the social ferments that had been in place in 
Italy since the early decades of the Ottocento. Immediately after the Restoration, 
governments had to deal with a number of forces that coexisted in the Italian peninsula, but 
at the end of the century these contrasts had even sharpened. New ambitions and old 
prerogatives were emerging, and new social classes were rising and seeking their place in 
society. After the Italian Unification, the state was forced to set up a relationship with new 
ideas and expectations, and, then, to face the agricultural crisis and the transition towards 
industrialisation, with the various social, cultural and psychological issues that these 
changes brought along.164 Despite women’s increased participation in Italian society, 
especially in the labour market, women’s contribution had no influence on the drafting of 
the new code, and relations within the family were still strongly balanced towards husbands’ 
authority, and, as Paolo Passaniti argued, ‘alla fine anche un genitore è di troppo’.165 With 
the exception of inheritance rights, women’s status remained basically unchanged: the 
dichotomy obedience/protection within marriage and women’s subaltern position were 
reaffirmed. The former Kingdom of Sardinia unified the country from a political and 
juridical perspective, and tried to build an identity going beyond a mere imagined 
community. However, while creating the nation Italy, and aiming at ‘fare gli italiani’, once 
again, lawmakers neglected the ‘italiane’.166 
 
                                                 
163 Artt. 331-363, in Il codice penale per il Regno d’Italia, ed. by G. Crivellari (Rome: Unione Tipografica, 
1889), pp. 123-33. 
164 Grossi, ‘Assolutismo giuridico e diritto privato nel secolo XIX’, p. 16. 
165 Passaniti, Diritto di famiglia, p. 213. 
166 The well-known expression ‘fatta l’Italia bisogna fare gli Italiani’ is among the stereotypes of national 
rhetoric: it indicates the strong desire to build a nation and, at the same time, the difficulties such a process 
implied. See S. Soldani, Introduzione, in S. Soldani and G. Turi, eds, Fare gli italiani: scuola e cultura 
nell’Italia contemporanea (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993), pp. 9-34 (pp. 17-25). See also A.M. Banti, Il 










Women and Marriage between Civil, Criminal and 






Women and men beyond marriage 
 
If women and men were imagined to belong to strictly separate spheres, that is, the public 
and the private, the law, instead, permeated and intruded on every aspect of people’s lives. 
The extent of its intrusiveness could be inferred from matters regarding the very intimate 
sphere of a person, such as personal relations between men and women. The law, and the 
authorities responsible for its enforcement, exerted their influence over people’s behaviour 
and attitudes, and even ruled against situations which were beyond the established and 
desirable social order.  
The first section of this chapter is devoted to the marriage promise, and describes its 
importance in society, both for the betrothed and their families, given that a broken promise 
could even be interpreted as an offence to honour, a concept which, alongside morality, was 
shaped and valued by the Church and by society. This meant that sexual intercourse outside 
the marriage bond was not looked upon kindly, often even forbidden, and deemed to cause 
‘disordine’ or cast a lifelong moral stigma on those involved. The second and third sections 
of the chapter are dedicated to seduction and extramarital relations: the former is useful to 
the analysis as it was deemed to be strictly related to infanticide; the latter because it was 
considered a major challenge to society’s order. 
This chapter aims to shed light on the authorities’ attitude towards these issues in 
the Kingdom of Sardinia and in Lombardy-Venetia. As we shall see, ideas and behaviours 
were similar in both states and strongly influenced people’s attitude towards morality and 
marriage, with canonical impediments intertwining with secular laws. 
 
 
1. The promise to marry 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the Catholic Church had jurisdiction over non-
patrimonial matters regarding marriage. Even though the states of the Italian peninsula had 
their own laws, formalities for engagement, marriage and its dissolution were prescribed by 
ecclesiastical authorities. From the early Middle Ages to the nineteenth century and beyond, 
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the Church’s jurisdiction and decisions of its courts had effects beyond its secular state’s 
boundaries.  
Although, as Diego Quaglioni argues, ‘non si possa acconsentire alla schematica 
opposizione di un matrimonio formale, che nascerebbe solo con Trento e col decreto 
Tametsi, a un matrimonio aformale, che sarebbe il matrimonio medievale’,1 the Council of 
Trent undoubtedly represented a turning point. On this occasion, among other matters, the 
Church reorganised and formally settled its rules concerning marriage, thus strongly 
reaffirming that its rules were the rules, to be observed and complied with. From 1563 
onwards, marriage, which up to that moment had been a pact between two individuals able 
to give consent, had to abide by the rules prescribed by the Council’s Canons. Chapter I of 
its twenty-fourth Session, the decree known as Tametsi, adopted on 11 November 1563, 
declared that a marriage was valid only if concluded in the presence of a priest, in facie 
ecclesiae (before the church).2 Conversely,  
 
Qui aliter, quam praesente parocho, vel sacerdote, de ipsius parochi seu ordinarii licentia, et duobus vel tribus 
testibus, matrimonium contrahere attentabunt, eos sancta synodus, ad sic contrahendum omnino inhabiles 
reddit, et hujusmodi contractus irritos et nullos esse decernit, prout eos praesenti decreto irritos facit, et 
                                                 
1 D. Quaglioni, ‘“Sacramenti detestabili”. La forma del matrimonio prima e dopo Trento’, in Seidel Menchi 
and Quaglioni, eds, Matrimoni in dubbio, pp. 61-79 (p. 74). 
2 An overview of marriage and the Council of Trent can be found in J.A. Brundage, Law, Sex and Christian 
Society in Medieval Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 562-65; Gaudemet, Le Mariage 
en Occident, pp. 286-95. See also O. Niccoli, ‘Baci rubati. Gesti e riti nuziali in Italia prima e dopo il Concilio 
di Trento’, in S. Bertelli and M. Centanni, eds, Il gesto nel rito e nel cerimoniale dal mondo antico ad oggi 
(Florence: Ponte alle Grazie, 1995), pp. 224-47; D. Lombardi, ‘Fidanzamenti e matrimoni dal Concilio di 
Trento alle riforme settecentesche’, in Beer, Klapisch-Zuber and De Giorgio, eds, Storia del matrimonio, pp. 
215-50; D. Lombardi, ‘Intervention by Church and State in Marriage Disputes in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-
Century Florence’, in T. Dean and K.J.P. Lowe, eds, Crime, Society and the Law in Renaissance Italy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 142-56; Lombardi, Matrimoni di antico regime, pp. 99-
118; J.G. Sperling, ‘Marriage at the Time of the Council of Trent (1560-70): Clandestine Marriages, Kinship 
Prohibitions, and Dowry Exchange in European Comparison’, Journal of Early Modern History, 8/1-2 (2004), 
67-108; D. Quaglioni, ‘Segni, rituali e simboli nuziali nel diritto’, in Seidel Menchi and Quaglioni, eds, I 
tribunali del matrimonio, pp. 43-63. On marriage and canon law, see Gaudemet, Sociétés et marriage, pp. 
425-47. For a study of marriage before the Council of Trent, see S. Seidel Menchi, ‘Percorsi variegati, percorsi 
obbligati: elogio del matrimonio pre-tridentino’, in Seidel Menchi and Quaglioni, eds, Matrimoni in dubbio, 





A marriage contracted in facie ecclesiae was a sacramental and indissoluble bond sanctified 
by God. It usually followed the sponsalia (betrothal), in which the couple promised to marry 
through words of consent. From the time of the Council of Trent until the nineteenth century, 
according to canon law, consent to marry was personal and freely given through verba de 
futuro or verba de praesenti (words of future or words of present).4 While the former was 
considered just an engagement, and therefore a breach of the promise was to some extent 
possible, the latter was an indissoluble marriage. This point was questioned by one of the 
most prominent eighteenth-century canonists, Jacob Anton Zallinger zum Thurn (1735-
1813), who maintained that sponsalia through verba de futuro followed by consummation 
equated to a valid marriage in places where the Canons of the Council of Trent had not been 
published.5 Canon law did not require the parents’ consent to contract marriage, but secular 
                                                 
3 Council of Trent, Sess. XXIV chapt. I: ‘Those who shall attempt to contract marriage otherwise than in the 
presence of the parish priest, or of some other priest by permission of the said parish priest, or of the Ordinary, 
and in the presence of two or three witnesses; the holy Synod renders such wholly incapable of thus contracting 
and declares such contracts invalid and null, as by the present decree it invalidates and annuls them’. Text 
translated in ‘The Council of Trent. The Twenty-Fourth Session’, in The Canons and Decrees of the Sacred 
and Oecumenical Council of Trent, ed. and trans. by J. Waterworth (London: Dolman, 1848), pp. 192-232 (p. 
197), <https://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct24.html> [accessed on 30 April 2017].   
4 On consent and the Council of Trent, see J. Gaudemet, ‘L’Apport de la doctrine canonique aux droits 
occidentaux en matière de mariage’, in S. Korta, H. Zapp, C.G. Furst and A. Weiss, Ius canonicum in Oriente 
et Occidente (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2003), pp. 167-95 (pp. 169-79). On the marriage promise, see also 
Donahue, Law, Marriage, and Society, pp. 16-33; M. Pelaja, ‘La promessa’, in Beer, Klapisch-Zuber and De 
Giorgio, eds, Storia del matrimonio, pp. 391-416; Lombardi, Storia del matrimonio, pp. 33-34.   
5 The jurist Jakob Anton von Zallinger Zum Thurm (1735-1813) maintained that ‘Olim tamen, ante Decretum 
Concilii Tridentini de matrimoniis clandestinis, et nunc etiam in locis, ubi illud Decretum non viget, siquis 
post sponsalia de futuro sposam carnaliter cognorat, praesumebatur consensum de praesenti in matrimonium 
praestitisse, et quidem praesumptione juris et de jure, contra quam non admittebatur probatio’ (Once, before 
the decree of the Council of Trent on clandestine marriages, and now also in those places, in which the decree 
has no force, if someone, after having made the betrothal through words of future, carnally knew his bride, it 
was presumed that it proved that a consent to marriage through words of present was given, and indeed a juris 
et de jure presumption, against which no evidence was admitted); my translation. See J.A. von Zallinger Zum 
Thurm, Institutiones juris ecclesiastici, maxime privati, ordine Decretalium, 5 vols (Augusta Vindelicorum: 
Sumtibus Matthaei Rieger, 1793), IV, p. 7. See also the case described in S. Delmedico, Breve studio sulla 
condizione giuridica della donna nello Stato Pontificio dell’Ottocento ([n.p.]: Lulu.com, 2014), pp. 24-26. 
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lawmakers, aware of the importance of the family and its formation, included this approval 
as a formal requirement in their iura propria, as in the eighteenth-century Costituzioni for 
example. As the marriage bond fell under the Church’s jurisdiction, these laws only 
regulated the access to wealth of the insubordinate sons and daughters, allowing their 
parents to provide them with smaller portions of alimony and inheritance as opposed to 
obedient offspring.6 This means that a marriage concluded without the parents’ approval, 
although strongly discouraged, was a valid bond once contracted.7 
A marriage promise was an impedient impediment: the betrothed were barred from 
marrying someone else. However, if a marriage was concluded in spite of the impediment, 
the bond was not void.8 A marriage promise could be broken if one of the betrothed could 
demonstrate that there were formalities that had not been taken into consideration, or if he 
or she had good reasons to refuse to marry the other party. A broken promise was a matter 
pertaining to canon law, and complaints had to be filed before the Bishop’s Curia, which 
also had the power to remove impedient and diriment impediments (diriment impediments 
will be analysed later in this chapter).  
The formalities regarding betrothals were not regulated by law, and were rather a 
private agreement.9 Among the upper classes, these took the shape of written acts that were 
usually formalised before a notary, because a breach of the promise had to be firmly avoided 
considering the financial investment that a marriage represented for a family. Among the 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Artt. 8-9, Leggi, e costituzioni di Sua Maestà (Turin: Stamperia Reale, 1770), pp. 324-25; 
Artt. I-II Tit. XIII, Codice Estense, in Collezione completa, p. 809. See also Lombardi, Storia del matrimonio 
dal Medioevo a oggi, p. 150. 
7 On parental consent to marriage in municipal statutes, see T. Dean, ‘Fathers and Daughters: Marriage Laws 
and Marriage Disputes in Bologna and Italy, 1200-1500’, in Dean and Lowe, eds, Crime, Society and the Law, 
pp. 85-106 (pp. 89-90). 
8 Impediments to marriage can be impedient or diriment: impedient impediments make a marriage illicit but 
valid, whereas diriment impediments invalidate it. Impedient impediments can be simple vow, prior marriage 
promise, lack of solemnities. On impediments, see also F. Mercanti, Compendio di diritto canonico con 
illustrazioni istorico-dogmatiche, 4 vols (Prato: Guasti, 1832), I, pp. 448-49; C.E. Smith, Papal Enforcement 
of Some Medieval Marriage Laws (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1972 [1940]), pp. 5-53; Donahue, Law, 
Marriage, and Society, pp. 18-32. 
9 For an overview of betrothals after the Council of Trent, see Lombardi, ‘Intervention by Church and State in 
Marriage Disputes in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Florence’, p. 145; J. Kirshner, Marriage, Dowry, 
and Citizenship in Late Medieval and Renaissance Italy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), p. 52. 
See also Kuehn, Family and Gender, pp. 104-12.  
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lower classes, notarised promises were less usual, and often the betrothed formalised their 
commitment through a private, sometimes oral, agreement. If there was no written 
document, in the event of a breach of marriage promise, appellants had to rely on the 
evidence they were able to produce before the Curia.  
In the following cases brought before the Bishop’s Curia of Verona, in Lombardy-
Venetia, the varying weight of the plaintiffs’ evidence led to quite different outcomes. In 
1830, for example, Andrea Buttarini – a boatman from Lonato, near Verona – wrote to the 
Bishop’s Curia to establish an impediment to the marriage of Camilla Bettanini with 
Giuseppe Papa.10 Andrea maintained that Camilla had promised to marry him, and, to prove 
his case, brought a witness before the Curia. As was the usual procedure, the Curia 
summoned Camilla to explain why she had broken her promise. The woman maintained 
that the promise was made under the condition that her parents approved the marriage, but 
they did not. Andrea’s claim was rejected, because the Curia ruled that according to canon 
law a promise was valid if made ‘coram testibus, non coram teste’ (before witnesses and 
not before one witness only), as in this case.11 The sentence also stemmed from the Curia’s 
assumption that Andrea just aimed to make a ‘leggiadra vendetta’ against Camilla, rather 
than really wanting her to keep the promise.12  
Women were not always the weaker side, though, and often strategies and disputes 
related to marriage were arranged together with their family.13 Across all classes, a broken 
marriage promise also had social implications. A case in point is that of Giovanni Battista 
Civieri, a man from Verona. He was far from just plotting a ‘leggiadra vendetta’ against the 
woman he had once been engaged to: in fact, his desire to marry her was real, and he had 
standing proofs to impede her marriage to another man. He went before the Bishop’s Curia 
of Verona to ask that the permission given to Luigia Ruzzenenti to marry the other man, 
Giovanni Battista Pagani, be withdrawn. Luigia’s promise to marry him was ‘indubitata’, 
                                                 
10 Verona, Bishop’s Curia of Verona (BCV), Matrimoniorum, Processi, 1830-1844, 26. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 On this point, see, for example, the case described in E. Papagna, ‘Storie comuni di sposi promessi. I processi 
della curia arcivescovile di Trani nel tardo Settecento’, in Seidel Menchi and Quaglioni, eds, I tribunali del 
matrimonio, pp. 459-95 (pp. 480-83), in which a girl continued to procrastinate over the date of her marriage 
with her fiancé because she was trying to secure a wealthier match. 
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and Civieri proved it by showing a number of letters she had written to him.14 Luigia was a 
minor under the custody of her paternal uncle Paolo, since her parents had died several years 
earlier, and, in 1844, was promised to Civieri in the first instance. However, her uncle Paolo, 
‘per effetto di manifesta ingiustizia, ed a fine di fare un’onta alla famiglia Civieri, seppe 
indegnamente indurre, [...] Dio sa con quali mezzi’, his niece Luigia to accept the hand of 
Pagani, a merchant.15  
Civieri lamented much more than a broken promise or the unfair behaviour of 
Luigia’s uncle: he particularly highlighted that Paolo deliberately wanted to ‘fare un’onta’ 
to his family, thus emphasising the crucial link between promise and honour, and the need 
to defend his family’s prestige before society, not to mention his desire to marry Luigia. 
Civieri pointed out that they promised to marry ‘di moto loro proprio non indotti da alcuno’, 
and such a promise could not be withdrawn ‘a piacere d’uno di loro senza l’adesione 
espressa ed assentita dell’altro contraente’.16 Furthermore, Beatrice, Luigia’s aunt and wife 
of Paolo, had even obliged him to buy furniture for their future bedroom. This might have 
been a strategy of Luigia’s family to ascertain that Civieri was a reliable person: asking him 
to make such a purchase was not a negligible commitment for individuals belonging to the 
lower classes. 
The letters Civieri brought before the Curia to prove the promise had all been written 
by Luigia between 29 September 1845 and 18 October 1846. Their inspection testified to 
the existence of genuine feelings between the two, and not to a mere arranged engagement. 
In September 1845, for example, Luigia wrote that she was very happy to know that he 
loved her ‘di vero core’, and, a month later, despite signing off the letter with the word 
‘distintamente’, she specified that she would always be ‘la tua’.17 On 8 December of the 
same year, something happened between her uncle and the Civieri family, but Luigia 
assured Civieri that she would be ‘sempre fedele fino alla morte’; this time, she signed off 
                                                 
14 BCV, Matrimoniorium, Processi, 1845-1868, 27. 
15 Ibid. Despite being extremely different from a Medieval vendetta (on this point, see T. Dean, ‘Marriage and 
Mutilation: Vendetta in Late Medieval Italy’, Past and Present, 157 (1997), 3-36 (especially pp. 3-5)), this 
onta is somehow comparable to a sort of insult made to one member in order to offend the whole family, 
highlighting the idea of honour which was highly valued across all social classes.     
16 BCV, Matrimoniorium, Processi, 1845-1868, 27. 
17 Ibid.  
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with ‘di vero amore e non ti scordar di me e sono la tua’.18 A few weeks later, the situation 
seemed to have worsened to the extent that she wrote ‘ti prego di non abbandonarmi e porta 
pazienza che tutto si finisce’; in July 1846, she again confirmed ‘non dubitare che altro non 
amarò che te’.19  
The evidence to support Civieri’s claim was sound. However, in June 1847, Luigia 
and Pagani – the man her uncle wanted her to marry – put up the banns in the local church 
of San Zeno Maggiore. Civieri immediately reported to the Curia in order to stop the 
wedding from taking place. On 2 August 1847, the Curia summoned the girl to clarify her 
position: Luigia confirmed that she wanted to marry Civieri. Despite having put up the banns 
for her marriage to another man only a few months earlier, she finally married Civieri on 1 
November 1847.20 There is no written evidence explaining why Luigia’s family changed 
their minds again. One might argue that, since a broken marriage promise was a breach of 
canon law as well as of the shared rules of society (which were often as strong and influential 
as the written law), the authoritativeness of the Church, together with the need to avoid 
stigmatisation, may have led Luigia’s family to abide by the original promise made to 
Civieri. A broken marriage promise was a thorny issue, the regulation of which was far from 
simple: the Curia usually tried to persuade the parties involved to comply with it, given that, 
in practice, forcing them to marry against their will could be quite difficult. 
 
 
2. Seduction of a ‘zitella onesta’ 
 
Along with the broken marriage promise, seduction, which implied sexual intercourse, was 
an equally significant matter and a source of great concern.21 In the Settecento, the wave of 
                                                 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.  
20 S. Zeno Maggiore, Matrimoni, 1817-1848, 28. 
21 On seduction by marriage promise, see G. Alessi, Processo per seduzione: piacere e castigo nella Toscana 
leopoldina (Catania: [n. pub.], 1988); A. Boureau, ‘L’imene e l’ulivo. La verginità femminile nel discorso 
della Chiesa nel XIII secolo’, Quaderni storici, 25 (1990), 791-803; G. Alessi, ‘Il gioco degli scambi: 
seduzione e risarcimento nella casistica cattolica del XVI e XVII secolo’, Ibid., 805-31; D. Lombardi, 
‘Intervention by Church and State in Marriage Disputes in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Florence’, in 
Dean and Lowe, eds, Crime, Society and the Law, pp. 142-56 (pp. 154-56); Cazzetta, Praesumitur seducta, 
pp. 136-46; Pelaja, Matrimonio e sessualità a Roma nell’Ottocento, pp. 51-59, 154-73; Lombardi, Matrimoni 
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new ideas, which, as we saw in Chapter 2, led to the redefinition of women’s role in society 
as first educators, allowed room to consider them capable of understanding the implication 
of sexual consent. Up to that moment, a woman semper praesumitur seducta (was always 
presumed to have been seduced): this entailed that, if she gave consent to sexual intercourse 
(a stuprum or stupro), this was due to her fragilitas, because her will was presumed to 
always be ‘honest’.22 Until the nineteenth century, the term stuprum was used to define 
sexual intercourse with an unmarried woman or with a widow of honourable social 
conditions.23 The use of this term, which defined an intercourse contrary to morality, was 
intended to recall the sense of shame and dishonour caused by sexual relations taking place 
outside the marriage bond. Although it was deemed to be an illicit form of intercourse, it 
did not imply violence.24 The stuprum could be ‘semplice’ or ‘qualificato,’ and the 
distinction was between the presence or absence of a marriage promise.  
The ability to give consent, instead, meant that a woman might be guilty of having 
had illicit intercourse and a socia criminis (an associate of the crime), not just a mere 
seduced victim. As an accomplice, she was fully aware of the implication of her actions, 
and claiming seduction was considered a way to obtain an easy marriage. As highlighted by 
Giovanni Cazzetta, the rhetoric of the ‘abusi delle donne’, that is, women who consciously 
manipulated the law in their favour in order to be married, led to several proposals to 
                                                 
di antico regime, pp. 392-412; L. Faoro, ‘“Nefandum dogma”. Seduzione e promessa di matrimonio in una 
comparsa trentina del XVII secolo’, in Seidel Menchi and Quaglioni, eds, Matrimoni in dubbio, pp. 431-528; 
D. Hacke, ‘La promessa disattesa: il caso di Perina Gabrieli (Venezia 1620)’, in Ibid., pp. 395-413; G. Arrivo, 
Seduzioni, promesse, matrimoni. Il processo per stupro nella Toscana del Settecento (Rome: Edizioni di Storia 
e Letteratura, 2006); G. Alessi, ‘Stupro non violento e matrimonio riparatore. Le inquiete peregrinazioni 
dogmatiche della seduzione’, in Seidel Menchi and Quaglioni, eds, I tribunali del matrimonio, pp. 609-40. On 
the Church’s attitude towards sex, see M. Pelaja, Scandali. Sessualità e violenza nella Roma dell’Ottocento 
(Rome: Biblink, 2001); Pelaja and Scaraffia, Due in una carne; G.D. Tonini Masella, Donne sole, modelle, 
prostitute: marginalità femminili a Roma fra Sette e Ottocento (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2012), 
pp. 71-84. On the marriage promise in the period before the Council of Trent, see T. Dean, ‘Fathers and 
Daughters: Marriage Laws and Marriage Disputes in Bologna and Italy, 1200-1500’, in Dean and Lowe, eds, 
Crime, Society and the Law, pp. 85-106. 
22 On this point, see Cazzetta, Praesumitur seducta, in particular, pp. 15-95. 
23 On the term stuprum, see Digest 48.5.35 (34), Ad legem Iuliam de adulteriis coercendis: ‘stuprum in vidua 
vel virgine vel puero committitur’ (fornication is committed with a widow, a virgin, or a boy). For the use of 
the term stuprum in ancient times, see also Brundage, Law, Sex and Christian Society, pp. 28-29.  
24 The definition of rape was stupro violento (violent stuprum). 
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decriminalise the seduction of women who gave their consent.25 These proposals were 
driven by the aim to avoid ‘il risultato “mostruoso” di premiare col diritto donne 
colpevoli’.26 In this regard, for example, in the mid-eighteenth century, Ludovico Muratori 
reported the case of a minister, who, aiming to stop the ‘esorbitanza ne gli Stupri’, enacted 
a law through which ‘facile riusciva l’accusare e costringere gli Stupratori a sposare o a 
dotare le zitelle’.27 Muratori claimed that the impact of this provision on society had been 
negative: ‘le povere fanciulle si sentivano tratte a fallare per la facilità loro somministrata 
di veder premiati o ricompensati i lor falli’.28 He also argued that both men and women 
could become prey to this kind of disorder, and a law that was not sufficiently harsh would 
consequently worsen society’s morality.29 On this point, it is very interesting to note how 
Muratori considered both sexes prone to commit immoral acts: yet, for men, these 
‘disorders’ could be forgiven as they would not bear any visible and long-lasting signs; for 
women, these falli would leave a mark and a blemish that could only be removed through 
marriage or, eventually, by obtaining a dowry, which would re-instate their value in the 
marriage market, and make them respectable wives. Although Muratori referred to them as 
‘povere fanciulle’, according to eighteenth-century rhetoric, a woman rapidly evolved from 
being a person unable to understand the dishonesty of her actions, and whose consent was 
defective, to an individual fully aware of her action, in other words, a person, who with 
actual malice wanted to ensnare the man and achieve a marriage, the primary goal of every 
woman.  
This meant that the claim of an honest unmarried woman, a zitella onesta, was to be 
carefully assessed.30 She could report to the Bishop’s Curia to initiate a lawsuit against her 
seducer, and put in place an impediment to bar him from contracting marriage with someone 
else. For example, in a dispute reported in the journal Giurisprudenza del codice civile and 
                                                 
25 On consent in the law, see Cazzetta, Praesumitur seducta, pp. 163-84. 
26 Cazzetta, Praesumitur seducta, in particular, pp. 17, 125-32. 
27 L.A. Muratori, Della pubblica felicità, oggetto de’ buoni principi (Lucca: [n.pub.], 1749), pp. 102-03.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 The term ‘zitella’ originated from ‘cita’ and ‘zita’, which meant young unmarried girl. See M. Cortellazzo 
and P. Zolli, Dizionario etimologico della lingua italiana, 5 vols (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1979-1988), V, s. v. 
zitella; S. Battaglia, Grande dizionario della lingua italiana, 21 vols (Turin: UTET, 1961-2002), XXI, s.v. 
zitella. The term zitella, ‘with the passage of time, morphed into ‘spinsters’’ (Hosker, “Donne sole” in Post-
Unification Italy, p. 85). On the figure of the zitella in conduct literature, see Hosker, Ibid., pp. 85-113. 
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brought before an unnamed tribunal of the Kingdom of Sardinia, a man, together with his 
father, asked the secular judge to order the Archbishop’s Curia of Vercelli to remove the 
impedient impediment, which was hindering his marriage.31 Despite being rejected by the 
court for lack of jurisdiction (as we saw, these matters pertained to the Church’s courts), the 
case is significant in terms of understanding how people tried to outflank this kind of issue. 
This man had sexual intercourse with a woman and got her pregnant. He then wanted to 
marry another woman, maybe of higher status, but the pregnant woman reported to the 
Archbishop’s Curia of Vercelli and asked to put in place an impediment to bar his marriage 
to someone else. The seducer and his father asked to ‘levare […] l’impedimento impediente 
nascente dalla deflorazione […] mediante cauzione di pagare quella indennità che potesse 
alla medesima essere dovuta’.32 In their minds, a compensation would simply pay off the 
problem: a ‘deflorata’ and pregnant woman, who gave consent to sexual intercourse after 
being promised marriage. As argued by Giorgia Alessi, since the sixteenth century, tribunals 
such as the Roman Sacra Rota had directed that a seducer could choose to either provide 
with a dowry, or marry, the seduced woman, while ‘le antiche norme avevano addossato 
[quest’obbligo] cumulativamente’.33 This aimed to avoid ‘alla famiglie più nobili o 
facoltose l’onta di un matrimonio coatto con sedotte di bassa condizione’.34  
The seduction of a zitella onesta was a major challenge to the common and shared 
sense of honour and morality, and was to be deterred. The Austrian criminal code, the 
Codice penale dei crimini, dei delitti e delle contravvenzioni (1852), punished the seduction 
by promise of marriage with a fine and a prison sentence from three months up to a year.35 
The ‘disonorata’ was also entitled to compensation.36 The jurist Luigi Oldrati explained that 
the 1852 code changed the word ‘deflorata’, which was used in the previous code (the 1803 
                                                 
31 Giurisprudenza del codice civile, 5 (1842), 149-51. 
32 Ibid., p. 149. 
33 Alessi, ‘Il gioco degli scambi’, p. 809. See also Alessi, ‘Stupro non violento e matrimonio riparatore’, in 
Seidel Menchi and Quaglioni, eds, I tribunali del matrimonio, pp. 609-40.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Art. 506, Codice penale dei crimini, dei delitti e delle contravvenzioni colle ordinanze sulla competenza dei 
giudizi penali, e col regolamento sulla stampa del 27 maggio 1852 per l’impero d’Austria (Vienna: Manz, 
1869), p. 177. 
36 Ibid.  
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Codice penale dei delitti e delle gravi trasgressioni di polizia),37 into ‘disonorata’.38 In 
particular, he noted that ‘deflorazione è il vocabolo usato dai criminalisti ad esprimere il 
delibamento del fior verginale, e la nuova legge avendo sostituito al verbo deflora quello di 
disonora, pare abbia voluto estendere l’azione anche alla persona già deflorata’.39 In other 
words, this greater protection was also provided to women who had already lost their 
modesty, which was not uncommon since a marriage promise ‘per una zitella è forte stimolo 
a cedere alle voglie del seduttore’.40 Oldrati implied that women, who were not deemed to 
have the same firmness as men, could easily become prey to unscrupulous seducers, putting 
their honour at risk, and irreversibly damaging their reputation.41   
Poised between the rhetoric of the ‘abusi delle donne’ and the need to protect 
women, lawmakers considered seduction a very sensitive question as it often entailed a 
pregnancy: alongside a possible request to be married, a seduced woman could also ask for 
alimony to support her children. The question of the attribution of paternity reaffirms the 
double standard by which society considered the sexual behaviour of women and men; 
indeed, the greatest legal achievement of those who supported instances against the ‘abusi 
delle donne’ was the prohibition of this search. By impeding the search for paternity, 
                                                 
37 On the 1803 Austrian criminal code, see S. Vinciguerra, ed., Codice penale universale austriaco (1803) 
(Padua: Cedam, 2001). 
38 L. Oldrati, Codice penale austriaco attualmente in vigore nel regno Lombardo-Veneto con osservazioni 
teorico-pratiche e confronto coll’antecedente abrogato (Milan: Manini, 1852), p. 432. 
39 Oldrati, Codice penale austriaco, p. 432. In this passage, it is worth noting the unusual use of the term 
‘persona’, considering that nineteenth-century codes and tracts usually reported ‘femmina’ or ‘donna’. This 
might testify to a progressive shift in some jurists’ minds, from the idea that men and women should be 
considered individuals with different rights and duties, to a more inclusive approach. It could also mean that 
women were beginning to be considered worthy of enjoying rights based not purely on their biological nature, 
but because they were ‘persone’.  
40 Ibid. 
41 On honour and reputation, which were important both for married and unmarried women, see D. Hacke, 
‘La promessa disattesa: il caso di Perina Gabrieli (Venezia 1620)’, in Seidel Menchi and Quaglioni, eds, 
Matrimoni in dubbio, pp. 395-413 (pp. 402-04); L. Turchi, ‘Adulterio, onere della prova e testimonianza. In 
margine a un processo correggese di età tridentina’, in Seidel Menchi and Quaglioni, eds, Trasgressioni, pp. 
305-50 (in particular, pp. 318-19). On the rhetoric of the danger posed by seducers, see Cazzetta, Præsumitur 
seducta, pp. 330-38. 
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legislators aimed to remove what was considered an obsolete and outdated rule of the Ancien 
Régime, and, above all, to abolish this ‘privilege’ given to ‘donne non oneste’.42 
In the Kingdom of Sardinia, nineteenth-century law did not allow the search for 
paternity, except in two specific cases: if a man explicitly declared himself to be the father 
of a child (in a written document), or in case of an ascertained rape.43 In Lombardy-Venetia, 
instead, paternity could be attributed to a man who, after the court’s investigations, was 
believed to have had sexual intercourse with a woman provided that her child was born 
within the appropriate period.44 
The search for paternity was crucial to obtain support for children born outside 
wedlock. Illegitimate children were a cause of great concern: even though the law provided 
them with the possibility to obtain support from their fathers,45 claiming to have been 
seduced and obtaining a favourable ruling as a result was not an easy task for a woman.  
A good example of this is the lawsuit concerning A. P., a woman seduced by promise 
of marriage. She had a long-lasting love affair with D. (both the plaintiff and the defendant 
were identified with their initials only) and gave birth to two girls in the years after the 
promulgation of the 1837 civil code of the Kingdom of Sardinia.46 Before the court of 
Cagliari, she claimed that, if the current code required valid betrothals to be made in writing 
(through a private act or before a notary), D. promised to marry her when the 1827 Leggi 
civili of King Carlo Felice were in force, and this code did not have such a rule. A. P. was 
not able to prove when and if the marriage promise had effectively been made, and, 
therefore, in the absence of written evidence, she had no way to claim any civil effects. 
Given that a natural child could be recognised on the basis of Articles 180 and 185, and that, 
with the 1837 code, the search for paternity was not allowed, she was not even able to ask 
for any support for her daughters.  
The court, however, issued a contradictory sentence: A. P. could not make any claim 
for her daughters, but surprisingly she was allowed to obtain compensation for having been 
                                                 
42 Cazzetta, Præsumitur seducta, p. 149.  
43 Artt. 180 and 185, Codice civile per gli Stati di S. M. il Re di Sardegna, in Collezione completa, p. 603. 
44 Art. 163, Codice civile universale austriaco pel Regno Lombardo-Veneto, in Collezione completa, p. 156. 
45 Art. 166, Codice civile universale austriaco pel Regno Lombardo-Veneto, in Collezione completa, p. 157. 
On the right of natural children to receive alimony, see G.S. Pene Vidari, Ricerche sul diritto agli alimenti 
(Turin: Giappichelli, 1970). See also Cazzetta, Præsumitur seducta, pp. 147-49.  
46 Giurisprudenza degli Stati Sardi (1857), 661-62 (p. 661). 
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seduced. Indeed,  
 
essa ha incontrovertibilmente diritto ad una competente indennità pel danno morale e materiale arrecatole 
dall’appellante suddetto, coll’averla, secondo venne concludentemente stabilito dalla prova testimoniale, con 
lusinghiere promesse indotta nei primi anni della sua adolescenza a far paghe le amorose sue voglie; senza 
che a farle perdere siffatto diritto giovar possano al D… i fatti di non castigata condotta contro di essa 
articolati; si perché nulla di veramente positivo venne a tale riguardo accertato, e si ancora perché in ogni caso 
egli stesso ha da tenersi in colpa, se coll’avere esso medesimo fatto primamente deviare dal retto sentiero una 
giovinetta inesperta, le segnò primo la via della sregolatezza.47 
 
To support this argument, the court explained that A. P. had asked for 15,000 lire in 
compensation, and D. had offered only 1,000 lire: the fact that the seducer offered this sum 
meant that he acknowledged the harm caused to A. P. and was in fact guilty. With the 
judgement of 11 August 1857, the court of Cagliari condemned D. to pay 1,000 lire. Even 
more striking than the large difference between the compensation asked for and the amount 
effectively received by A. P. is that the court mentioned that she gave consent to sexual 
intercourse after his ‘lusinghiere promesse’, but argued that it was impossible to prove the 
marriage promise. The court also ruled that D. was the seducer of A. P. and she had 
‘incontrovertibilmente’ the right to obtain compensation for the moral and material damage 
suffered. Instead, A. P.’s daughters were completely neglected and were not given any 
support, as they were illegitimate children and their paternity could not be ascertained. The 
reading of this sentence is once again a powerful reminder of the pivotal importance of the 
family, a sacred bond constituted through marriage, which alongside access to its wealth, 
would also provide children with status and worth.  
Along with compromising their reputation and leading an immoral life, women who 
had illicit sexual intercourse were also considered to be at risk of committing infanticide.48 
As the Milanese lawyer Lino Ferriani pointed out in his La infanticida nel codice penale e 
nella vita sociale (1886),  
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ci furono sempre donne che si macchiarono le mani nel sangue dei loro neonati o per evitare l’onta e lo 
scandalo, o perché spinte dalla miseria cresciuta nella corruzione, o per lucro infame, o per anima abbruttita 
sino dall’infanzia.49  
 
However, he allowed that women were not completely to blame. Those who truly ‘arma[no] 
la mano dell’infanticida’ were the seducers of honest women:50 they belonged to the upper 
class, they were wealthy and therefore had more vices than others.51 As we shall see later in 
this chapter, this idea contradicts the commonplace that considered the poor as more vicious 
and prone to commit sins. Loredana Garlati suggests that this ‘new understanding of 
infanticide emerged with the Enlightenment principles’, and its interpretation became 
‘attached to an undefended female, victim of society, its values, and of men’s deceitful 
seduction’.52 Women were considered as sociae criminis and undefended victims depending 
on the circumstances: this contradictory approach may be explained by the difficulties in 
understanding and accepting women’s new sense of self, which emerged from the 
Enlightenment onwards, and led to a redefinition of their role, even though still to be played 
within the family.  
Moreover, infanticide did not always have the same significance. Alongside the 
distinction between infanticide done voluntarily or caused by withholding care from the 
new-born baby, criminalists also distinguished between the killing of a legitimate child and 
that of an illegitimate one.53 In the Kingdom of Sardinia, the punishment for infanticide 
could be reduced by ‘uno o di due gradi riguardo alla madre che lo abbia commesso sulla 
prole illegittima, quando concorrono circostanze attenuanti’.54 The criminal code of 
Lombardy-Venetia made the same distinction: infanticide was punished with ‘duro carcere 
in vita, se il figlio era legittimo; se questi era illegittimo, ha luogo la pena del duro carcere 
                                                 
49 L. Ferriani, La infanticida nel codice penale e nella vita sociale: considerazioni (Milan: Dumolard, 1886), 
p. 73. 
50 On this point, see also Cazzetta, Præsumitur seducta, p. 335.  
51 Ferriani, La infanticida, p. 73. 
52 Garlati, ‘Honour and Guilt’, p. 259. 
53 See Oldrati, Codice penale austriaco, p. 121. See also Giurisprudenza degli Stati Sardi (1852), 733-34. 




da dieci a venti anni’.55 Clearly, legitimate children were deemed to have more value than 
illegitimate ones because they were born within wedlock and would bear the family name. 
Conversely, an illegitimate child would be stigmatised even during adulthood, and would 
hold an ambiguous place in society, to the extent that, in some legal proceedings, people 
indicted with crimes were mentioned with the term ‘spurio’ (illegitimate, fake, spurious) 
added to their names, indicating that their birth was an indelible spot, which would affect 
their lives forever, even though the case had nothing to do with their being illegitimate.56 
Moreover, an illegitimate who in adulthood wanted to receive ordination needed to ask for 
the dispensatio natalium, a dispensation granted by ecclesiastical authorities that cleaned 
up his uncertain birth and allowed him to enter Christendom as a person worthy of respect.57 
This shared sense of honour attributed value to people on the basis of their birth: hence the 
fact that women were given a lower penalty if infanticide was committed against an 
illegitimate child stems from a general comprehension of their need to protect their 
reputation.  
This attitude towards people born outside wedlock did not mean that infanticide 
committed on an illegitimate child was not prosecuted. In a case heard before the court of 
final appeal of Turin, Giuseppa Bouvard, a 30-year-old peasant, demanded a reduction of 
her punishment. Previously, she had been convicted for having killed her baby and 
condemned to forced labour for life by the court of Chambéry, in Savoie, which at the time 
was part of the Kingdom of Sardinia.58 Before the court of Turin, she argued that homicide, 
including that of a baby, implied premeditation. Her child, instead, was ‘di recente nato’ 
and, consequently, she had no time to plan a possible infanticide. She also asked to be 
condemned according to Article 579 of the criminal code, which dealt specifically with 
infanticide committed on an illegitimate child, and gave milder punishments. The court gave 
this description:   
 
le 30 juin 1850, sur les onze heures du matin, la recourante est accouchée d’un enfant du sexe masculin [...] 
cet enfant a été présenté le jour même de sa naissance au recteur de la paroisse de Perjussy, qui l’a baptisé, et 
                                                 
55 Oldrati, Codice penale austriaco, p. 121. 
56 See, for example, the case of Domenico spurio Belloni indicted for rape in Macerata at the end of the 
nineteenth century, in Macerata, State Archive of Macerata, Processi Penali, 1891, 164.  
57 Galdi, Enciclopedia legale, II, p. 709. 
58 Giurisprudenza degli Stati Sardi (1851), 56-59. 
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inscrit sur les registres des actes de l’état civil; et que la recourante lui a donné la mort dans la Commune 
d’Arenthon, pendant la nuit du 30 juin au 1er juillet. […] la naissance de cet enfant a été connue, et légalement 
constatée.59 
 
On 15 March 1851, the tribunal of Turin rejected the appeal and confirmed the punishment 
based upon Article 582 (voluntary homicide without mitigating circumstances).60 It is 
interesting to note that the new-born baby was first baptised and then killed. Even though 
the behaviour of Giuseppa was unclear, one could argue that this testifies to her piety. 
Giuseppa might have been aware that according to Catholic dogmas she would deserve Hell, 
but, despite not being able or willing to look after her child, and presumably having the 
intention of committing infanticide, she wanted her baby to become a true Christian, and be 
received in Heaven as only the baptised could. Baptism was therefore intended as a moment 
of creation, with the soul entering the body as the result of divine intervention.61 
In Lombardy-Venetia, investigations and proceedings regarding infanticide were 
similar to the Kingdom of Sardinia. A case described in the journal Giurisprudenza pratica 
secondo la legislazione austriaca, concerned a 23-year old woman, Anna K., who was a 
housekeeper in a manor in an unspecified area of the countryside. Up to that time, she had 
never been under investigation.62 Her father had died many years earlier and her mother did 
her same job in a nearby manor. Anna K., as well as Giuseppa Bouvard, belonged to the 
‘human type’ that committed infanticide as described by Adriano Prosperi in his 
monographic study on the subject: servants or humble labourers, almost always 
unmarried.63 Usually they did not have any close relatives, such as a mother or a father, 
living with them or supporting them.  
Court records reported that Anna K. was arrested on the basis of Article 264 of the 
Codice penale dei delitti e delle gravi trasgressioni di polizia (1803), in February 1822.64 
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In compliance with the terms of Article 264, she was deemed to have committed infanticide 
because ‘l’ingrossamento del suo corpo l’avea fatto riguardar da tutti come gravida’; then, 
all of a sudden, she returned to her usual physical appearance, without anyone having heard 
of her giving birth.65 Even though there were no traces of the baby, she was subjected to 
inspection by an obstetrician, who confirmed that Anna had given birth three weeks earlier 
at the most. This testimony forced Anna to reveal the truth: eight days after Easter, she had 
been seduced by the son of her master and then ‘esserselo ingrossato il ventre, arrestati i 
suoi benefici, ed essersi quindi creduta gravida’.66 On 20 January 1822, nine months after 
the seduction had taken place, two other girls, who worked as housekeepers in the same 
house, went to dance in a nearby inn, leaving Anna alone. She was already in bed when she 
felt a strong pain, and went to the commode ‘dove senza dolori qualche cosa da lei passò 
nel recipiente’.67 Anna gave a confused description of what had happened to her and insisted 
that everything ‘passò tra la precipitazione e l’irriflessione’.68 She then returned to bed, and, 
when her co-workers came back from their evening out, did not mention what had happened.  
Since Anna shared the bed with the other two girls, one of them inevitably noticed 
that she seemed to have suddenly lost weight, and reported this fact during the trial.69 The 
evidence and the testimonies were all against Anna, who had no way of escaping the 
indictment. She admitted to having understood ‘qual nero attentato avesse commesso contro 
la propria prole, che lo avrebbe pianto per tutta la vita, ma che allora non era corsa col 
pensiero alle tristi conseguenze, e così dicendo proruppe in dirotto pianto’.70 Anna secretly 
carried out her entire pregnancy without being able ‘to seek the advice and experience of 
married women or widows’.71 During birth, she was alone and without any support, as also 
during the trial. Anna claimed that she did not remember what had happened to her baby, 
and made no mention of cutting the umbilical cord. Instead, she insisted that everything 
                                                 
certezza di un parto poc’anzi accaduto’. See Art. 264, Codice de’ delitti e delle gravi trasgressioni politiche 
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66 Ibid., p. 82 
67 Ibid., p. 80. 
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went on very quickly, and that she had not understood what was happening. Whether Anna’s 
ignorance of the consequences of her seduction was genuine, or just an attempt to escape 
conviction, she was nonetheless sentenced to two years of rigorous imprisonment for 
infanticide for voluntarily omitting the care a new-born needed.  
Beyond the specific case and indictment of this young woman, the analysis of the 
court records as reported by Giurisprudenza pratica has value in that it shows which issues 
were taken into consideration by the law in action. Although a crucial link between 
seduction and infanticide was acknowledged, protection of the involved women faded more 
and more, to the extent that jurists even highlighted ‘le solite scuse che le accusate sogliono 
addurre per ischivare le pene criminali nei casi d’infanticidio’.72 The journal stressed that 
the first excuse a woman used to avoid indictment was that she had given birth to a stillborn. 
The second most recurrent claim was that she was not aware of being pregnant. An 
infanticide also used to say that she was: 
 
sorpresa e sopraffatta dall’impreveduto parto ed abbia perciò partorito secretamente e senza assistenza; che 
nell’atto del parto abbia perduto affatto ogni presenza di mente, e che non abbia saputo più che cosa si facesse 
del feto; finalmente che per ignoranza non abbia prestato all’infante la necessaria cura ed assistenza e per 
esempio non abbia reciso ed annodato il vincolo umbellicale; dal che i medici asseriscono dover conseguire il 
dissanguamento e la morte.73  
    
Judges were to pay particular attention to the excuse of ‘perdere i sentimenti’, which was 
often used to remove the ‘imputazione morale’, but, in the opinion of doctors, this situation 
rarely happened during easy and regular childbirths.74 What emerges from these nineteenth-
century communes opiniones is ‘una tela intrisa di ambiguità’,75 in which women were still 
considered unable to understand civil law, and were to be hindered from undertaking any 
legal act, but, at the same time, they were regarded as perfectly able to elaborate excuses in 
order to evade criminal law, and therefore should be punished in the same way as men. 
 
 
                                                 
72 Ibid., p. 85. 
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74 See also Giurisprudenza pratica, 13 (1830), 176-77. 
75 Cazzetta, Praesumitur seducta, p. 338. 
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3. Extramarital relations 
 
Alongside seduction, which affected ‘honest’ girls, extramarital relations, that is, sexual 
intercourse outside marriage, were also not allowed, and even punished. Public authorities, 
and society as a whole, paid great attention to issues causing disorder and scandalo 
pubblico, events conflicting with the moral, behavioural and cultural structures around 
which society revolved. As we shall see, authorities tried their best to circumscribe sexual 
intercourse within the boundaries of wedlock both by removing possible obstacles to 
marriage (e.g. canonical impediments) and by punishing situations that could not be solved 
in other ways, as in the case when the parties involved were already married to other people. 
Sexual intercourse outside the marriage bond was defined in terms of ‘pratiche disoneste’ 
or ‘commercio illecito’, explicitly conferring a moral stigma, and, at the same time, defining 
sex within marriage as honest and licit. 
In the Kingdom of Sardinia, the ‘pratiche disoneste’ were handled as a crime and 
punished according to Article 437 of the Codice Penale. The sentence depended upon 
whether the people involved were married or not, and, made no formal distinction between 
men and women: unmarried people could risk up to one year in prison; a married person, 
who had sexual intercourse with an unmarried person, could undergo one to two years of 
prison; if both were married, they would be condemned to imprisonment from two to three 
years.76 This article did not mention adultery: the boundaries between adultery and 
extramarital relations were blurred and pertained to the way they were perceived (I shall 
deal with adultery in Chapter 6, when examining causes of separation). Extramarital 
relations, which often were also adulterous, impacted on society’s sense of honour, and 
authorities felt the need to remedy. A cause for adultery, instead, had to be initiated by the 
betrayed spouse, who could also decide not to initiate it at all. Illicit sexual intercourse was 
a public matter and a crime against ‘il costume pubblico’, whereas adultery was a crime 
against ‘l’ordine delle famiglie’.77 
This is illustrated in a judgement of 17 August 1855, regarding a man, whose family 
name was Ellena (no other details about his identity were given), given a three-year sentence 
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in prison for having had an affair with a woman, a certain Duverney.78 They both lived in 
Chambéry and were both married to other people, yet they persisted in their relation, which 
provoked scandalo pubblico in the local community. The mayor of Chambéry demanded 
their arrest, and the tribunal, after having questioned the witnesses, enforced their 
punishment on the basis of Article 437. The case was appealed by Ellena: he argued that his 
punishment was unjust as none of the people who had borne witness against him should 
have been allowed to do so. In particular, he claimed that neither the mayor nor the police 
could testify, as this was not an office but an instance case. The difference relied on the 
possibility of the case being initiated by public authorities (office case) or by a person who 
had a claim (instance case). Ellena maintained that the lawsuit could have been initiated 
only by his spouse, who had been betrayed and had motives to seek a remedy. He also 
argued that Article 437 punished concubinage, and the nature of their relation was not such, 
because they did not live together and the law condemned not ‘gli atti di fornicazione, ma 
l’insulto fatto alla società ed alla religione con legami illegali imitanti il matrimonio, con 
carattere di comune abitazione, letto, vita e nome’.79 Other than claiming that public 
authority was not allowed to bear witness in such a case, Ellena also tried to highlight that 
‘le relazioni illecite tra persone di sesso diverso sono affare di coscienza’.80 Conversely to 
Ellena’s point, this case confirms that nineteenth-century society firmly believed that sex 
was not just an intimate matter and public authorities were allowed to intrude in a person’s 
intimate life. Ellena’s argument was essentially wrong: Article 437 did not punish 
concubinage as did, instead, Article 526. Both the court of first instance and that of appeal 
pointed out that Article 437 precisely stated that ‘toutes les relations illicites qui ont été 
fréquentes et ont amenés le scandale public’ were to be punished. The sentence was 
appropriate because it has been ascertained that:  
 
la femme Duverney avait des relations illicites avec Ellena, qu’elle entrait chez lui de jour et de nuit, que ces 
relations, dont ce dernier s’était même vanté, avaient le caractère de scandal public, et que les deux prévenus 
étaient mariés.81 
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It is worth noting that the court emphasised the characteristics of this relation, which fit into 
its definition of public scandal: their sexual relations were ‘fréquentes’, and the woman 
entered the man’s house at all hours of the day.  
In Lombardy-Venetia, instead, sexual intercourse was not punished, arguably 
because ‘lo scandalo dell’inquisizione sarebbe spesso un male maggiore dell’impunità’.82 
However, the moral authority and the rules of the Catholic Church strongly influenced the 
approach towards these issues. Session XXIV of the Council of Trent’s Canons stated that 
those who carried out ‘pratiche disoneste’ were warned three times, and, if they persisted in 
behaving in such a way, excommunicated, regardless of their status or social class. Although 
punishment was deemed to be applied to people of any class and status, closer attention was 
paid to the poor, who were considered to be more easily prey to incontinence,83 which was 
‘[il vizio] il più vile, il più schifoso, il più abbominevole’.84 
In 1855, for example, the Milanese Curia wrote a letter to the local lieutenancy with 
the suggestion to allow a couple to marry as soon as possible. The case concerned a woman 
from Busto Arsizio (a town 40 km from Milan), who wanted to marry the man with whom 
she had lived in previous years. As her husband, from whom she had legally been separated 
since 1847, had just died, she did not want to wait the time prescribed by the law before 
remarriage. The Curia explained the situation with these words: ‘la sconsigliata si diede ad 
altro uomo libero [...] e con esso visse in riprovevole concubinato, con quanto rumore e con 
qual danno di cattivo esempio, non è a dirsi’.85 The choice of the terms used serves as a 
notable example of the Ottocento’s mindset. The woman is described as ‘sconsigliata’, 
maybe meaning that she had not been educated to the correct way of living, and had not 
received the right ‘consiglio’. Along with the disappointment that emerges from this letter, 
it could be also noted that this couple had lived together for many years, and the Church 
could do nothing else but morally condemn them.86 The situation of this sconsigliata, 
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however, was redeemable: by allowing the couple to marry immediately, ‘si verrebbe in tal 
modo a por fine immediata ad un disordine che generi e genera tanto scandalo’.87  
The Church, and secular authorities as well, tended to do their best to favour 
marriage. As we have seen, ecclesiastical authorities had significant powers over canon law 
outside the boundaries of the Papal States. Alongside impedient impediments such as 
marriage promise, discussed earlier in this chapter, the local Bishop could also remove the 
fourteen types of diriment impediments, which rendered a person incapable of validly 
contracting a marriage.88 Affinity, for example, was a diriment impediment the Bishop’s 
Curia had the power to issue a dispensation. It was defined as ‘una specie di parentela 
originata dalla copula carnale o sia lecita o illecita, purché sia sufficiente alla generazione’,89 
and could exist between a man and a woman’s blood relations, and vice versa.90 This was 
an impediment that individuals very often asked to remove: it frequently happened that a 
widow or a widower continued to have relations with the family of his or her deceased 
spouse and ended up marrying another member of the in-law family. In these cases, the new 
couple usually reported to the Curia and explained their motivations for marrying, which 
often were basic and aimed at getting through everyday life. 
A case in point is that of Francesco Gerardo Turri and Amalia Civali, who, in 1863, 
went before the Bishop’s Curia of Verona to ask for the necessary dispensation. Amalia, 
aged 37, was the widow of Giovanni Turri, the brother of Francesco Gerardo, aged 40. The 
two described their actual condition and pleaded to be allowed to marry. They admitted to 
having had sexual intercourse before the death of Amalia’s husband, and even believed that 
the son she had was Francesco Gerardo’s and not her late husband’s child. Moreover, 
Amalia was again pregnant, and Francesco Gerardo was the father. They made no mention 
of any feeling or love existing between them, further still, Francesco Gerardo added that he 
was in extreme need of a woman to carry out housework and assist his aged parents. They 
also stressed to the Curia that they both were very poor, ‘miserabilissimi’, and, taken into 
consideration the ‘mali commessi’, would not find other spouses. However, the most 
important argument in favour of the removal of the impediment might have been that, if 
they got married, ‘sarebbe levato lo scandalo e provveduto alla donna, che altrimenti così 
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abbandonata si darebbe ad una vita cattiva’.91 As Margherita Pelaja argued, the Church saw 
the people as prone to sin, ‘sempre sull’orlo dell’orgasmo’,92 and, therefore, every action to 
avoid scandal and favour marriage was to be taken.93 The couple of this case touched the 
right chord by highlighting the scandal and the risk for Amalia of incurring in a ‘vita 
cattiva’: the impediment to marriage was removed, and they were allowed to marry.94 
Confining sexual intercourse within the boundaries of marriage was a primary goal 
to pursue. James Brundage highlighted that authorities were convinced that ‘fornication was 
[…] the basic type of illicit sex, a sordid business that fouled the body while it sullied the 
soul’,95 and these ideas were delivered by means of both temporal and secular authorities in 
states such as the Kingdom of Sardinia and Lombardy-Venetia. But sin and grace were ‘a 
concern of all people, from the theologians to the most modest peasants, [and much] more 
than a means of governing Christian society’,96 and, as Jean Delumeau observed, ‘spiritual 
fear most deeply afflicted the Christian elites themselves’.97  
In such a context, confession, and possibly repentance, were solutions provided to 
society, which was viewed in a constant and crucial tension between sin and salvation,98 
and, at the same time, were means to confirm the Catholic Church’s power and influence 
beyond the boundaries of its secular state. Many tracts explained how to tackle in practice 
sensitive and difficult situations where people’s morality was at risk, given that ‘gli agguati 
del peccato della carne [sono] onnipresenti’ and the sin ‘ci stringe d’assedio e si cela sotto 
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le più innocenti apparenze’.99 For example, the priest Filippo Maria Salvatori in his 
Istruzione pratica per i confessori novelli (1832) explained that ‘in tre ore circa di lavoro 
seguito mi riesce di fare una confessione generale anche di 50 e 60 anni’.100 Confession, a 
prerequisite for absolution, had to be complete and sincere; but receiving a confession was 
a thorny issue even for an experienced priest, who had to pay particular attention to avoiding 
any contact with the sinner, especially if this was a woman, as ‘il volto della donna è come 
un vento che brucia la pelle’.101 Despite these efforts and training, once confession and 
repentance were obtained, it was difficult to find a person who would not fall into sin again. 
Carrying out dishonest practices brought such a ‘danno spirituale, peggiore di tutti gli altri, 
sì è la gran difficoltà che incontrano i disonesti ad emendarsi, la gran facilità a morire 
impenitenti e dannarsi’.102 
By controlling marriage and sexuality, the Catholic Church penetrated into the fabric 
of Italian society and imposed its own sense of morality, which was to be pursued and 
praised as the ‘correct’ way of conducting oneself in life and society. This is because ‘sexual 
beliefs and practices exert power, not only over individual conduct, but also over the ways 
in which institutions themselves grow and develop [having] significant bearings upon 
property interests, household structure, and notions about morality, among many other 
things’.103 Preventing the disordine that dishonest practices could cause to society was not 
just a way to avoid scandal and ensure peace: the intrusiveness in the intimate sphere of an 
individual was a means of control,104 and also a mission entrusted to authorities. When 
prison was not enough to discourage illicit intercourse, moral condemnation and menace of 
perdition were put into play, as the ultimate goal was an ideal society in which things moved 
                                                 
99 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
100 F.M. Salvatori, Istruzione pratica per i confessori novelli: divisa in due parti (Turin: Marietti, 1832), p. 
271. On confession and the Church, see also P. Brooks, Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and 
Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 90-102; Pelaja and Scaraffia, Due in una carne, 
pp. 101-48.   
101 Antonino da Firenze cited in Pelaja and Scaraffia, Due in una carne, p. 136. 
102 Piano and Labus, Istruzioni dogmatiche, p. 694. 
103 Brundage, Law, Sex and Christian Society, p. 1.  
104 On this point, see also Delumeau, Sin and Fear, pp. 320-22; Di Simplicio, Peccato penitenza perdono; 
Bonacchi, Legge e peccato; C.F. Black, Church, Religion and Society in Early Modern Italy (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); I. Fosi, La giustizia del papa. Sudditi e tribunali nello Stato Pontificio in età 
moderna (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 2007). 
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in the correct way, with people put down to authority, and the law and hierarchical order 





Women, marriage and the transmission of property 
 
If intrusion in the people’s intimate sphere was a way to exert control over society and 
enforce the established order, lawmakers and authorities also paid attention to matters 
regarding the transmission of wealth. Through dowry and inheritance, wealth changed 
owner thus challenging the equilibrium on which families and society depended. While, in 
the Kingdom of Sardinia, the dowry was a woman’s lawful share of her parents’ inheritance; 
in Lombardy-Venetia, women had the possibility to inherit to the same degree as their male 
relatives, with the dowry being just an advance on the portion of inheritance they were 
entitled to at their parents’ death. 
However, as we shall see, cultural shackles were still very strong, and despite being 
under the rule of Austrian law, Lombardy-Venetia shared social rules with other areas of 
the Italian peninsula. In particular, the prominence given to men can be inferred from many 
private acts, such as wills, which attempted to override the law, and debarred women from 
accessing the due portion of their family’s wealth.  
Drawing on archival material and legal journals, including Annali di Giurisprudenza 
or Giurisprudenza pratica secondo la legislazione austriaca, this Chapter analyses attitudes 
towards dowry and inheritance by examining a legal disquisition as well as a select number 
of cases. With regard to the Kingdom of Sardinia, the cases are judicial proceedings 
concerning dowry; cases regarding Lombardy-Venetia, instead, pertain to wills, and 
demonstrate the distorting intent with which the latter were sometimes used. These case 
studies taken together help us to understand the expectations, mentalities and behavioural 
patterns of nineteenth-century society. 
 
 
1. ‘Recapitata onestamente’: women’s exclusion from inheritance in the Kingdom of 
Sardinia 
 
As we saw earlier in Chapter 3, the dowry was a crucial institution in most areas of the 
Italian peninsula. In the Kingdom of Sardinia, it was the only inheritance portion women 
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had a right to, except for the short period of the French conquests, when they were entitled 
to inherit in the same way as men. With the repeal of the Napoleonic code after the Congress 
of Vienna, the Regio Editto of 21 May 1814 directed that the Regie Costituzioni of 1770, 
and other acts promulgated up to 23 June 1800, again had force of law.1 This meant that 
women’s access to inheritance was once again limited to an ‘appropriate’ dowry. The 
measure of this appropriateness was calculated by considering the family’s goods, and 
dowries given ‘alle persone di simil grado, secondo la consuetudine del luogo’.2 For married 
women, an appropriate dowry was ‘quella dote, colla quale sieno state onestamente 
ricapitate’.3 As we shall see, this concept had fluid boundaries which were sometimes 
questioned before courts.  
Having a dowry also implied that a woman was excluded from inheriting from her 
mother,4 and had no right to her relatives’ patrimony. Especially during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, these norms led to several disputes, to the extent that jurists felt the need 
to clarify some points related to women’s exclusion. In 1838, Annali di giurisprudenza, an 
authoritative journal of jurisprudence of the Kingdom of Sardinia, published a disquisition 
on the maxim ‘tot dotes quot hereditates’ (as many dowries as inheritances), that is, whether 
an amount corresponding to an appropriate dowry was due to a woman on each ab intestato 
inheritance.5 This was meant to explain that, although a patrimony could substantially 
increase after receiving several inheritances, a woman, who was already dowered, was not 
entitled to any addition. As we shall see in this disquisition as well as in the cases reported 
in the following sections, the issue contained many contradictions and inconsistencies: the 
difficulties in dealing with the enormous bulk of laws, all in force at the same time, and the 
need to interpret the law without provoking a disruptive effect in the social fabric 
consistently affected the coherence of the legal framework.6  
                                                 
1 Regio Editto, N. 9, Raccolta degli atti del governo di Sua Maestà il Re di Sardegna dall'anno 1814 a tutto il 
1832, 22 vols (Turin: Pignetti and Carena, 1842), I, pp. 15-18. 
2 Art. 6, Lib. V, Tit. 7, Leggi, e costituzioni di Sua Maestà, p. 336. 
3 Ibid., p. 336. 
4 Art. 3, Lib. V, Tit. 7, Leggi, e costituzioni di Sua Maestà, 2 vols (Turin: Stamperia Reale, 1770), I, p. 336. 
5 Annali di giurisprudenza raccolta mensile pubblicata da una società di avvocati e causidici, 1 (1838), 41-
51.  
6 On the lack of coherence in the nineteenth-century legal system, see P. Grossi, ‘Tradizione e modelli nella 
sistemazione post-unitaria della proprietà’, Quaderni Fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, 
5-6 (1976-1977), 202-338 (pp. 203-06). 
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The disquisition stated that, even if women were excluded propter dotem by law, at 
the opening of each inheritance, they had to be considered as if they were heirs in order to 
correctly assess their case. The reasoning behind this principle was that, if the assets 
increased considerably, the dowry, too, might be subject to a re-measurement of 
appropriateness. Annali di giurisprudenza pointed out that the crucial point to consider was 
whether a woman was married or not, because ‘la differenza che passa tra la maritata e la 
nubile sta riposta nel modo di determinare la congruità della dote, che venne loro lasciata, 
o costituita’.7 Even though the Regie Costituzioni did not explicitly make such distinction, 
the journal argued that the appropriateness was to be determined at the time of marriage, 
given that an unmarried woman could also have a dowry which could have been bequeathed 
by will or promised before her marriage, and then formally constituted after this event. The 
journal specified that a woman, who was ‘recapitata onestamente’, ‘è rimossa dalle 
successioni che a di lei favore si aprono’, because a married woman was always assumed to 
be appropriately dowered.8 On this basis, there was no reason to grant her further rights. As 
we shall see, a possible consequence of this principle was that if, for example, a woman had 
received a dowry appropriate to her status from a relative, she would even be excluded from 
the inheritance of her father. 
Annali di giurisprudenza next gave a number of examples of late eighteenth-century 
lawsuits, which allowed room for questions. In 1781, for example, Rosalia Caccia – already 
married and dowered – was denied the inheritance of her deceased sister Polissena; but their 
sister Felicita was able to inherit because she was still unmarried and had no dowry. In 
another case, decided in 1795, a court denied Maddalena Gallea Bussolino, who was also 
already married and with a dowry provided by an uncle, the possibility to inherit from her 
mother and her sister, because she was already ‘recapitata’ and dowered.9 Conversely, in a 
judgement ruled a few years earlier, in 1740, the court maintained that, as Rosalia Anna 
inherited a sum of money from her mother and, then, constituted her dowry by herself, she 
was still able to succeed to her father, ‘senza punto far caso della circostanza se […] fosse 
maritata, o nubile’.10 As mentioned earlier, the formal act of constituting a dowry prevented 
the free use of money and goods which were part of it, thus keeping them safe for the time 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 Annali di giurisprudenza, 1 (1838), 41-56 (p. 51). 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid., p. 52. 
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of widowhood. In the case of Rosalia Anna, the decision relied on the assumption that her 
dowry was not constituted in a way to remove her from succession, because it was not given 
by ‘ascendenti paterni, o materni, o da trasversali’.11 It is clear that this interpretation of the 
law contradicted what the journal claimed at the beginning of the disquisition, namely that 
a married woman was always assumed to be appropriately dowered, and, therefore, ‘rimossa 
dalle successioni che a di lei favore si aprono’. 
Annali di giurisprudenza added that judges often granted more than one dowry to 
women: ‘sembrando loro troppo rigorosa l’esclusione […] ravvisavano ottimo consiglio il 
mitigare l’asprezza della legge, allorché l’occasione si presentava di farlo senza sovvertirne 
il letterale precetto’.12 The journal argued that there were always solid reasons that permitted 
an exception, and courts had to carefully assess if money or goods already given to women 
could be considered appropriate dowries or not. For example, in 1837, a court ordered that 
a woman, Giacinta Regis, could obtain a dowry from the patrimony of her brother 
Domenico. The decision highlighted that, even though she had already been given a dowry 
from her father’s estate, Giacinta was not yet married and was allowed to remeasure the 
appropriateness of her dowry on the basis of the wealth left by her deceased brother.13  
With regard to unmarried women, the value of their dowries had to be carefully 
evaluated and they had the right to examine their appropriateness on the basis of the quality 
and quantity of their family’s assets. If a dowry left by an ancestor or by other relatives was 
still appropriate, it should not be increased; instead, if it ceased to be appropriate, especially 
in comparison to ‘persone di simil grado secondo la consuetudine del luogo’, addition 
should be made to that dowry.14 
As it emerged from this disquisition, alongside the written law, its interpretation was 
far from pristine, and the maxim ‘tot dotes quot hereditates’ needed to be interpreted case 
by case and not taken literally. With regard to dowry, given its pivotal importance in areas 
such as the Kingdom of Sardinia, various sources of law coexisted and their interpretation 
led to contradictions, overlaps and inconsistencies, which often resulted in unexpected court 
judgements.  
 
                                                 
11 Ibid, pp. 52-53. 
12 Ibid., p. 49. 
13 Ibid., p. 47. 




2. The Roncallis: a wealthy family in Piedmont 
 
In the Kingdom of Sardinia, despite being debarred from accessing a large portion of their 
parents’ patrimony, women had to be present when the formal act of constituting their dowry 
was signed. A case regarding a litigation that took place in Piedmont, which was part of the 
Kingdom of Sardinia, is illustrative of this rule.  
The dispute regards members of a large patriarchal family, the Roncallis, and 
highlights the large difference between the portion of family assets that women and men 
were entitled to receive. Furthermore, it gives an interesting perspective on how courts dealt 
with the many co-existing and, sometimes, conflicting laws. As we shall see, the Roncalli 
family lived in the Kingdom of Sardinia, precisely in Vigevano, a town 50 km from Milan. 
They were very close to the Duchy of Milan, which would become part of the Kingdom of 
Lombardy-Venetia, and had several social and economic relations in that area. Alongside 
the custom of using the scudi of Milan as currency, inhabitants often signed legal acts based 
on the Duchy’s local statutes. In such cases, judges had not only to tackle a dispute in itself, 
but also to deal with different sources of law. 
Maria Longhi and Giuseppe Roncalli had one son and six daughters. An image of 




The Roncallis were very wealthy, and were able to provide each of their daughters with a 
dowry worth 3,833 scudi of Milan, plus a 540-scudo trousseau. As Cesarina Casanova 
observed, a family’s choices of continuity corresponded ‘all’entità delle risorse, materiali e 
simboliche, […] e al quadro istituzionale e normativo che condiziona le loro possibilità di 
disporne’.15 Such were the Roncallis’ choices in the interests of continuity: they gave very 
good dowries to all their daughters, but it was their son Vincenzo who was the ‘chosen’ one. 
Entrusted with the goal to carry forward the family’s name and status, he was entitled to 
inherit the great majority of their patrimonies and, above all, their physical assets, namely 
estates and land.  
Two daughters, Giacoma and Gioanna, married in 1802 and 1809, respectively. 
They both went to live in Milan and their dowries were established on the basis of the 
Statutes of Milan. Giacoma’s dowry was constituted on 9 December 1802, and was given 
to Serafino Sanchioli, father of her husband Giuseppe. Gioanna married 17-year old 
Giuseppe Antonio Negroni. In Gioanna’s case, the dowry instrument, dated 20 January 
1809, reported that it was Clara Sassi – mother of Giuseppe Antonio – who gave consent to 
her son’s marriage and received ‘in her hands’ the dowry of her daughter-in-law.16 
According to the Statutes of Milan, a woman was able to make contracts if she was a widow 
and had no agnates, and this point was to be proven with an oath.17 A widow was also able 
                                                 
15 Casanova, La famiglia italiana, p. 43. 
16 Turin, State Archive of Turin (AST), Casale, Corte di Appello, First Quarter of 1849, n. 31. A summary of 
this case can also be found in Giurisprudenza Italiana, 2 (1849), 671-97. 
17 See Statute 328, Statuti di Milano: volgarizzati con note, e spiegazioni (Milan: Galeazzi, 1773), pp. 177-79. 
Since ancient times, the oath was highly significant for the confirmation of a legal transaction, if its validity 
was doubtful. Various jurists maintained that ‘col mezzo del giuramento si riconoscevano efficaci anche 
obblighi che il diritto civile rifiutava di riconoscere’, and its importance was granted by the legal value it had 
in Canon law, in which ‘valeva a costituire una propria obbligazione ogni qual volta la promessa fosse 
moralmente lecita’ (Pertile, Storia del diritto italiano, IV, pp. 467-70). An oath was also meant to be an 
assertion of the truth ‘invocando Dio come vindice della menzogna’ (A. Lorenzoni, Scelta di disposizioni del 
diritto romano (Padua: Cartallier and Sicca, 1838), pp. 160-63), or a confirmation of the truth (‘colui che giura 
rende a Dio il diritto della verità’): it was an obligation that bound people who swore, compelling them to 
fulfil this promise. The oath was ‘un atto di religione col quale si prende Dio a testimonio delle cose che si 
affermano o si promettono’ (Enciclopedia dell’ecclesiastico, 4 vols (Naples: Ranucci, 1844), II, pp. 241-44. 
Despite its decreasing use in the eighteenth century, the Regie Costituzioni described the oath in great detail. 
See Artt. 1-20, Lib. III, Tit. XIV, Leggi, e costituzioni di Sua Maestà. Loix et constitutions de Sa Majesté, 2 
vols (Turin: Stamperia Reale, 1770), I, pp. 350-58. In particular, Art. 11 mentioned that anyone who perjured 
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to give consent to her children’s marriage if they were minors.18 The consent Clara Sassi 
gave to her son’s marriage and the fact that she received her daughter-in-law’s dowry prove 
she was a widow. Although at that time the Napoleonic Code was in force in this area and 
excluded the recourse to any other sources of law, people continued to conclude acts by 
referring to local statutes. Given the uncertain political and juridical situation they 
experienced, perhaps people might have preferred to resort to the legal system they were 
familiar with, despite its many inconsistencies.   
Two other daughters, Vincenza and Teresa, both married in 1805: Vincenza to 
Gioanni Francesco Mellana on 23 June, and Teresa to Antonio Maria Gallone on 17 
November. On the day of Teresa’s marriage both sisters’ dowry instruments were signed: 
their father Giuseppe gave them 3,000 scudi of Milan each, while their mother Maria 
granted them 833 scudi each.19 Both parents signed the dowry instruments after the 
marriages of the two girls, as did the girls’ fathers-in-law, who in their turn promised the 
controdote, as was customary in that area.20 These instruments were made on the basis of 
the Statutes of Vigevano, the town where the two sisters lived and would continue to live 
after their marriage.  
At the turn of the century several new norms were enforced in the area where the 
Roncallis lived, which was then under French rule: in 1805, at the time of the girls’ 
marriages, the droit intermédiaire was in force; in 1806, the Napoleonic Code would be 
applied. However, as Giuseppe and Maria Roncalli had already done with their first two 
daughters, the dowries of Vincenza and Teresa, too, were signed according to municipal 
statutes. In Vincenza’s instrument, Filippo Mellana, father of Gioanni Francesco and acting 
on his behalf through a power of attorney, ‘ha confessato, admesso, e dichiarato, avere 
avuto, e ricevuto [la dote e] tutta la scherpa, o fardello’, and promised that ‘mai più né esso, 
né il suo signor padre, loro eredi, e successori gli chiederanno più cosa alcuna per quanto 
                                                 
was considered ‘ipso iure per infame, sarà privato d’ogni dignità, o altro pubblico uffizio’ (Art. 11, p. 354-
55). 
18 De Poenis, Lib. IV, Constitutiones Mediolanensis (Milan: Marelli, 1764), p. 255. 
19 L. Malavasi, La Metrologia Italiana, nei suoi scambievoli rapporti desunti dal confronto col sistema 
metrico-decimale (Modena: Malavasi and Compagno, 1844), p. 284. The scudo or scudo effettivo of Milan 
roughly corresponded to 6 Milanese lire, 3.89 Piedmontese lire, 4.61 Piedmontese new lire and 4.56 Italian 
lire.   
20 AST, Casale, Corte di Appello, First Quarter of 1849, n. 31. 
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sopra, a pena dei danni, interessi e spese in giudicio e fuori’.21 The instrument also reported 
that, if Gioanni died before Vincenza, the dowry was to be returned increased by 20 per cent 
(controdote). If instead she were to die before him, and the couple had no children, only 
half the dowry was to be returned (this gain was known as lucrum dotis and will be analysed 
in the next chapter). The controdote and the lucrum dotis were common customs of that 
area, whereas some statutes of the Italian peninsula explicitly mentioned these provisions.  
Interestingly, the act also stated that Maria Longhi, Vincenza’s mother, gave 833 
scudi  
 
coll’assenso, e pieno consenso del nominato di lei consorte signor Giuseppe Roncalli, quanto anche per ogni 
maggior abbondanza delli signori Cappellano in questa Regia cattedrale Pietro Paolo fu signor Gioanni 
Antonio, e Giacomo ambi Longhi del vivente Gioanni Battista, qui nati, ed abitanti, quali conoscendo utile il 
presente contratto le danno e prestano il loro assenso, e consenso.22  
 
Pietro Paolo and Giacomo were cousins of Maria Longhi and were not required by law to 
authorise her to undertake this act, but, as written in the instrument, this was nevertheless 
done ‘per ogni maggior abbondanza’. As we saw in Chapter 3, male relatives were a sort of 
reference point from the family of origin to whom a woman could report in case of need. 
Their inclusion in the signature of these acts was also a way of insuring themselves against 
potential future disputes. 
The act constituting Teresa’s dowry was similar to that of Vincenza, and was signed 
by Evasio Gallone, on behalf of his son Antonio Maria.23  
On 30 March 1831, Maria Longhi died. In her will, dated 6 June 1817, she left all 
her patrimony to her only son Vincenzo. She added that a dowry equal to those of Vincenza 
and Teresa was to be given to the remaining daughters, Giuseppa and Rosa Anna, who at 
the time when she drew up her will were not yet married. She also pointed out that if 
Giuseppa and Rosa Anna wanted to become nuns, Vincenzo would have to give them ‘vita 
loro natural durante un annuo livello di lire duecento cinquanta di Milano, eguali a lire cento 
novantuna, e centesimi ottantotto nuove di Piemonte da pagarsi a semestri maturati’.24 If 
                                                 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid. 




they were to die unmarried, the 833 scudi they would otherwise receive should not be shared 
with the other daughters but would go to Vincenzo.25 Giuseppa married just a year after her 
mother’s will was written, in 1818, and Rosa Anna in 1828, but Maria had not made any 
change to her testament.  
On 15 July 1834, three years after Maria’s death, her husband also died. In his will, 
made on 24 September 1819, Giuseppe Roncalli ‘supplement[ed] the rules of law 
concerning inheritance’,26 leaving all his patrimony to his son Vincenzo whilst bequeathing 
100 coins of pure gold to each of his daughters and to his grandchildren, Marianna Sanchioli, 
daughter of Giacoma, and Carolina, Evasio, and Giacoma Gallone, children of Teresa, who, 
by 1819, had already passed away. These legacies were to be paid out a year after his death 
and without any interest. Giuseppe also added that they could have these coins only if they 
did not bother Vincenzo with further requests. To Rosa Anna, the only daughter who at the 
time he drafted his will was not yet married, he left the same amount of money he gave to 
his other daughters as a dowry. Rosa Anna eventually got married in 1828, but, at the time 
of her father’s death, had already died. That of Giuseppe Roncalli could be described as ‘an 
unchanging legal image of the father who knows best and always does right by his children 
and substance’:27 a typical paterfamilias, whose major concern was the transmission of his 
property to the right person, who, in this case, was his son. One might argue that Giuseppe’s 
will favoured his daughters and grandchildren, rather than his son Vincenzo: as we saw, 
according to the law in force (the Regie Costituzioni) women were excluded from inheriting, 
and the price of their exclusion was a dowry. Hence, they were not entitled to receive any 
further goods or money if already dowered, contrary to what happened in this case. 
However, the fact that Giuseppe died fifteenth years after drawing up his will and had not 
even considered the marriage and the death of his daughter Rosa Anna allows room to think 
that his major concern was to benefit his son, who would become the new paterfamilias, 
and to prevent the fragmentation of his patrimony, a dreadful scenario he witnessed as 
possible during the French conquests, just thirty years earlier.  
Three months after his father’s death, Vincenzo gave the 100-coin legacy included 
in his father’s testament to his sisters, to his nephew Evasio and to his two nieces Marianna 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Kuehn, Family and Gender, p. 225. 
27 Ibid., p. 346. 
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and Giacoma. The other niece, Carolina, was already dead. As we saw, in his will, Giuseppe 
Roncalli prescribed that, if in the meanwhile any of his daughters or grandchildren died, 
their legacy should not be given to their surviving heirs. Vincenzo, however, decided to 
donate Carolina’s legacy to Evasio and Giacoma, rather than keeping it for himself. He did 
the same with his sister Rosa Anna’s children, whose mother was already dead by then, and 
who, based upon the will, were not entitled to receive any legacy. The recipients of the 
legacies signed an act by which they declared that they would not ask for any more money. 
Vincenzo’s generosity might have relied on the fact that the patrimony he inherited was so 
large that 200 coins of gold were not much to him, and, by doing so, he might have hoped 
not to allow any room for further disputes. The fact that he gave these legacies nine months 
earlier than the prescribed time also seems to confirm this assumption. 
Despite formally renouncing any further claim, on 11 March 1842, Teresa’s children 
together with Vincenza sued Vincenzo before the court of Vigevano. Their claim was that 
both sisters (Teresa and Vincenza) married under the droit intermédiaire, and Law 6 
Thermidor V (24 July 1797) provided that a dowry alone would not exclude women from 
further inheritance. In this case, their parents had excluded them from their wills, but they 
were still entitled to obtain the legitima portio, a fourteenth of Maria’s and Giuseppe’s 
patrimony, given that they had seven children. Moreover, they claimed that, at the time of 
their marriages, Vincenza and Teresa were not able to validly renounce their rights, because 
they did not know the exact value of their parents’ patrimony, which they now estimated to 
be worth two million lire.28 Their brother Vincenzo Roncalli, instead, argued that both their 
parents had died at the time when the Regie Costituzioni and the Statutes of Vigevano were 
again in force, and prescribed that they were just entitled to an appropriate dowry.  
It took three years to have the first ruling and, on 14 June 1845, the tribunal of 
Vigevano directed that, although Law 6 Thermidor V allowed women to inherit, these rights 
were granted only if these norms were still in force at the time of their parents’ death. 
Therefore, the case was to be decided on the basis of the Regie Costituzioni, which, 
‘trattandosi d’escludere le femmine dalle successioni ab intestato, ravvisavano congrua 
quella dote, quand’anche tenuissima, purché fossevi susseguito l’onesto ricapito della 
dotata’.29 In this particular case, 
                                                 
28 Two million lire were worth 433,839 scudi. 




in cui non trattasi di successione ab intestato, congrua devesi ritenere la dote costituita alle Vincenzina, e 
Teresa sorelle Roncalli, dacché tale venne dichiarata nel testamento paterno e tale venne pure riconosciuta 
dalli Mellana, e Gallone rispettivi mariti delle dette sorelle Vincenzina e Teresa, non che dai loro genitori dai 
quali vennero tali doti esatte senza punto muovere querela sulla incongruità loro.30  
 
The tribunal also argued that Giuseppe, the paterfamilias, had explicitly requested that his 
daughters should not ‘molestare l’erede’: by accepting his legacy, Teresa’s children and 
Vincenza had demonstrated a perfect understanding of the testator’s will, and had no reason 
to insist.31  
But the lawsuit was far from over: they appealed before the Senato of Casale, a 
Piedmontese high court, which, in order to reach a decision, evaluated all the documents 
presented by both parties. The lawyers of Vincenza and Teresa’s children maintained that 
there were some points that could overturn the previous decision: first of all, as they did in 
the previous instance before the court of Vigevano, they reasserted that Law 6 Thermidor 
V, which did not exclude women from inheritance, was in force when the two women 
married; second, their dowries were not constituted in the presence of Vincenza and Teresa, 
and, particularly, at the time of their constitution the two women were already married and 
‘queste circostanze bastano ad escludere li concetti di doti congrue, od incongrue’; third, 
their dowry instruments were void because drawn up on the basis of the Statutes of 
Vigevano, which could not be enforced as, at that time, the Regie Costituzioni had already 
been enacted. These were the law of the whole Kingdom of Sardinia and could not be 
overridden by the law of a town, as municipal statutes were.32 The appellants also insisted, 
once again, that they did not know the exact amount of the parents’ patrimony when they 
signed the acquittance after receiving the 100-coin legacy, and offered to prove this by oath. 
They claimed that Maria’s patrimony was worth 300,000 lire in estates; Giuseppe had 
properties in Vigevano and Novara worth 700,000 lire, 20,000 lire in chattels and a further 
800,000 lire in money and funds held in banks of Milan and Piedmont.   
In the vision of their parents, the Roncalli daughters were going to enrich other 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. On hierarchy of legal sources, see also A. Liva, La gerarchia delle fonti di diritto nelle città dell’Italia 
settentrionale (Milan: Giuffrè, 1976). 
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families through their dowries and have children not bearing their names: their son, by 
contrast, was going to ‘preserve’ and ‘perpetuate’ the Roncalli name and was worthy of an 
amount of wealth that would allow him to become a paterfamilias, that is, the head of a 
patriarchal and upstanding family as his father had been. Accordingly, the daughters were 
deemed worthy of obtaining 3,833 scudi each, while Vincenzo inherited roughly 410,000 
scudi. Against the appellants’ argument, Vincenzo’s lawyer affirmed that the inherited 
patrimony was not that large, but any investigation to estimate its exact amount was 
‘superflua e senza scopo’, because the Statutes of Vigevano ruled that women could only 
obtain an appropriate dowry, no matter if given before or after marriage.33 The exact amount 
of an appropriate dowry was not mentioned in these Statutes, but, as Vincenzo’s lawyer 
claimed, it could be inferred from the sixteen documents he presented. These described 
dowries given to ‘femmine vigevanasche’, from 1795 to 1806 and from 1814 up to 1836, 
and represent a further source of information about the customs of the town of Vigevano: 
alongside the value of dowries, they also allow us to better understand the social and 
economic fabric of the area. In 1795, for example, Francesca Mantegazza, a ‘femmina 
vigevanasca’, married the physician Ignazio Clerici with the consent of her father Pietro 
Giorgio Mantegazza, and was given an 8,000-lira dowry (1,735 scudi of Milan). Francesca 
considered this dowry appropriate as provided by the Statutes of Vigevano, and accepted it 
with ‘l’intervento, pieno consenso e approvazione del suo signor marito’.34 Her husband 
authorised her to accept this dowry ‘perché riconosce cedere le cose suddette in evidente 
utilità e vantaggio della detta sua moglie’.35 Maria Gusberti, another ‘vigevanasca’, married 
Federico Rainoldi in 1801 and, after her marriage, received a 21,000-lira of Milan dowry 
(3,500 scudi), plus a fardello worth 3,000 lire (500 scudi). She confirmed that its 
constitution was ruled by the Statutes of Vigevano. Teresa Negroni, too, received her dowry 
after her marriage with Francesco Fusi in 1815: its value was 25,000 lire of Milan while her 
scherpa was worth 2,800 lire. Lucia De Previde Massara married Cavalier Zeffirino Calleri 
di Sala in 1827, and received a dowry worth 25,328 lire (5,494 scudi of Milan) from her 
father Ignazio. The dowry was constituted a year later, with an act dated 30 June 1828, and 
given to her father-in-law Francesco Zeffirino, who was a member of the Reggimento 
                                                 





Cavalleggeri Savoia, a prominent cavalry unit.  
These dowries had been given to women, whose status – according to Vincenzo’s 
claims – was comparable to that of the Roncalli family, who were landowners. However, 
only one of the sixteen documents produced, that regarding Lucia De Previde Massara’s 
dowry, exceeded the dowries of the Roncalli women. The other dowry instruments provided 
by Vincenzo’s lawyer concerned families of lower status and were very scant. Giovanna 
Carnevale, for example, married Felice Bassi in 1795 and received a 266.10-lira (57.7 scudi) 
dowry. In the same year, Maria Delbuono married Giovanni Battista Zorzoli. Her dowry, 
worth 133 Piedmontese lire, was paid by her brother on the basis of their father’s will. The 
dowry of Maria Riva, who married Gioanni Acquotta in 1817, was scant, too. She received 
only 380 lire. Finally, Regina Ornati married Pietro Dondena in 1838, and received her 740-
lira dowry from her brothers, as provided in their father’s will.  
Vincenzo’s lawyer claimed that also the cases of two other families, the Pellegrini 
and the Rabezzana, should also be taken into consideration as judicial precedents, in order 
to reach a fair decision. The former case was cited to show that the Pellegrini sisters – Maria, 
Angelica and Maddalena – won their cause against their brothers Michele and Bartolomeo 
because their dowry instruments lacked the formal requirements needed by this kind of act. 
As both their parents died ab intestato, the father in August 1833 and the mother in 
December 1829, the Pellegrini sisters asked their brothers to give ‘una esatta e fedele 
consegna dell’eredità paterna e materna’:36 this would allow them to assess their ‘dote 
congrua’ based on their father’s and mother’s patrimony. They maintained that their dowries 
had to be at least close to the value of the legitima portio, that is, an eighteenth of the 
patrimony, as there were seven daughters and two sons. They claimed that their father’s 
assets were worth 70,000 lire, while their mother’s goods consisted of 3,400 lire. As the 
Regie Costituzioni excluded women from inheritance, they had to receive the ‘price’ of this 
exclusion, which was worth ‘una congrua dote ragguagliata sulla legittima’.37 Moreover, 
they asserted that they had to obtain ‘tante [...] le doti, quante le successioni, attesoché erano 
il prezzo dell’esclusione’,38 a point contradicting the argument presented earlier in Annali 
di giurisprudenza, which highlighted that a properly dowered woman was not entitled to 






obtain any addition to what she had already received.  
Michele and Bartolomeo Pellegrini produced three instruments dated 21 September 
1824, 21 September 1825 and 6 April 1832, which showed that their sisters’ husbands had 
received 1,300 lire each and promised not to ‘inferirli né permettere che loro venisse inferta 
molestia’.39 They added that their sisters’ dowries were appropriate because they had 
allowed them to be ‘onestamente recapitate’, according to the status of their families and 
customs of Boves, the village – 100 km away from Turin – where they lived. On 7 April 
1843, the Senato of Piedmont directed that the three acts were not formally valid dowry 
instruments and that their contents did not explicitly recognise the dowries as ‘congrue’. 
The three instruments had been signed by Giacomo Peano, father-in law of Maddalena, by 
Giuseppe Cavallo and Giuseppe Pellegrini, husbands of Angelica and Maria, respectively, 
but none of the women were present. The father-in-law and the two husbands declared 
themselves satisfied with the amount of the dowries, but did not dismiss the possibility of 
future claims. Vincenzo Roncalli produced this case to demonstrate that the grounds for this 
judgement, made in favour of the women, was that these instruments were not drawn up in 
the correct way. Conversely, Vincenzo maintained that in his own case all the formalities 
required by law had been observed.  
The other case brought in by Vincenzo’s lawyer was that of the Rabezzana family. 
The paterfamilias, Giuseppe, died on 9 November 1835 after making up his will on 17 
January of the same year. He bequeathed the sum of 1,500 lire to each of his two daughters, 
Teresa, married to Giuseppe Bonino, and Maria, married to Carlo Massa. All his other assets 
were to be inherited by his son Bartolomeo and his grandsons Giuseppe and Francesco, 
children of his deceased son Francesco. Since the two women had married under French 
laws, Teresa had not received any dowry, while Maria obtained 1,000 lire ‘pour avancement 
d’hoire’ together with a 1,300-lira trousseau, on 21 September 1810.40 Maria, together with 
the heirs of Teresa, who died in 1839, asked for the legitima portio estimated at 8,000 lire 
over Giuseppe’s patrimony, which was worth 100,000 lire. After the judgement made by 
the tribunal of Asti in favour of Teresa’s heirs and Maria on 27 May 1843, Bartolomeo and 
Giuseppe’s grandsons appealed before the Senato of Piedmont. On 30 January 1844, the 
court reversed the previous sentence by arguing that a dowry was not an indisputable 





hereditary right. Its amount was not certain, because ‘non sempre il patrimonio del dotante 
è giusta norma per misurare la congruità’.41 The court maintained that Maria and Teresa 
were not able to produce any evidence to confirm that they did not know the exact amount 
of their father’s patrimony when they accepted the 1,500-lira legacy. As they were ‘assistite 
massimamente […] sempre dai mariti loro’,42 they had consciously accepted the bequest, 
which would prevent them from undertaking any further act. The women, 
 
non avendo [...] potuto ignorare il disposto del testamento del padre soprattutto nella parte che le concerneva, 
non potevano dubitare che il padre stesso non aveva riputata sufficiente la somma loro sborsata nell’atto del 
rispettivo matrimonio per dirle congruamente dotate, a segno di poterle senz’altro escludere dalla sua 
successione.43  
 
This case was produced by Vincenzo as evidence that, by accepting the 100-coin legacy, 
his sisters were aware of their father’s patrimony and thus they validly renounced any 
further claim. Despite all Vincenzo’s efforts to support his argument, the judgement of the 
Senato of Casale was not in his favour. The tribunal maintained that the Statutes of 
Vigevano were valid only with regard to the norms not included in the Regie Costituzioni, 
and ‘furono solo mantenuti in quelle parti che non ripugnassero alle Costituzioni 
medesime’.44 It was pointed out that, in order to exclude women from inheritance, these 
Statutes did not require a dowry to be ‘congrua’, whereas the Regie Costituzioni prescribed 
that a woman’s exclusion was permitted only against an appropriate dowry, with Article 6 
explicitly defining the requisites of this concept. The court added that, if forms of 
compensation other than an appropriate dowry were taken into account for the exclusion of 
women from inheritance, the provisions of the Regie Costituzioni would be overridden. In 
particular,  
 
non è sfuggito alla sapienza di Carlo Emmanuele III come l’eccessivo desiderio di conservazione delle 
famiglie che cotanto dominava in que’ tempi si dovesse pure conciliare coll’amor naturale che nelle leggi di 
successioni era stato norma all’Imperator Giustiniano; non gli sfuggiva neppure come un soverchio 
concentramento di ricchezze possa talvolta tornar pregiudicevole, quindi con una apposita disposizione fissava 







i limiti dell’esclusione delle figlie dalla successione paterna, ossia quale dovesse essere il correspettivo di tale 
loro esclusione.45  
 
The Senato suggested that the ‘sapienza’ of King Carlo Emmanuele III enacted rules 
favouring women, but what emerges from these words is much more the concern about a 
possible ‘concentramento di ricchezze’, which had to be limited if not avoided altogether. 
The ‘conservazione delle famiglie’ was considered crucial but had to be pursued within 
appropriate norms such as those included in the Regie Costituzioni. The preservation of 
families was a goal also taken into consideration by the Statutes of Vigevano, but ‘la legge 
dominante esige come di rigore certi e determinati mezzi per conseguirlo; la legge 
particolare non li cura ed inumanamente li sprezza’.46 Departing from the ‘legge 
dominante’, that is, the Regie Costituzioni, and asserting that the dowry instruments were 
valid private agreements could not be acceptable as even Roman law provided the maxim 
‘ius publicum privatorum pactis mutari nequit’ (the law could not be disregarded by private 
agreements).47  
Even if ‘non havvi contestazione sull’onesto recapito delle dotate’, a father was 
obliged to provide his daughters not just with a dowry, regardless of its value, but with an 
appropriate one. The constitution of a dowry was a formal act that had to be accepted by the 
dowered girl, and, in this case, no reference was made to any acceptance or consent given 
by Vincenza and Teresa. Indeed, ‘si richiede che dallo stesso atto risulti non solamente 
dell’assegno di detta dote dal canto del padre, ma eziandio del consenso espresso o tacito 
per parte della figlia di accettare la dote medesima’, and this consent was absolutely 
necessary and was to be ‘almeno presunto’.48 Chiara Saraceno pointed out that women’s 
rights were difficult to assert before a court,49 but their consent to acts which involved their 
rights was necessary. This is highly paradoxical: women were deemed able to understand 
the value of goods, that of their dowries in this case, a point strongly conflicting with the 





49 On this point, see, for example, the analysis of C. Saraceno, ‘Le donne nella famiglia: una complessa 
costruzione giuridica. 1750-1942’, in Barbagli and Kertzer, eds, Storia della famiglia italiana, 1750-1950, pp. 
103-28 (pp. 105-10). 
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founding idea of marital authorisation or other kind of authorisation needed by women to 
undertake legal acts. 
The sixteen dowry instruments presented by Vincenzo’s lawyer played in the 
appellants’ favour. Given that no law defined the exact amount of a dowry, the court argued 
that the maxim ‘dos congrua illa dicitur quae respondet facultatibus mulieris atque utriusque 
coniugis dignitati: ratione quoque habita consuetudinis quae in regione seu familia 
servatur’,50 quoted by jurisprudence, and, in particular, by the influential Piedmontese jurist 
Tommaso Maurizio Richeri,51 allowed room to calculate the value of a dowry by 
considering the legitima portio, ‘se non in modo rigoroso, almeno approssimativo’.52  
The Senato of Casale ruled that, even if, at the time of their parents’ death, the Regie 
Costituzioni were in force again, the dowries of the two Roncalli sisters ‘non valevano ad 
altro titolo che ad anticipazione di eredità’, because Vincenza and Teresa were ‘non presenti 
e non stipulanti’,53 and had not signed any document in which they renounced their lawful 
portion of inheritance. In other words, Vincenza and Teresa’s heirs were entitled to receive 
an addition to the dowries given at the time of their marriages. There are no further archival 
documents that provide evidence of how the case was settled between Vincenzo and the 
appellants: we can assume that Vincenza and the heirs of Teresa obtained a sum of money 
close to the legitima portio, 30,988 scudi of Milan or 142,857 lire, which corresponds to the 
fourteenth part of the Roncallis’ patrimony. As we saw, this was worth two million lire.  
 
 
3. Negotiating their exclusion: the Marchisone sisters 
  
The case of the Roncalli family did not stand alone, and allowed room for similar decisions. 
Another case in point is that of the Marchisone family from which we can again infer the 
                                                 
50 ‘The appropriate dowry is the one which corresponds to the wealth of the bride and to the dignity of the 
spouses; also by considering customs followed both in the area and within their family’. 
51 Tommaso Maurizio Richeri (1733-1797) was a Piedmontese jurist. His major work Universa civilis et 
criminalis iurisprudentia iuxta seriem institutionum ex naturali et romano iure deprompta et ad usum fori 
perpetuo accomodata (1774-1782) was considered fundamental to learn and understand Roman law.  
52 AST, Casale, Corte di Appello, First Quarter of 1849, n. 31.  
53 Ibid. See also Giurisprudenza Italiana, 2 (1849), 671-97 (p. 694). 
151 
 
considerable difference between women and men in matters of inheritance rights.54 
 
The members of the Marchisone family lived in the province of Turin, in the towns of 
Ajrasca (now Airasca), Orbassano and Villafranca. Vincenzo was the paterfamilias, and 
had three daughters, Michela Maria, Anna Maria and Margherita, and two sons, Bartolomeo 
and Giuseppe. On 11 June 1791, Michela Maria Marchisone, together with Giacomo 
Domenico Fornasio from Ajrasca, whom she had married a few months earlier, appeared 
before a notary to receive her dowry from her father Vincenzo. She obtained the amount 
promised before her marriage, 2,000 lire in cash, gold and silver, along with the fardello. 
The two spouses declared to be ‘soddisfatti tanto per la dotte quanto per il fardello che 
dichiarano di aver ricevuto nella conformità’, and not to ask for any more money.55 Giacomo 
Domenico also followed the ‘lodevole consuetudine di questo luogo’, which consisted in 
his promise to constitute a controdote worth a third of the dowry itself. He thus vowed that 
he would ‘il tutto conservare, e custodire, rendere e restituire [...] in caso di soluzione di 
matrimonio o altro legittimo contrario evento il che Dio non voglia [e di confermare] la 
quota consuetudinaria quanto ai reciproci guadagni e lucri dotali’.56  
A few years later, in 1799, Anna Maria, sister of Michela Maria, married as well. 
On 10 Messidor IX, that is 29 June 1801, as Piedmont was already under French rule, Anna 
                                                 
54 A short summary of this case can also be found in Giurisprudenza degli Stati Sardi (1852), 141-43. 




Maria, her husband Michele Ghione and her father-in-law appeared before the same notary 
in order to receive the dowry. This time, the paterfamilias provided a 3,000-lira dowry and 
the trousseau. This dowry, too, was given in cash, gold and silver, and was ‘dalla stessa 
Anna Maria presso di se rittirata, e quindi col pieno consenso del suo marito brevi manu 
rimessa al suo suocero Felice Ghione di Orbassano’.57 Like her sister, Anna Maria regarded 
herself ‘sufficientemente dotata secondo il suo stato e qualità tanto per le ragioni paterne 
che materne, vi ha perciò a queste rinunciato’.58 Both her husband and her father-in-law 
promised the aumento dotale (controdote) of one third of the value of the dowry, as ‘la 
lodevole consuetudine di questo comune’ provided.59 Vincenzo Marchisone also constituted 
a dowry to his third daughter, Margherita, promised to Tommaso Barberis from Villafranca. 
Her dowry was worth 3,000 lire plus a 1,400-lira trousseau. This act was signed on 8 
October 1811, before her actual wedding.60  
On 10 March 1847, Anna Maria Marchisone and the heirs of her two sisters Michela 
Maria and Margherita, already deceased by then, initiated a cause before the Tribunal of 
Pinerolo, the competent court for the area where they lived. They sued Bartolomeo and 
Giuseppe, sons of Vincenzo, who died in 1831, leaving a 100,000-lira patrimony. In his 
will, made up on 20 November 1828, Vincenzo had declared that, since his daughters were 
already dowered, his two sons Bartolomeo and Giuseppe were to be the sole heirs of all his 
assets. The Tribunal of Pinerolo ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled to receive any 
portion of Vincenzo’s patrimony, but requested a further check with regard to Margherita’s 
case. Her dowry had been constituted before her marriage, when the Civil Code of the 
Kingdom of Italy, known as Napoleonic Code, was in force. Nevertheless, as her father died 
under the regime of the Regie Costituzioni, its appropriateness was to be measured on this 
basis, which – as we have seen – ruled that women were not entitled to receive any further 
goods or money if already dowered. In addition, in the years from her marriage up to 
Vincenzo’s death, ‘non fu mai elevato dubbio che la stessa famiglia non fosse pienamente 
soddisfatta di ogni sua ragione’, and, furthermore, ‘la querela d’inofficiosità contro il 
testamento paterno competendo ai figli ingiustamente diseredati dal padre, non presenta 
nemmeno una analogia alla domanda di supplemento di dote mossa dalli padre e figli 
                                                 
57 AST, Notaio Giovanni Pietro Ellena, 1801, n. 2271. 
58 AST, Tribunale di Pinerolo, Sentenze civili, First Quarter of 1847, n. 60. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid.  
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Barberis’.61 However, because Margherita had not signed a receipt accepting the dowry to 
be ‘congrua’, her brothers Bartolomeo and Giuseppe were ordered to present documents 
that would allow her heirs to assess its appropriateness. In the case of Michela Maria and 
Anna Maria, their dowries were formally constituted after, but had been promised before, 
their marriages, when the Regie Costituzioni were in force. Therefore, the tribunal 
maintained that ‘non si mosse neppur dubbio in atti, che queste due figlie Marchisone siano 
state onestamente ricapitate con quella rispettiva dote’.62 
In absence of any documents that testify to further actions taken against Bartolomeo 
and Giuseppe, we may presume that the issue regarding Margherita’s dowry was somehow 
resolved through a private agreement. Anna Maria Marchisone and the heirs of her sister 
Michela Maria, instead, appealed to the court of Turin. On 26 April 1850, the court ordered 
Bartolomeo and Giuseppe to give ‘esatta e fedele consegna’ of the inherited patrimony.63 
This would allow the appellants to estimate if the dowries given to the two sisters were 
‘congrue’, as showed in the disquisition described earlier in this chapter.  
The two brothers refused to execute this order and appealed to the Corte di 
Cassazione, the court of last appeal: in its decision of 5 January 1852, the court condemned 
them to pay a ‘congrua’ dowry to Anna Maria and Michela Maria’s heirs. The Corte di 
Cassazione explained that women’s exclusion from the right to co-succeed with their 
brothers to parental inheritance was compensated by the right to a ‘congrua’ dowry, and this 
right was to be guaranteed.64 Indeed, for the sake of justice, a daughter was entitled to 
discuss the compensation and the price for her exclusion from her relatives’ inheritance, 
 
prima ancora di abbandonare la casa e famiglia paterna, per passare a far parte o ad essere origine di altra 
famiglia, prima di devenire ad un patto che importasse od involvesse in sé una rinuncia ad ogni diritto sulla 
successione dei propri ascendenti, se il matrimonio consideravasi come apertura della successione a di lei 
profitto.65  
                                                 
61 The querela inofficiosi testamenti was a means provided by Roman law, which allowed an heir who had 
been disinherited or passed over without valid reason to initiate a lawsuit and request the annulmet of a will. 
See Digest, 5.2.1-32; Codex, 3.28.1-36. See also Giurisprudenza romana ossia corpo del diritto civile romano 
volgarizzato col testo a fronte (Milan: Baret, 1815), pp. 165-67. 
62 AST, Tribunale di Pinerolo, Sentenze civili, First Quarter of 1847, n. 60.  
63 AST, Giudice di Appello, Sentenza Civili, April 1850, n. 315. 





The ground on which this judgement relied was the fact that the two sisters were already 
married when their dowries were constituted. In other words, their dowries were constituted 
after their marriages, and consequently they had not been given the possibility to discuss 
the compensation for their exclusion from inheritance, before being involved in a lifelong 
and irrevocable bond as wedlock was. 
These cases show that nineteenth-century law in action did not always have an 
unquestionable outcome: judgements were often completely reversed by other courts, and 
judges did not even feel morally bound to the judicial precedent. The dowry, the great 
importance of which has been demonstrated by the analysis of these cases, was by all means 
intended to ‘provvedere ai bisogni e decoro della famiglia’. Hence, its value was carefully 
assessed by women as well as by their husbands and heirs, who tried to obtain as much 
money as they could without hesitating to resort to a judge and going through several 
instances before reaching a final, and hopefully positive, verdict. Even though they abided 
by the legal system and shared a common view of women’s status, courts accurately 
examined all circumstances and carefully considered women’s rights to obtain further 
money from their parents’ inheritance. The point that the Roncalli and Marchisone sisters 
had not been allowed to negotiate their exclusion from inheritance, because the former were 
absent when their dowries were constituted, and the latter were already married, highlights 
an interesting issue: women did not just have to comply with someone else’s decision, but 
were given the possibility to discuss and assess the value of their dowry. Although it is 
difficult to understand the extent of negotiations a woman could undertake before obtaining 
a dowry, the two cases demonstrate that courts allowed them to have a say. The nineteenth-
century family, therefore, was still ‘fondata su rapporti asimmetrici, generatrice di tensioni 
e di conflitti ma anche articolata in modo da offrire spazi alle figure “minori”’.66 As also 
Cesarina Casanova argued: the real position of each member was the result of a continual 
negotiation.67 This does not mean that women had the legal capacity of individualised 
choices and actions, but that the limits of their inclusion or exclusion could be fluid and 
negotiable.  
                                                 
66 M.A. Visceglia, ‘Introduzione’, in M.A. Visceglia and R. Ago, eds, Signori, patrizi, cavalieri in Italia 
centro-meridionale nell’età moderna (Rome: Laterza, 1992), pp. v-xxxiii (p. xxiii). 
67 Casanova, La famiglia italiana, p. 148. 
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In 1837, the new code promulgated in the Kingdom of Sardinia permitted all 
legitimate children or their descendants to succeed in their relatives’ ab intestato 
inheritance. Nonetheless, by allowing the ‘subingresso’, the code still marked a different 
hereditary regime between men and women. Although new ideas regarding women and their 
roles in society began to spread along the Italian peninsula, the heritage of the Ancien 
Régime remained strong and persistent, and the importance given to agnation continued to 
be broadly accepted and praised by families.  
  
 
4. Women and wills in Lombardy-Venetia: overriding the law 
 
Far from constituting a rational framework, the fluid boundaries of nineteenth-century law 
allowed room for discussion and legal disputes, which, nevertheless, did not always have a 
clear outcome. Alongside the coexistence of several laws in each state, courts often had to 
deal with cases regarding people, properties and laws from different states. In such a context, 
people tried to tackle the arising issues, and, in doing so, often overrode the law. Moreover, 
in Lombardy-Venetia, where all children had the same inheritance rights regardless of their 
sex, some people tried not to comply with this rule by making wills that favoured sons.  
A case in point is that of Speranza Sacerdote, a woman who lived in Casale, a town 
in Piedmont, and sued her brothers to obtain a portion of the assets her deceased father 
owned in Lombardy-Venetia.68 When she married Raffael Vita-Levi, in 1808, her father 
gave her a sum of money as a dowry, explicitly stating that this was only an advance on his 
inheritance. On 19 May 1830, Speranza received from her father another 13,000 lire and, 
subsequently, declared to be ‘onestamente ricapitata, congruamente dotata e 
sufficientemente provvista sul di lui patrimonio’.69 Her father, together with his sons, 
simulated a sale to ensure that his properties in Lombardy-Venetia would not be subject to 
the Austrian law that allowed daughters to have succession rights in addition to the dowry. 
Speranza initiated a litigation, asking to inherit her lawful portion of her father’s assets in 
                                                 
68 AST, Casale, Corte di Appello, Second Semester of 1853, n. 45. An overview of this case can also be found 
in Giurisprudenza degli Stati sardi (1853), 655-60. Casale is a town in the Monferrato area, which is now 
called Casale Monferrato. However, in judicial proceedings it is just cited as Casale. 
69 Ibid., p. 656. 
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Lombardy-Venetia. On 25 July 1853, the court of Casale stated that the act of sale registered 
on 13 October 1831 was a simulation, and that Speranza was entitled to obtain a portion of 
those properties as provided by the Austrian code.  
Such a decision is extremely important because it was made by a Piedmontese court, 
which trespassed its jurisdiction to rule over a contract affecting properties abroad, allowing 
a woman to obtain an additional amount of wealth. Despite her declaration of being 
‘onestamente ricapitata’, Speranza could still ask for more goods by demonstrating that 
what she had received matched neither her father’s patrimony, nor the amount normally 
given to women by other families of similar status. The court concluded that abdication of 
rights was always linked to the appropriateness of the dowry: if it was not appropriate, there 
was room for further claims. The contradiction between written law, law in action and 
jurisprudence is evident: even though she was married, and a married woman was always 
considered to be ‘congruamente dotata’, Speranza could inherit. One might argue that the 
court of Casale clearly agreed with the point made in the Roncalli case, that is, ‘un soverchio 
concentramento di ricchezze possa talvolta tornar pregiudicevole’. Its decision to allow a 
woman to obtain more money was therefore meant to split large patrimonies and impede 
the concentration of wealth in the hands of few people. In this case, even though these 
properties were abroad, their income would have further improved the economic power of 
the Sacerdote family.  
As previously mentioned, in Lombardy-Venetia, the Codice civile universale 
austriaco pel Regno Lombardo-Veneto allowed all children to inherit equally from their 
parents. The constitution of a dowry was permitted and considered as an advance on parental 
inheritance. However, in this state, as elsewhere, the custom of making up wills was 
widespread among all social classes, and often aimed to grant more rights to sons to the 
detriment of daughters. In other words, it was a way to circumvent the law and to allow 
testators to bequeath a large part of their patrimonies to those of their choice.  
The next case was reported in Giurisprudenza pratica secondo la legislazione 
austriaca,70 a journal of jurisprudence published in Milan. It describes a situation similar to 
                                                 
70 The journal Giurisprudenza pratica secondo la legislazione austriaca attivata anche nel Regno Lombardo-
Veneto o sia collezione di decisioni sentenze e decreti in materia civile commerciale criminale di diritto 
pubblico was published in Milan from 1817 to 1833; its name then changed to Giurisprudenza teorico-pratica 
secondo la legislazione austriaca o sia Collezione di decisioni sentenze e decreti in materia civile commerciale 
criminale e di diritto pubblico (1836-1845).  
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many others in nineteenth-century Lombardy-Venetia, in which a father, Giovanni Battista 
Guarrini, bequeathed to his daughter the legitima portio only. Giovanni Battista was a 
nobleman who lived in Crema, a town 50 km away from Milan. He died on 22 July 1824 
and left a will rogated by the notary Giovanni Battista Tensini. To his daughter Marianna, 
he bequeathed what was due to her by law, namely a quarter of his patrimony, and pointed 
out that she should ‘riunire alla mia eredità comprendere e computare nella di lei legittima 
la dote e schirpe da me testatore costituita all’atto del suo matrimonio, e da me per intiero 
pagata’.71 The remaining three quarters of his patrimony were given to his son Giacomo 
Antonio,72 who had to guarantee the usufruct of a quarter of the whole patrimony, ‘tutto 
compreso e niente eccettuato’, to his mother, Paola Fracavalli. Paola was also entitled to get 
her dowry back. The testator had another son, Alessandro, who had left Crema several years 
earlier and had not been heard of since. As in many other cases, the domestic strategy of 
fathers ‘contavano tradizionalmente sul potere sanzionatorio riconosciutogli dal diritto 
successorio’,73 thus punishing Alessandro by ordering that, should he come back, he could 
receive no more than a quarter of his father’s wealth.74  
Marianna was married to the wealthy count Paolo Premoli, and had six children. She 
was given 54,735 lire austriache as a dowry. At first, Marianna’s brother Giacomo complied 
with the testament of his father, and made the hotchpot of his sister’s dowry in the legitima 
portio.75 Marianna was entitled to receive 13,683 lire austriache, which was also confirmed 
by the tribunal of Crema in 1826.76 However, two years later, in 1828, Giacomo returned 
before the court to ask if, by law, the hotchpot of his sister’s dowry and trousseau was to be 
made by considering the hereditaments of their father, or just the forced heirship as their 
                                                 
71 Giurisprudenza pratica, 10 (1829), pp. 93-94.  
72 In the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, ‘la porzione legittima assegnata dalla legge a ciascuno de’ figli è la 
metà di quello che sarebbe pervenuto ad essi nella successione intestate’, see Art. 765, Codice civile universale 
austriaco pel Regno Lombardo-Veneto, in Collezione completa, p. 189. 
73 Cavina, Il padre spodestato, pp. 242-43. 
74 Giurisprudenza pratica, 10 (1829), p. 95. 
75 In order to secure equal division among heirs in an ab intestato succession, properties are fictitiously 
reunited through the so-called hotchpot. As is widely known, civil law systems do not recognise the total 
freedom of testators to dispose of their hereditaments. Therefore, the inheritance is composed of the portion, 
which could be freely disposed of, the free estate or discretionary portion, and of the indefeasible portion or 
forced heirship or legitima portio.  
76 Giurisprudenza pratica, 10 (1829), p. 98.  
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father had written in his will. The difference between reuniting the dowry with the legitima 
portio, or with the entire patrimony, was great. Indeed, if Marianna had to make the hotchpot 
by considering the legitime, she would receive the 13,683 lire austriache mentioned above; 
otherwise, she would not be entitled to obtain any further sum.  
The tribunal of Crema ruled that the hotchpot was to be made considering the entire 
patrimony. This judgement was appealed before the tribunal of Milan, which refuted the 
decision, and then before the Supremo Tribunale of Verona, which abided by the decision 
made in Crema. Its outcome was described in the journal Giurisprudenza pratica, which 
claimed that ‘la tesi negli atti d’appello e di revisione nei quali presero parte anche li più 
reputati Giureconsulti del Foro di Milano’ was that the hotchpot was to be made on the value 
of the hereditament.77 The issue debated in this lawsuit was very common in the nineteenth 
century, and was included in this journal in order to help judges in similar circumstances. 
Far from introducing anything new in nineteenth-century jurisprudence, it confirmed, 
instead, the ongoing habit of considering women as ‘caput et finis’ of their families, and 
therefore worthy of aspiring only to a dowry, or little more. 
Provisions that debarred daughters from inheriting portions larger than the legitime 
were not uncommon, even in wills drawn up by women. Indeed, their behaviour strongly 
endorsed the idea that the man was the indisputable head of a family, and wealth was to 
revolve around him. Women’s rights, therefore, could be neglected and even given up for 
the sake of the family’s prestige and status. Several wills held in archives, for example, give 
evidence of mothers granting their entire patrimony (except for the legitima portio, to which 
heirs were lawfully entitled) to their sons. These mothers pointed out that their daughters 
had already been provided with good dowries, and had no motives to ask for more goods or 
money.  
For example, Maria Teresa Albertini, a wealthy woman from Verona, married to a 
nobleman, Bartolomeo Raffoni Morardo, made her will on 5 October 1818. She had three 
children: Giuseppe, Anna Maria, a former nun, and Elisabetta, married to the nobleman 
Francesco Cavazocca. Having made religious vows, Anna Maria could not inherit, even if 
                                                 
77 Giurisprudenza pratica, 10 (1829), 107-12. On the hotchpot, see also the disquisitions of three prominent 
jurists of the Austrian Empire, Vitaliano Oldrado, Vincenzo Augusto Wagner and Francesco Foramiti, 
reported in Giurisprudenza pratica, 10 (1829), 188-306. 
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she was no longer a nun.78 Hence, her mother made her a bequest of 300 lire per year, which 
she had to receive from Giuseppe. Whereas the legitime was left to Elisabetta and Giuseppe, 
Maria Teresa bequeathed ‘tuttociò che la legge mi permette di disporre’ to her only son 
Giuseppe.79 Another example is that of a widow also from Verona, Palma Naido, who in 
her testament drawn up on 6 July 1819, left the property of the disposable portion of her 
goods to her sons Pietro and Giuseppe, while the legitime was divided between all her five 
children, two sons and three daughters.80 Finally, in her will rogated on 25 September 1857, 
Margherita Boschetti, from Milan, bequeathed all her assets to her son Paolo Pizzi.81 She 
ordered that her son had to pay a pension of 2.5 lire austriache per day to her husband, who 
also obtained the usufruct of the garden and the house where they used to live.82 Margherita 
then made a bequest of 7,000 lire austriache to the three children of her deceased daughter, 
and pointed out that her grandchildren had to accept her will ‘nel suo integrale tenore’,83 as 
their mother had already obtained a dowry at the time of her marriage. If they failed to 
accept her will, they could only have the legitime over her patrimony, which, after having 
reunited their mother’s dowry, was less than the bequest made by Margherita.  
The examples of these women, who limited the portion their daughters would inherit 
in favour of their sons, are particularly significant as they were all from Lombardy-Venetia. 
If some women living in areas where the dowry was their only right struggled to obtain 
more from their parents’ inheritance, other women seemed to strongly comply with the 
dowry system. This behaviour is even more striking in states where laws ruled that they 
could equally inherit. However, these co-existing attitudes could have been two sides of the 
same coin: women abided by the idea of entering ‘aliene famiglie’, and sought to contribute 
                                                 
78 When making religious vows, monks and nuns supposedly became dead to the world. Their status was 
considered that of a civil death: consequently, they were not allowed to inherit. On this status, see A. Molho, 
‘Tamquam vere mortua: le professioni religiose femminili nella Firenze del tardo Medioevo’, Società e Storia, 
43 (1989), 1-44; J.G. Sperling, Convents and the Body Politic in Late Renaissance Venice (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 2. For a disquisition of that time, see also, Quistione transitoria se un 
monaco professo suddito del regno Lombardo-Veneto possa succedere ad una eredità apertasi in quel regno 
1817 per quanto riflette i bene situati in Piemonte (Milan: Pogliani, 1819). 
79 Verona, State Archive of Verona (SAV), 1865, Testamenti, n. 73, n. 2000. 
80 SAV, 1865, Testamenti, n. 73, n. 3260.  





to the improvement of their prestige. By limiting the amount of money and goods their 
daughters could obtain, they strongly accepted that the ‘correct’ way to improve a family’s 










Marriage, the pivotal institution of society in the Ottocento, was a lifelong bond that was 
contracted before the Church and deemed to last until the death of one of the spouse. This 
‘natural’ ending often raised issues related to wealth and inheritance that deeply involved 
women. Widowhood was a crucial moment in life as it could imply a sudden and deep 
change in the amount of wealth women could enjoy, and even throw them into poverty. The 
first section of this chapter is devoted to the analysis of lawsuits and legal provisions 
concerning widows. As we shall see, lawmakers and courts attempted to provide some 
protection to women, and often enabled them to inherit from their deceased husband if they 
were at risk of falling into poverty.  
Marriage could also come to an end through consensual or non-consensual 
separation, which did not allow the spouses to remarry as divorce did not exist for Catholics. 
These situations are examined in the second and third sections of the chapter. If litigations 
related to consensual separation, mainly involved issues related to money, those related to 
non-consensual separation were thorny cases in which two people confronted each other 
before a court, and tried to do their best to avoid separation.  
 
  
1. Wealth, poverty and widowhood 
 
As most marriages in the Ottocento came to an end with the death of one of the spouses, 
people often wrote wills to guarantee some rights to their surviving spouse. At the death of 
their husbands, women had no rights to their husbands’ patrimony, and were only entitled 
to ask for a scant portion of inheritance if they were poor and without a dowry. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the main purpose of a dowry was to bear the 
burden of marriage. However, dowries had a second, perhaps even more important purpose, 
in that they often were the only means of support for widows.1 Becoming a widow, at what 
                                                 
1 On widowhood, see in M. Palazzi, ‘Solitudini femminili e patrilignaggio. Nubili e vedove fra Sette e 
Ottocento’, in Barbagli and Kertzer, eds, Storia della famiglia italiana, 1750-1950, pp. 129-59; S. Cavallo and 
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was already a difficult moment of grief and solitude, meant that financial implications had 
to be considered. The Justinian Corpus Iuris Civilis defined the dowry as property of the 
woman naturaliter,2 even though it was in the possession of the husband’s family. Hence, 
a woman’s in-laws were obliged to return her dowry,3 but this was not always a smooth 
process: sometimes a woman and her family of origin had to face long negotiations and 
often the dowry was not returned in full. A case in point is that of Costanza Monti Perticari, 
the daughter of the poet Vincenzo Monti, whose dowry was returned after long and 
exhausting negotiations.4 
When widowed, a woman would normally return to her natal family or, if wealthy 
enough, she might decide to live alone.5 As previously mentioned, in the Italian peninsula, 
patrimonial relationships between spouses were marked by a strict separation of goods and 
legal norms complied with the principle paterna paternis, materna maternis. A woman who 
lived alone and owned nothing more than her dowry, along with the interest it produced, 
might have to face critical changes in her lifestyle. Given the great importance of honour in 
society, sometimes the easiest way to maintain a family’s prestige was to ‘ricollocare’ – 
                                                 
L. Warner, eds, Widowhood in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Harlow: Longman, 1999); A. Crabb, The 
Strozzi of Florence: Widowhood and Family Solidarity in the Renaissance (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2000). For a study on widows and conduct literature, see H. Sanson, ‘Widowhood and 
Conduct in Late Sixteenth-Century Italy: The Unusual Case of La Vedova del Fusco (1570)’, The Italianist, 
35/1 (2015), 1-26; Hosker, “Donne sole” in Post-Unification Italy, pp. 33-52; H. Sanson, ‘Conduct for the 
Real Widow: Giulio Cesare Cabei’s Ornamenti della gentildonna vedova (1574)’, in Sanson and Lucioli, eds, 
Conduct Literature for and about Women in Italy, pp. 41-62. 
2 Codex, 5, 12, 30. 
3 In ancient times, roughly up to the second century BC, the dowry, once paid, merged completely with the 
assets of the groom if he was sui iuris, or with those of his paterfamilias, if he was not emancipated. Later, an 
action, known as Actio rei uxoriae, was introduced that was to ensure that the dowry would be returned to the 
woman, or her natal family, if and when the marriage ended. See Fayer, La familia romana, II, p. 698. 
4 The case of Costanza Monti Perticari is described in C. Agostinelli, “Per me sola”: biografia intellettuale e 
scrittura privata di Costanza Monti Perticari (Rome: Carocci, 2006); and L. Baffioni Venturi, Costanza Monti 
e Giulio Perticari: amore e morte tra Marche e Romagna all’inizio dell’Ottocento (Ancona: peQuod, 2008).   
5 See, for example, the case of Teresa Pucci, a woman from the Papal States, who had always lived together 
with her brother’s family. Even though she had a dowry, its interest would not allow her to have the same 
lifestyle she could have if living alone. Moreover, after the death of her brother, Teresa continued to live with 
her sister-in-law. See S. Delmedico, ‘Alimenti e dote alla periferia dello Stato Pontificio: la famiglia Pucci’, 
The Italianist, 37/1 (2017), 50-68 (p. 58).  
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literally to ‘re-place’ – the widow, which meant finding her another husband. A new 
marriage would, hopefully, ensure the same economic status to the widow, and, at the same 
time, create further relations and links, which might prove profitable to the widow’s brothers 
or any other relatives.6  
As we saw in Chapter 3, having a dowry was not a prerequisite to a marriage, but, if 
not dowered, widows did not have any money or other goods to rely on. To solve this issue, 
some laws provided that, if poor and without a dowry, a widow was entitled to obtain a 
portion of her deceased spouse’s assets, known as quarta uxoria. This provision, which had 
been in force since the time of Justinian, implied that women were granted a quarter of the 
property. According to Novel 53 of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, women who had married 
without a dowry were to be supported by the property left by the decedent and share it with 
their children. This provision was further detailed in Novel 117, where it was explicitly 
stated that a wife had inheritance rights over the properties of her husband. These rights 
were, respectively, usufruct if there were children, ownership if there were no children. With 
regard to the Kingdom of Sardinia, the 1770 Regie Costituzioni made a generic reference to 
the ‘Legge’, meaning that Novels 53 and 117 of the Corpus Iuris Civilis were to be taken 
into account.7  
                                                 
6 Despite tackling the Middle Ages and the Early Modern period, the following essays can offer an interesting 
insight into widowhood and remarriage also for the period we are analysing, see Calvi, ‘Reconstructing the 
Family’; Chabot, ‘Seconde nozze e identità materna’; M. Moran, ‘Motherhood and the Politics of Family 
Decisions in Early Modern Italy’, Journal of Family History, 40/3 (2015), 351-72 (pp. 360-64). 
7 Art. 17, Lib. V, Tit. 1, Leggi, e costituzioni di Sua Maestà, 2 vols (Turin: Stamperia Reale, 1770), I, p. 301. 
The situation of the surviving spouse did not improve under the Napoleonic code, which provided that, if they 
were not legally separated, he or she could obtain ownership of the inheritance only in absence of relatives 
and natural children (Art. 767, Codice civile di Napoleone il Grande pel regno d’Italia (Turin: Reale 
Stamperia, 1806), pp. 225-26). Similarly, according to the law in force in other states, such as in the Grand 
Duchy of Tuscany, poverty was a requirement if the surviving spouse invoked the quarta uxoria. This right 
relied on the provisions of both Novel 117 and Article 27 of Law 18 August 1814, which — in the case of 
women — ensured ‘una tal quale porzione legittima sull’eredità maritale’ (on this point, see the discussion in 
the legal journal La temi: giornale di legislazione e di giurisprudenza (1847), 374-75). In the Duchy of Parma, 
the Codice civile per gli stati parmensi provided the usufruct of the fourth part of the inheritance to the 
impecunious surviving spouse (Art. 659, Codice civile per gli stati parmensi, in Collezione completa, p. 412). 
The 1851 Codice Civile per gli Stati Estensi had similar rules: it granted alimony to the poor spouse if there 
were children, ownership if the deceased did not have any offspring (Artt. 836 and 934, Codice Civile per gli 
Stati Estensi (Modena: Eredi Tipografi Reali, 1851), p. 200). The law in the Papal States, finally, did not make 
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As we shall see in the following cases, the law and tribunals considered women 
worthy of protection, and allowed them to access this quarta uxoria. The first case concerns 
Carlo Garello, a notary from Susa, Piedmont, who made his will on 16 November 1832. 
Carlo bequeathed to Ignazio, Teresa and Giuseppa, his three natural children, ‘quel tanto 
che fosse loro dovuto a termini delle leggi’.8 The law provided that natural children were 
entitled to receive only alimony from their father, or from his heirs. Carlo’s patrimony was 
left to his sisters’ children. Six days after making his will, Carlo married Cattarina 
Montabone, mother of his natural children. He had already been condemned to pay his 
children alimony after a judgement made by the Reale Senato on 10 February 1818. Another 
judgement – decreed by the Bishop’s Curia – had ordered him to marry or dower Cattarina. 
A few hours after his marriage, though, he died. Cattarina and his children, who were poor, 
initiated a lawsuit before the Regio Tribunale di Prefettura of Susa on 11 January 1835. 
Their poverty was an already verified situation to the extent that they qualified to obtain 
free legal aid by the lawyer of the poor. Since after their parents’ marriage, Ignazio, Teresa 
and Giuseppa were no longer to be considered natural children but became legitimate, they 
demanded the annulment of the will. Carlo’s sisters, on the contrary, claimed that his 
children were still to be considered natural and not legitimate, because his marriage with 
Cattarina was not valid. They argued that, in the marriage act:  
 
non costava sufficientemente della delegazione che dal Vescovo si fosse fatta al Parroco, e da questo al 
Sacerdote, dinanzi a cui si disse contratto il matrimonio. […] tale delegazione non erasi fatta né in iscritti, né 
con parole; bensì il sacerdote Re circa le ore quattro del mattino del giorno stesso, in cui il testatore morì, 
spedì uno degli individui, che dovevano server di testimonio, al Parroco, onde ottenerne l’opportuna 
delegazione; […] recatosi quegli alla casa parrocchiale ed esposta la sua commissione alla fantesca del 
Parroco, la medesima dettogli che ne avrebbe informato il Parroco stesso, dopo pochi istanti ritornò dicendo 
a quell’individuo, che il Parroco l’incaricava d’annunziargli che per ben fatto avrebbe avuto quanto sarebbe 
per fare il sacerdote Re.9 
 
The marriage was celebrated on 22 November 1822, at six in the morning, and, as becomes 
evident from this report, Carlo was near to death when he decided to marry Cattarina. Given 
                                                 
any mention of this kind of situation, which meant that Roman law was to be taken into consideration as a 
subsidiary source. 
8 Annali di giurisprudenza, 2 (1838), 154-73 (p. 155). 
9 Ibid., p. 157. 
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that the lawsuit concerned the validity of both a marriage and a will, the tribunal of Susa 
declared itself incompetent to judge over the case and sent it to the Senato of Turin, by 
arguing that a superior court could more appropriately pass judgement on such a thorny 
issue, which implied both ecclesiastical and secular matters. After taking into consideration 
the assessment of the Office of the General Attorney, which reckoned that Cattarina and 
Carlo had contracted a valid marriage, the Senato decided that Cattarina and Carlo’s son 
Ignazio were entitled to receive the ‘porzione dalla legge riserbata a favore della moglie 
povera e indotata’ and the legitima portio, respectively.10 Thus, Ignazio obtained the 
property of a third of his father’s patrimony; Cattarina enjoyed the usufruct over a quarter 
of the assets; the two daughters, Teresa and Giuseppa, could obtain dowries. The amount 
that Carlo’s sisters would inherit was, therefore, substantially reduced.  
Carlo made his will in favour of his sisters six days before dying, and decided to 
marry Cattarina at 4 am on the day of his death: arguably, his mind may not have been 
entirely lucid when he married, making his consent to marriage defective. Moreover, a 
marriage was valid if celebrated in facie ecclesiae, and the ‘sacerdote Re’ was a 
representative of the Church, but the authorisation to marry the couple was given by the 
‘fantesca’ who reported the words of the parish priest. Given that Re asked to be authorised, 
one might argue that this act was usually deemed necessary, and that the full validity of oral 
authorisation could have been at least questioned. The sentence of the Senato of Turin, 
nonetheless, favoured Cattarina and her children, providing them with support. Through this 
judgement, the court showed itself to be close to people and to understand their needs, acting 
not only within the boundaries of the law but also as an institution well rooted in society. 
Another case in point is that of Maria Vandoni, which was brought before the 
Tribunale di Prefettura of Novara (Piedmont) in 1836 and then appealed to the Senato of 
Casale in 1839. Maria asked Pietro Valentino, brother and heir of her deceased husband, 
Giovanni Valentino, for the quarta uxoria, maintaining that she was poor and without a 
dowry.11 Pietro tried to refute this claim by replying that she ran a small shop selling salt 
and tobacco in the village of Alzate, and also, a food shop not far from there, ‘da cui [poteva] 
trarre una sussistenza adatta alla sua condizione di contadina’.12 Furthermore, during her 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p. 172. 
11 AST, Casale, Corte di Appello, Second Semester, 1839, n. 4. This case can also be found in Annali di 
giurisprudenza, 4 (1839), 258-68. 
12 Ibid., p. 258.  
166 
 
first marriage to Lorenzo Ballaro, she had received a dowry of 1,000 lire: Pietro assumed it 
had been reconstituted for her second marriage to Luigi Valbassora, as well as for her third 
marriage, the one to Pietro’s brother, Giovanni, in 1834.  
The three marriages contracted by Maria testified to the reliability of the model 
suggested by Lucetta Scaraffia, and already mentioned in Chapter 1. Life in rural areas very 
often required the presence of the couple, to carry out everyday tasks and household roles. 
Moreover, the economic support spouses could provide one another was crucial among low 
income people. This could explain why Maria married three times even though she was not 
young anymore and had a poor dowry only at the time of her first marriage: what made her 
attractive on the marriage market were her personal attributes, such as the household tasks 
she was able to carry out. 
Pietro also added that Maria and Giovanni had lived together for some time without 
being married: extramarital relations, as we have seen, were both a sin and a crime which 
could impact on the woman’s morality, and – in this case – they were mentioned in order to 
affect her request for a portion of the inheritance. Countering Pietro’s first argument, Maria 
replied that the proceeds of her sales counter of salt and tobacco belonged to her son from 
her first marriage, and that the dowry brought to the first husband was no more than house 
furniture she then owned, as shown in the dowry instrument. Lorenzo Vandoni, Maria’s 
brother, testified that he had in fact constituted for his sister a dowry worth 1,000 lire of 
Milan in house furniture, as requested by their father in his will of 11 January 1803. Maria’s 
father, although not able to give his daughter any money as a dowry, wrote a testament to 
dispose of his poor goods, which demonstrated the extensive use of making wills even 
among lower classes. The house furniture was worn-out and some of it had been used for 
the dowry of Maria’s own daughter, who married in 1825. Maria, who had married Giovanni 
three months before his death, maintained that she was able to demonstrate that his assets 
were worth 9,000 lire. On 2 September 1839, the Senato of Casale explained in its 
judgement that, to the demand of the quarta uxoria,  
 
non può opporsi in modo generico, che la donna, che vi aspira sia dotata, ma vuolsi di più, che questa dote sia 
effettiva, reale e sufficiente a torla da quell’inopia, cui l’Imperatore Giustiniano pensò e provvide, accordando 
al coniuge superstite questo benefizio.13  
 
                                                 
13 Annali di giurisprudenza, 4 (1839), 258-68 (p. 261).  
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This benefit was granted to the ‘coniuge superstite’, no matter if a man or a woman. The 
quarta was not to be considered only uxoria: a poor husband too could obtain this portion 
from the inheritance of his wealthy, deceased wife.14 The ratio of providing the quarta 
uxoria was to avoid that ‘quella [persona] che aveva condotta consuetudine matrimoniale 
una vita commoda ed agiata, vedevasi costretta a mendicare quasi ne’ tristi giorni della 
vedovanza’.15   
The court eventually assumed that Maria did not have a dowry at the time of her 
marriage to Giovanni, and the proceeds of her food shop were deemed insufficient to 
provide her with the necessary support. The judge maintained that jurisprudence had moved 
on from the gloss of the medieval jurist Bartolus of Saxoferrato, who claimed that ‘dos data 
in primo matrimonio intelligitur in secundo repetita’ (a dowry given for the first marriage 
of a woman is assumed to be repeated also for the second one),16 and, in present days, the 
consent of the person who gave the first dowry was considered necessary for a new 
constitution of dowry, in the event of a second marriage, and this had not been the case for 
Maria. Moreover, before the publication of the Regie Costituzioni, the constitution of a 
dowry was possible even without registering the act with a notary, but, at the time of Maria’s 
marriage, registration was mandatory and an implicit constitution of dowry was no longer 
possible. Consequently, the court ruled that Maria did not have any dowry and was able to 
inherit from her deceased husband.       
In 1837, the requirement of poverty was removed from the Civil Code of the 
Kingdom of Sardinia. The new law granted the surviving spouse the right of usufruct over 
the quarta, and if the deceased did not have any legitimate children, the quarter of the 
inheritance was given in property to the spouse.17  
This provision was similar to that of the 1816 Codice civile universale austriaco pel 
Regno Lombardo-Veneto, by which the surviving spouse was granted the usufruct of a 
portion of the estate equal to that of the children if they were three or more, a third if there 
were less than three children. While property was always left to children, the usufruct of a 
portion could be enjoyed by the spouse, who did not need to be poor to obtain these 
                                                 
14 See Annali di giurisprudenza, 4 (1839), 455-61. 
15 Annali di giurisprudenza, 4 (1839), pp. 262-63. 
16 Bartolus of Saxoferrato, Ad legem 40, cited in Annali di giurisprudenza, 4 (1839), 258-68 (pp. 264-65). 




The introduction of this provision in nineteenth-century legal codes marked a crucial 
transition from the idea of marriage as a mere contract between two families, with women 
being considered no more than childbearing vessels, to that of a relation between two 
people, which could also imply love and mutual support. Lawmakers seemed to 
acknowledge that women actively contributed to the household, and allowing widows to 




2. Annulment and consensual separation 
 
According to the Catholic Church, a valid, sacramental and consummated marriage was a 
‘foedus a Dio institutum’ (a pact instituted by God), which came to an end with the death 
of one of the spouses. However, if there were consistent reasons, the spouses could ask for 
the annulment, a dispensation given by the Pope only if the marriage was ‘ratum sed non 
consummatum’ (concluded but not consummated).19 The declaration of annulment followed 
several examinations. First, the spouses should relate ‘tutta la storia dei fatti occorsi nella 
consumazione del matrimonio, e specialmente quante volte, e da quanto tempo l’ha tentata 
con buon fede, e rimosso qualunque dolo’.20 The process could involve gathering proofs to 
ascertain that consummation had not take place. The spouses might be ordered to live 
together for three years, undergo physical inspection, or be asked for the deposition of the 
‘settima mano’, that is, seven members of kin would have to confirm that they were morally 
convinced about the marriage having not been consummated. The annulment was a grace 
given by the Pope and nullified the marriage ex nunc (from now on).21 A ratum sed non 
                                                 
18 Art. 757, Codice civile universale austriaco pel Regno Lombardo-Veneto in Collezione completa, p. 189. 
19 ‘Dei Miseratione, 3 November 1741’, in Sanctissimi domini nostri Benedicti Papae XIV, Bullarium, 4 vols 
(Venice: Occhi, 1768), I, pp. 695-701. On marriage in canon law, see A. Esmein, Le Mariage en droit 
canonique, 2 vols (Paris: Larose et Forcel, 1891); Gaudemet, Le Mariage en Occident; A.C. Jemolo, Il 
matrimonio nel diritto canonico: dal Concilio di Trento al Codice del 1917 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993). 
20 M.T. Salzano, Lezioni di diritto canonico pubblico, e privato considerato in sé stesso e secondo l’attual 
polizia del Regno delle Due Sicilie, 4 vols (Naples: Giordano, 1843), IV, p. 90. 
21 On annulment, see also E. Gentile, Teorico-pratica secondo l’ecclesiastica, e la civil polizia, 2 vols (Naples: 
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consummatum marriage was valid until the declaration of nullity was made. By contrast, a 
marriage could also be declared void ex tunc (from the outset): this was the case if a marriage 
presented formal defects such as a failure to comply with the rules of form or procedure or 
it originated from a simulation. A nullified ex tunc marriage was considered as if it had 
never been contracted.   
Despite being ‘principium, et fundamentum immortalitatis humani generis’ (the 
principle and foundation of humankind’s immortality), marriage could also come to an end 
through separation.22 Separation did not allow remarriage, because, as previously 
mentioned, among Catholics the marriage bond could end only with the death of one of the 
spouses.23 This was also the case if only one of the spouses was Catholic at the time of the 
marriage. In the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, remarriage was permitted to non-Catholic 
subjects only if they had not concurred in causing the end of their marriage.24   
The process to end a marriage through separation involved the Church in the first 
instance. The authorisation of the parish priest, the bishop, or even the pope, was necessary 
for a separation to produce civil effects. Whereas the Codice civile per gli Stati di S. M. il 
Re di Sardegna only mentioned that a separation was illicit without the authorisation of the 
                                                 
Manfredi, 1794), II, pp. 236-58; G. Grimaldi, Dissertazione di Ginesio Grimaldi sul punto dello scioglimento 
de’ matrimoni per cagion d’impotenza (Naples: Simoniana, 1765); Mercanti, Compendio di diritto canonico, 
II, pp. 525-26; Salzano, Lezioni di diritto canonico pubblico, e privato, IV, pp. 90-96. 
22 C. Cosci and J.C. Clusini, De separatione tori conjugalis tam nullo existente seu soluto, quam salvo vinculo 
matrimonii, eiusque effectibus, 3 vols (Rome: Salvioni, 1773-1779), I, p. 1. For an example of separation 
among lower class people, see D. Lombardi, ‘L’odio capitale, ovvero l’incompatibilità di carattere: Maria 
Falcini e Andrea Lotti (Firenze 1773-1777)’, in Seidel Menchi and Quaglioni, eds, Coniugi nemici, pp. 335-
67. An example of separation between nobles could be found in I. Fosi, ‘Da un tribunale all’altro: il divorzio 
fra Benedetta Pinelli e Girolamo Grimaldi, principe di Gerace (1609-1653)’, in Ibid., pp. 417-52. See also, 
Palazzi, Donne sole; L. Guzzetti, ‘Separations and Separated Couples in Fourteenth-Century Venice’, in Dean 
and Lowe, eds, Marriage in Italy, pp. 249-74. For a study of separated women in conduct literature, see 
Hosker, “Donne sole” in Post-Unification Italy, pp. 63-84. 
23 Artt. 144 and 150, Codice civile per gli Stati di S. M. il Re di Sardegna, in Collezione completa, p. 600; Art. 
111, Codice civile universale austriaco pel Regno Lombardo-Veneto in Collezione completa, p. 153. On this 
point, see also M.R. Di Simone, ‘La condizione giuridica della donna nell’ABGB’, Historia et ius, 9 (2016), 
paper 3, pp. 17-18. On marriage as a lifelong bond according to canon law, see Gaudemet, Le Mariage en 
Occident, pp. 284-89. 




ecclesiastic curia,25 the Codice civile universale austriaco pel Regno Lombardo-Veneto 
described in detail how this approval was to be requested. The couple were required to report 
to the parish priest and explain the motives that induced them to make this decision. The 
parish priest, in turn, had the duty to:  
 
richiamare alla mente dei conjugi le promesse reciproche solennemente fatte al momento dell’unione in 
matrimonio, e l’inculcare loro energicamente le conseguenze dannose della separazione. Queste ammonizioni 
debbono ripetersi per tre diverse volte.26  
 
As explained in a civil law handbook of the time, the Manuale sul Codice civile generale 
austriaco (1844), the three warnings needed to be repeated ‘in uno spazio di tempo 
competente a lasciare luogo alla riflessione’.27 If these attempts proved ineffective, the 
parish priest could produce a document in which he explained that, although extensively 
warned, the couple persisted in their will to separate. This document allowed the couple to 
report to the civil judge and ask to settle the patrimonial agreements regarding the 
marriage.28 Despite being strictly interconnected, the ecclesiastic and secular judges 
defended their prerogatives. In 1854, for example, the court of Casale pointed out that, if 
the Curia had not authorised a separation, the civil judge could not do anything against this 
decision (as we shall see, exceptions could be made only in case of torture).29 Similarly, in 
a case brought to sentence in 1856, in Turin, the tribunal stated that if an ecclesiastic court 
decided on alimony or other civil effects of separation, it would commit an abuse of power.30 
Separation had to be assessed by a court, and could not be decided by the spouses: indeed, 
they could not autonomously determine to live in different houses, because this behaviour 
would be illegal and would not allow any demand for alimony.31 Furthermore, a 1859 
decision defined the pact made by two married people to leave separately as ‘immorale e 
nullo’.32 The use of the term immoral provides, once again, an insight into nineteenth-
                                                 
25 Art. 140, Codice civile per gli Stati di S. M. il Re di Sardegna, in Collezione completa, p. 600.  
26 Art. 104, Codice civile universale austriaco pel Regno Lombardo-Veneto in Collezione completa, p. 152. 
27 A. Amati, Manuale sul Codice civile generale austriaco (Milan: Visaj, 1844), p. 49. 
28 Art. 105, Codice civile universale austriaco pel Regno Lombardo-Veneto in Collezione completa, p. 152. 
29 Giurisprudenza degli Stati Sardi, 4 (1854), 596-98. 
30 Giurisprudenza degli Stati Sardi, 6 (1856), 232-35.   
31 Giurisprudenza degli Stati Sardi, 1 (1848-1849), 346.  
32 Giurisprudenza degli Stati Sardi, 1 (1859), 892. 
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century mentalities: a woman and a man, married but living in two different households 
without any consistent reason, were not complying with the shared, moral values of society. 
Although separation did not dissolve the bond, the spouses were allowed to live in 
separate houses, and all other marital agreements continued to be in force, unless explicitly 
stated. This meant that, as a dowry was ad sustinenda onera matrimonii – to bear the burden 
of marriage – the person who kept the dowry was obliged to provide alimony to the other 
spouse, even though they were separated. A case appealed before the tribunal of Turin in 
1852 demonstrates this point. Giovanni Maria Gambone and Anna Paoletti requested and 
obtained separation from the Archbishop’s Curia, but Giovanni Maria did not want to leave 
the house in which they used to live. The couple had a daughter, aged nine, but Anna – a 
widow, who had remarried – also had two other daughters from her previous marriage, to 
whom Giovanni Maria was co-guardian. His refusal to leave the marital house was 
motivated by the fact that he was not able to appropriately perform his function of co-
guardian if he had to live somewhere else. The house where they lived was owned by his 
wife, as a paraphernal asset, and by the daughters from her first marriage. The court ruled 
that one of the effects of a separation was that the couple would have to live in two different 
places. Given that Anna was co-owner of the house, Giovanni Maria was obliged to move 
out, even though he was co-guardian of Anna’s daughters.  
Living in two different households, however, did not allow the spouses to 
disentangle themselves from other regulations of the marital bond: a husband would 
continue to have rights over his wife’s dowry. Even after separation, a woman had to support 
her husband with the interests her dowry produced. Indeed,  
 
la legge accorda al marito la facoltà di amministrare la dote della moglie e di perceverne li frutti, e li interessi 
lo obbliga in pari tempo a somministrare alla moglie in proporzione delle sue sostanze e del suo stato, tutto 
ciò che è necessario ai bisogni della vita come pure sottostare alle spese di mantenimento ed educazione della 
prole.33 
 
In this case, the dowry (constituted on 10 November 1841) was kept by Anna because it 
was part of the patrimony she shared with her daughters, and could not be split. 
Theoretically, her husband was entitled to receive the interest and return to his wife the 
amount necessary to support her and the daughter from their marriage. The tribunal, instead, 
                                                 
33 Giurisprudenza degli Stati Sardi, 3 (1853), 275-78 (p. 277).  
172 
 
ordered that Anna Paoletti was entitled to keep the interest, and then return the rest to her 
husband. This was meant to ‘evitare l’occasione di emulativi e contestazione tra le parti, o 
d’un pregiudizievole ritardo ogni qualvolta venisse il caso di pagamento della pensione 
alimentari dovuta dal Gambone alla moglie ed alla comune figlia’.34 It is worth noting that 
Anna had a 17,000-lira dowry, which produced 850 lire of interest, and the court ordered 
that she was entitled to keep only 550 lire to support herself and the daughter she had with 
Giovanni Maria.35 This was a powerful reminder of who exactly bore the burden of 
marriage: the dowry was not just meant to support the wife’s expenses, but those of the 
entire family. Anna owned and held her dowry, yet she was not allowed to manage it and 
use its returns as she wished. An even more striking point was that a separated wife could 
not freely administer her non-dotal assets, as she still needed her husband’s authorisation to 
sell or mortgage her estates, even after separation.36  
 
 




Court trials regarding consensual separation were mainly initiated because of a 
disagreement on financial matters, as we saw in the case of Giovanni Maria Gambone and 
Anna Paoletti. Non-consensual separation, instead, implied a strong discord. Causes to 
demand a non-consensual separation were various, but adultery was one of the most 
sensitive issues: it was deemed to cause disordine within society threating honour, and also 
resulting in the birth of illegitimate children, who would challenge the pristineness of the 
family line.  
Adultery was considered a crime, and had been treated as such for many centuries. 
It was ‘la prova oggettiva della differenza sessuale che fonda l’ordine maschile’,37 and 
judged with varying harshness if committed by a man or a woman. It thus confirmed the 
double-standard by which society approached men’s and women’s behaviour. Roman law 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., p. 278. 
36 Art. 143, Codice civile per gli Stati di S. M. il Re di Sardegna, in Collezione completa, p. 600. 
37 Daumas, Adulteri e cornuti, p. 70. 
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defined adultery as a situation in which a married woman had sexual intercourse with a man 
who was not her spouse. In ancient times – under Augustus’ laws for example – the husband 
or the father of the adulterous woman had the jus occidendi, the right to slay, and the 
husband was entitled to retain a portion of his wife’s dowry.38 Canon law, too, took the issue 
into account, and explained that only the copula perfecta was to be considered adultery.39 
The law of the Church prescribed that the adulterous woman would lose her dowry.40 If the 
husband was the adulterous one, he would lose the right to hold and retain the interests 
produced by his wife’s dowry.41 Women’s imbecillitas – Maurice Daumas points out – was 
not considered when handling adultery: ‘al contrario, in quanto alleata naturale del Nemico, 
è molto spesso designata come la fonte stessa del male’.42  
Medieval municipal statutes also punished those who committed adultery, especially 
from the early fourteenth century onwards when they began, first, to impose financial 
penalties and, later on, corporal ones.43 Some statutes of the Italian peninsula prescribed 
mild penalties, such as a fine or the cutting of the adulterers’ hair, while others had very 
harsh rules. According to the 1305 Statute of Tivoli, for example, the betrayed wife, or a 
person charged by her, could whip her husband’s amasia (mistress) for as long as she 
wanted, providing that she avoided homicide or ‘perdita di membro’.44 The Statute of 
                                                 
38 For an overview of adultery and jus occidendi in Roman law, see D. Cohen, ‘The Augustan Law on 
Adultery: The Social and Cultural Context’, in Kertzer and Saller, eds, The Family in Italy, pp. 109-26; E. 
Cantarella, ‘Homicides of Honor: The Development of Italian Adultery Law over Two Millennia’, in Ibid., 
pp. 229-44 (pp. 229-35); Fayer, La familia romana, III, pp. 189-374; A. Massironi, ‘The Father’s Right to Kill 
his Adulterous Daughter in the Late Ius Commune’, in M.G. Di Renzo Villata, ed., Family Law and Society 
in Europe from the Middle Ages to the Contemporary Era (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 
pp. 187-215. See also F. Roberti, ‘Adulterio (diritto canonico)’, Novissimo Digesto Italiano, 20 vols (Turin: 
Utet, 1957), I, pp. 333-35; G. Branca, ‘Adulterio (diritto antico)’, Enciclopedia del diritto, 16 vols (Milan: 
Giuffrè, 1958-1965), I, pp. 620-21.  
39 The copula perfecta was sexual intercourse, which led to procreation. On this idea, see P. D’Avack, ‘La 
copula perfecta e la consummatio coniugi nelle fonti e nella dottrina canonistica classica’, Rivista italiana per 
le scienze giuridiche, 86/3 (1949), 163-250. 
40 Mercanti, Compendio di diritto canonico, II, pp. 536-37. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Daumas, Adulteri e cornuti, p. 103. 
43 T. Dean, ‘Fathers and Daughters: Marriage Laws and Marriage Disputes in Bologna and Italy, 1200-1500’, 
in Dean and Lowe, eds, Crime, Society and the Law, pp. 85-106 (pp. 86-87). 
44 A. Marongiu, ‘Adulterio (diritto intermedio)’, Enciclopedia del diritto, p. 622. 
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Omegna (1384) went so far as to condemn to death those who committed adultery.45  
However, adultery was not considered a point of no return, because ‘love as a 
disorienting or mad passion was of limited duration; thus, in cases of love it could be hoped 
that lovers would eventually return to their senses and their correct familial places’.46 
Bartolus of Saxoferrato suggested sending the adulterous wife to a nunnery. In this way, the 
husband could reconcile with his adulterous wife, because the time spent there was believed 
to remove any stain.47  
As explained by Guido Ruggiero, adultery was ‘perceived as loss of property for a 
husband and his household, [and] courts were largely concerned with marriage in term of 
property as were most of the husbands who sought justice against adulterers’.48 This might 
further explain why men could be convicted of adultery only if they kept their amasia in the 
marital house.49  
In the period from the Middle Ages to modern times, the judicial approach to 
adultery changed in terms of punishment: explicit provisions of physical punishment were 
removed from eighteenth-century laws, even though, as we shall see, the sentence for the 
killing of an adulterous spouse was often mitigated. Over the course of time, the double-
standard applied to men and women remained unchallenged and continued to be enshrined 
in the law. 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ruggiero, The Boundaries of Eros, p. 66. 
47 ‘Monasterium omnem maculam detergit [...] vir potest sibi reconciliare uxorem de adulterio damnatam, et 
in monasterium missam’ (the monastery cleans every stain [and therefore] a man can reconcile with his wife, 
who was convicted of adultery and put into a monastery), see, Bartolus of Saxoferrato, Commentaria in Corpus 
iuris civilis. Super Authenticis, & Institutionibus (Venice: Giunta, 1585), Collatio IX, 54.  
48 Ruggiero, The Boundaries of Eros, p. 45. 
49 Marongiu, ‘Adulterio (diritto intermedio)’, Enciclopedia del diritto, p. 623. On adultery, see also Ruggiero, 
The Boundaries of Eros, pp. 45-69. For some disputes regarding adultery and demand for separation during 
the Early Modern period, see Guzzetti, ‘Separations and Separated Couples’, pp. 249-74; S. Chojnacki, ‘Il 
divorzio di Cateruzza: rappresentazione femminile ed esito processuale (Venezia 1465), in Seidel Menchi and 
Quaglioni, eds, Coniugi nemici, pp. 371-416; M. Bellabarba, ‘I processi per adulterio nell’Archivio Diocesano 
Tridentino (XVII-XVIII secolo)’, in Seidel Menchi and Quaglioni, eds, Trasgressioni, pp. 185-227, in 
particular pp. 193-94; L. Turchi, ‘Adulterio, onere della prova e testimonianza. In margine a un processo 
correggese di età tridentina’, in Ibid., pp. 305-50. For a comparison, see the study on adultery in England, 
D.M. Turner, Fashioning Adultery: Gender, Sex, and Civility in England, 1660-1740 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002).  
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Following the Napoleonic conquests and the promulgation of the criminal code in 
1810,50 the law ruled that only the husband was entitled to denounce his wife’s adultery, 
which could be punished with imprisonment from three months up to two years. The 
husband could stop this punishment ‘consentendo a riprendere la moglie’.51 These criminal 
code provisions were already included in Napoleon’s civil code.52 Napoleonic criminal law 
provided that the punishment of an adulterous husband could take place only if he had 
brought his mistress to live in the spouses’ house, and that this punishment be limited to a 
fine.53 Adultery was an appropriate reason to demand divorce,54 as it implied a breach of 
the right of mutual fidelity with which the spouses should comply, and an even more crucial 
challenge to honour. However, also the right to ask for divorce was granted to men and 
women with varying degrees, confirming, again, women’s inferior status.  
The work of the Dominican friar Faustino Scarpazza is representative of the thoughts 
regarding adultery shared by many people in the Italian peninsula and, as we have seen, 
confirmed by the law:    
 
L’adulterio non ha sempre la medesima gravità, [...] è più grave l’adulterio di una conjugata con un libero 
uomo, di quello di un conjugato, con una donna libera, poiché nel primo caso si ha l’incertezza sulla legittimità 
della prole. […] Questa maggior gravità ci viene anche indicata dal Signore quando nei tempi antichi permise 
bensì la pluralità delle mogli, ma non mai la pluralità dei mariti. [Inoltre] la moglie non contrae infamia 
                                                 
50 The Codice dei Delitti e delle Pene pel Regno d’Italia (Milan: Reale Stamperia, 1810) was approved with 
decree 254 on 12 November 1810, and entered into force on 1 January 1811. On this code, see A. Laingui, ‘Il 
diritto penale della rivoluzione francese e dell’Impero’, in S. Vinciguerra, ed., Diritto penale dell’Ottocento: 
i codici preunitari e il codice Zanardelli (Padua: CEDAM, 1993), pp. 49-52; A. Cavanna, ‘Il codice penale 
napoleonico. Qualche considerazione generalissima’, in S. Vinciguerra, ed., Codice dei delitti e delle pene pel 
Regno d’Italia (1811) (Padua: Cedam, 2002), pp. XI-XXII (pp. XIV-XVI); M.A. Cattaneo, ‘L’autoritarismo 
penale napoleonico’, in Ibid., pp. 23-32. 
51 Artt. 336-337, in Codice dei Delitti e delle Pene pel Regno d’Italia (Milan: Reale Stamperia, 1810), p. 112.  
52 Artt. 308 and 309, Codice Civile del Regno d’Italia, in Collezione Completa dei Moderni Codici Civili 
(Turin: Minerva Subalpina, 1845), p. 18. 
53 Art. 339, in Codice dei Delitti e delle Pene pel Regno d’Italia (Milan: Reale Stamperia, 1810), p. 112.  
54 Artt. 229 and 230, Codice Civile del Regno d’Italia, in Collezione Completa dei Moderni Codici Civili, p. 
13. If there was no adultery implied, the code allowed that both spouses could ask for divorce ‘per eccessi, 
sevizie, o ingiurie gravi’, see Art. 231, Ibid., p. 13. It is worth highlighting that according to Napoleon’s code 
a couple could ask for divorce and then remarry, while other legal systems in force after the Restoration only 
allowed separation. Divorce was introduced in the Italian legal system with Law 898 in 1970. 
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dall’adulterio del marito, niuno se ne scandalezza, e può ritenerla per complice del di lui peccato, purché 
dimostri il suo dispiacere pei vizj del marito, e si adoperi perché si emendi.55  
 
Common views on marriage and the double standard relating to sexual behaviour were such 
that a wife’s adultery was deemed to strongly impact on her husband’s and their families’ 
honour, especially for the breach it could cause to the family line. Adultery committed by a 
man, instead, was not to be considered such a meaningful issue, as long as the betrayed wife 
showed sorrow for her husband’s vices, and tried her best to assure society that she was not 
an accomplice. It is also worth noting that, according to Scarpazza, it was the wife who was 
asked to ‘adoperarsi’ in order to make the husband stop betraying her. Moreover, if a man 
had children born outside the family, it would be a negligible issue for his standing and 
prestige, whereas, for a woman, having illegitimate children was a matter of the utmost 
dishonour. 
The 1839 criminal code of the Kingdom of Sardinia described adultery as a crime 
against ‘l’ordine delle famiglie’, and confirmed the provisions of the Napoleonic code.56 
This code reduced the punishment of those who, in the grip of the ‘justus dolor’ (the just 
rage), the uncontrollable feeling, killed the adulterous spouse. This justus dolor was 
believed to explode if, for example, a husband caught his wife during the act of committing 
adultery.57 This reduction was also granted to a woman’s parents if they caught their 
daughter committing adultery in their house, and then killed her.58 No provision tackled the 
case of a woman killing her adulterous husband, because, as we saw, ‘la moglie non contrae 
l’infamia dall’adulterio del marito’.   
The 1852 Austrian code that was in force in Lombardy-Venetia, instead, ruled that 
the adulterers were to be given a fine and imprisoned from one to six months, and added 
that ‘la donna deve punirsi con maggior rigore qualora, a motivo del commesso adulterio, 
possa insorger dubbio sulla legittimità del successivo parto’.59 The Austrian code did not 
                                                 
55 F. Scarpazza, Decisioni dei casi di coscienza e di dottrina canonica, 13 vols (Naples: Nuovo Gabinetto 
Letterario, 1828), I, pp. 24, 28. 
56 Artt. 523-529, Codice Penale per gli Stati di S. M. il Re di Sardegna (Turin: Minerva Subalpina, 1840), pp. 
90-91. 
57 On this point, see M. Cavina, Nozze di sangue: storia della violenza coniugale (Rome: Laterza, 2011), pp. 
68-81. 
58 Art. 604, Codice Penale per gli Stati di S. M. il Re di Sardegna, p. 102. 
59 Art. 502, L. Oldrati, Codice penale austriaco attualmente in vigore nel regno Lombardo-Veneto con 
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mention scandal and honour as reasons for the punishment of adultery: the adulterers were 
indicted, because the spouses had the right to mutual fidelity, and it was the breach of this 
right that was to be condemned.60 With the Unification of Italy and the enactment of the 
new civil code (1865), legal provisions on adultery became similar to those enforced in the 
Napoleonic and Kingdom of Sardinia codes, admitting a demand of separation by the wife 
only if the husband had kept his mistress in the marital house, or – and the Napoleonic code 
did not have this provision – ‘notoriamente in altro luogo, oppure concorrano circostanze 





Adultery was not the only motivation behind the demand for a non-consensual separation. 
In Lombardy-Venetia, abuse, torture, or even only a ‘condotta sregolata in guisa che […] i 
buoni costumi della famiglia siano posti in pericolo’ could represent substantial reasons to 
initiate a claim.62 It should be noted that not every kind of torture was considered as such, 
and a wife had to bear a certain degree of abuse. As Marco Cavina observed, ‘la violenza 
maritale fu un elemento fisiologico e accettato del matrimonio, legalmente fino a tutto 
l’Antico Regime, socialmente ben oltre’.63 The collection of volumes written during the 
second half of the eighteenth century by Cristoforo Cosci, an apostolic prothonotary, clearly 
explained this point. Cosci wrote that ‘saevitia viri in uxorem est res pessima, [sed] 
percussio moderata uxoris ad correctionem non est causa separationis tori’ (the torture of a 
woman by her husband is a very bad thing, but a moderate percussion of the wife with the 
aim to correct her is not a cause of separation of the bed).64 In the view of the time, women 
                                                 
osservazioni teorico-pratiche e confronto coll’antecedente abrogato (Milan: Manini, 1852), p. 428. 
60 Oldrati, Codice penale austriaco, p. 428. 
61 Art. 150, in Codice civile del Regno d’Italia: corredato della relazione del Ministro Guardasigilli fatta a S. 
M. in udienza del 25 giugno 1865 (Turin: Botta, 1865), p. 30. See also Artt. 148-149, Ibid. 
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– considered weak-headed and childish – needed to be guided and corrected, no matter how. 
Instead, ‘atroces saevitae’ (atrocious tortures) could lead to separation, and in order to 
determine the harshness of a saevitia ‘semper attendenda est qualitas personae’ (the status 
of the person involved should be considered).65 This meant that saevitae, such as denial of 
food and medicine, ‘in foeminis honestissimis et nobilibus illae saevitiae graviores sunt, 
[…] in humilioribus sunt leviores’ (to honest and noble women these tortures are more 
severe, to humble women are less).66 In a world which revolved around the ideas of status 
and prestige this statement is not surprising. The social, juridical and economic framework 
of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Italian peninsula, with its legacies of ‘soggezione 
di persona a persona’ (see Chapter 3), easily accepted the view that linked the body to 
wealth, suggesting that the life of a noble and wealthy person had more importance than 
that of a poor one.    
The claim for separation due to the saevitia suffered by one of the spouses was to be 
initiated in a similar way as that concerning other cases of separation. First, it was to be 
reported to the Curia, which had to release a document allowing the couple to report to the 
secular judge to assess their patrimonial matters. In the Kingdom of Sardinia, the civil judge 
could also order a separation, if the safety of the spouse who began the claim was at risk.67 
In Lombardy-Venetia, the civil judge could decide on the separation and on patrimonial 
matters if one of the spouses did not agree to appear before the Curia.68 Non-consensual 
separation was not easy to obtain unless there were substantial reasons to initiate this 
demand.  
In the two cases reported in legal journals (one in the Giurisprudenza teorico-pratica 
secondo la legislazione austriaca and the other in Annali di Giurisprudenza), the lawsuit 
was often initiated because of the passing on of venereal disease, which was equated to a 
saevitia. For example, in a case that was brought before several tribunals of Lombardy-
Venetia in 1835, a woman initiated a lawsuit against her husband, who, a few days after 
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their marriage, had passed syphilis on to her.69 The reported trials took place before secular 
judges, which leads us to believe that one of the spouses, the husband in this case, refused 
to appear before the Curia. At the very beginning, the wife was obliged to stay in bed though 
unaware of the nature of her sickness. Her uncle then invited her to his house for some days, 
hoping for ‘un miglioramento nel cambiamento dell’aria’.70 However, when she returned 
home her condition deteriorated to the extent that she was not able to do any housework. 
Her father was immediately informed, and took her to his home, where ‘le vennero prodigate 
tutte le possibili cure per rimetterla in salute’.71 The family even called a doctor from Milan, 
who confirmed that her sickness was due to the ‘lue venerea dalla quale era gravemente 
attaccata’, and suggested sending her to the ‘Ospedale Maggiore’.72 The journal did not 
report the couple’s names, or where they lived, but, from the information given, we can 
assume that they were from the province of Milan, and the Ospedale Maggiore was probably 
that of Milan. There, the wife was hospitalised against payment for several months, and, 
when she was able to return to her father’s house, continued to be under medical attention 
for some time. All these vicissitudes were proven by two letters, in which her husband 
admitted to being guilty of passing syphilis on to her, and promised to bear the cost of his 
wife’s medical treatment. She pointed out that the husband, perfectly aware of his sickness, 
had seriously undermined her health and her life. The records reported her stating that: 
 
con medicozzi curavasi da sé già da qualche giorno [e] conscio della sua infezione, conscio per l’esperienza 
che il male era comunicabile, superò ogni riguardo, sciolse qualunque freno, usò con la sposa e con l’uso la 
rese inferma ed infetta di un malore pericoloso.73 
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The woman pointed out that her husband had come down with the morbo gallico by 
committing an illicit and prohibited action: as he himself had even confirmed, ‘si era unito 
con una femmina da partito poco prima del matrimonio’.74 As we saw earlier, extramarital 
sexual intercourse was not punished in Lombardy-Venetia. Hence, one might argue that the 
wife wanted to leverage the court’s sense of morality and put her husband in a bad light to 
facilitate her demand for a separation. According to Article 109 of the Codice civile, the 
wife asked the court to pronounce a sentence that declared their separation, the return of her 
dowry and her trousseau, and the repayment of her medical expenses, which amounted to 
252.2 lire austriache, as well as a daily alimony of 1.5 lire austriache.75 The husband refuted 
his wife’s argument by pointing out that syphilis was not among the diseases that allowed 
separation according to Article 109. In particular, he claimed that the morbo gallico was not 
to be considered strictly contagious: transmittable diseases were only those that were passed 
on ‘con l’alito e con la semplice vicinanza, come sarebbe la febbre gialla, il morbo nero, le 
scrofole e simili’.76 He also claimed that he did not know he was sick; this explained why 
he took part ‘nelle allegrezze nuziali non si astenne di valersi né di vitto, né di bibite 
eccitanti’, and even consummated the marriage.77 He added that, had he been aware of his 
condition, he would have postponed their marriage until after his complete recovery. There 
was no actual malice in his actions – he maintained – and the two letters presented to court 
were by no means evidence of his guilt, and only proved ‘l’umiliazione dell’innocente 
marito, che afflitto dall’avvenuto sinistro ne chiede scusa alla moglie’.78 He also asked the 
court to order his wife to return to the marital house within fourteen days, ‘sotto la 
comminatoria d’esservi astretta anche con i mezzi compulsivi di giustizia’.79   
In line with the dominant ideas of the time, the tribunal of first instance assumed 
that a wife needed to bear a certain degree of saevitiae, and ruled that there were insufficient 
reasons for the couple to separate. The wife could ask at most a reimbursement for the 
medical expenses she had incurred. Passing on chronic syphilis was definitely a valid reason 
to ask for separation, but – the court ruled – only if this was done consciously, and if the 
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syphilis was incurable.80 As the couple married on 5 June and the husband sought medical 
help on 24 June, the court argued that it was unlikely that he could have been aware of his 
disease. This proved that there was no actual malice.81 The court also rejected the point that 
the passing on of a disease could be equated to mistreatment. On the contrary:   
 
coll’avere inscientemente comunicato il male alla moglie non può dirsi che abbia il marito tese insidie alla di 
lei vita e salute né vuolsi parificare un tal fatto ad una propinazione di veleno: la visita fatta eseguire alla 
moglie dal medico e le istanze per sottoporla ad una cura escludono ogni idea di insidia.82 
 
In the court’s opinion, the husband’s fairness and innocence could be undoubtedly inferred 
for having called a doctor and providing his wife with medical treatment. Admittedly the 
woman’s life could have been at risk, but no deadly event occured, and her suffering was 
not directly caused by her husband, as in the case, for example, of ‘percosse, minacce, 
mancanza di alimenti e simili’.83 The court of first instance ruled that the spouses should 
reunite, and that the wife, given that she had recovered, could ‘quindi superare il ribrezzo 
che la ricordanza del male sofferto poteva ispirare’.84  
The wife appealed the sentence and objected ‘contro il disordine di voler 
constringere una infelice ed innocente giovane a nuovamente giacere su di un talamo che il 
marito le preparò coperto di veleno’.85 She even suggested that her husband’s disease could 
have been caused by a ‘commercio con una bagascia’ after their marriage, which would 
make him culpable of adultery, according to Article 109. His fault was not excusable even 
if he had had this ‘meretricio suo congiungimento’ before their marriage, because he could 
have waited the time required for the disease to take its course.86 
The Eccelso Tribunale superiore d’Appello conceded the separation of bed and 
board, because the wrong that the husband had committed was enormous. The court argued 
that this woman, ‘zitella onesta e nel fiore degli anni’, had been offended ‘nell’atto stesso 
di ascendere quel talamo che immacolato attendeva, e trovava contaminato; quell’animo 
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non poteva non essere lacerato da amarissima afflizione’.87  
The sentence was again appealed. This time the husband argued that this cause was 
not just affecting their mere interest but it was a matter of public order. By exploiting ideas 
about marriage being a key institution on which society rested, the defendant obtained the 
favour of the court: the Supremo Senato of Verona, the tribunal of final instance, confirmed 
the first judgement and denied separation. However, the husband was required to refund the 
expenses incurred by his wife due to her disease. Despite appearances, this was an 
achievement for the wife, given that expenses for her sickness would usually have been paid 
with money coming from her dowry.   
A marriage was a lifelong bond that could not be dismissed because one of the 
spouses had transmitted a disease, thus denying the significance of personal feelings and 
psychological issues. Although sexual intercourse outside wedlock was not looked upon 
favourably, it was socially accepted for men, who were not expected to abide by the same 
sexual rules as women. As a woman’s goal was to marry, society required her to comply 
with behaviours that were seen as positive and womanly, such as being a good daughter, 
wife and then mother, sexually honourable and compliant with her role as an angel of the 
hearth.  
Moreover, in this case, the wife asked for separation, but at the same time seemed 
to share society’s vision about men and women. The wife’s arguments revolved around the 
disease and her sickness, and although she mentioned that her husband might have 
committed a prohibited action, she neglected to refer to his morality. The syphilis had been 
supposedly developed after a ‘commercio con una bagascia’, but revealing this detail was 
only functional to the demand of separation, and not an act to be stigmatised. We may 
assume that the ‘talamo che immacolato attendeva, e trovava contaminato’ only referred to 
the disease, as honesty and virginity were only considered womanly values.   
Another interesting example of the law in action is a case, discussed in the Kingdom 
of Sardinia, which also dealt with a sexually transmitted disease, but, this time, with fatal 
consequences, even though the case itself is about patrimonial matters.88  
The relatives of a deceased woman (names were not mentioned) asked the court to 
confirm that they were entitled to initiate a legal action against her widower, in order to 
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claim his forfeiture of the right to obtain the lucrum dotis, the gain that a man was entitled 
to keep before returning the dowry to his wife’s heirs after her death. Alongside the amount 
of the dowry and the trousseau, wedding agreements signed before notaries also regulated 
issues such as the place where the couple would settle after the marriage, and often 
confirmed the amount of the lucrum dotis. The value of the lucrum dotis was usually 
provided by the law, especially by municipal statutes, to which people still referred in many 
areas of the nineteenth-century Italian peninsula. A husband could obtain this gain only if 
the marriage was still in force at the time of his wife’s death. The point around which this 
lawsuit revolved was whether the couple was separated or not, given that the woman had 
initiated a cause against her husband, but had died before a verdict was reached. 
At the time of their wedding, in 1836, the wife obtained a 40,000-lira dowry. More 
than half of this dowry (25,000 lire) was paid in cash, while the remaining portion was used 
to cancel a mortgage the husband had over his own patrimony. In the dowry instrument, the 
spouses referred to the Statute of Turin to determine the lucrum dotis. Shortly after their 
marriage, the wife left the marital house and went before the Bishop of Turin to ask for the 
‘separazione di toro’, because she had discovered that she had been infected with syphilis 
by her husband, presumably after extramarital intercourse on his part. The husband claimed 
that neither he nor his wife had syphilis, and demanded that his wife return to their house. 
Both presented documents drawn up by their respective physicians to support their claims, 
but, shortly thereafter, the woman died. The husband sued his wife’s brother and mother, 
asking them to cancel the mortgage made over his property to guarantee the dowry, and 
claimed to be entitled to keep for himself 20,000 lire as lucrum dotis. They questioned his 
claims by maintaining that he did not deserve any lucrum dotis because he had committed 
adultery, and presented a statement from a doctor showing that his wife’s death was caused 
by a ‘subdola infiammazione intestinale a cui la causa sifilitica [aveva] servito di 
avviamento ed accidentali cause atmosferiche [avevano] indi procacciato incremento ed 
acutizzazione’.89 The husband, instead, argued that the autopsy did not report any traces of 
syphilis, and that the cause of death was deemed to be an inflammatory bowel disease.  
In June 1837, Turin’s tribunal ruled that the husband was entitled to keep the lucrum 
dotis, because, if the passing on of syphilis could have been equated to a saevitia – and 
therefore allowing separation – this was to be made ‘scientemente, e […] il risultato di dolo, 
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e di animo pravo, e che ebbe luogo con premeditazione, o con volontà deliberata di nuocere 
gravemente’, but this was not the case.90 The court added that the presented documents 
allowed room to doubt whether or not the husband had passed on the disease deliberately.  
The case was not over. Basing their claims on ‘la legge, […] la giurisprudenza, […] 
e la sana ragione’, the wife’s brother and mother appealed the judgement, arguing that the 
couple was in fact separated at the time of her death, because of the husband’s ‘inosservanza 
di fede coniugale, e […] mali trattamenti’.91 The appellants’ lawyer argued that the husband 
lost the lucrum dotis, not because of the separation per se, but because of his behaviour. He 
had caused the separation ‘malamente governandosi’, and, if the death of his wife made the 
sentence of separation ‘inutile, ed anzi impossibile’, the behaviour of the surviving spouse 
could not be left unpunished.92 As jurisprudence suggested that ‘le sevizie, le insidie tramate 
alla vita, le ingiuste diffamazioni’ were valid reasons to ask for a separation, this was even 
more so in the case of the transmission of such a disease.93 Although one could argue that 
the syphilis was not intentionally passed on, jurisprudence claimed that a husband’s duty 
was not to harm but to defend and protect his wife: therefore, the gross negligence that had 
made the woman ill could be equated to actual malice.94 The appellants also pointed out that 
the lucrum dotis was a sort of reward, a sign of gratitude for a good marriage, and the spouse, 
who had put the couple in such a deadly situation, could not aspire to obtain any gain.95  
The husband’s counterargument focused on the very intimate nature of the demand 
of separation, suggesting that such a request could not be transmitted to any heir and, 
therefore, his wife’s relatives had no power to initiate any claim.96 He also stated that he 
and his wife had reconciled, and that she had even given him a gift for his name day, in 
April 1836. He added that the following 10 June his mother-in-law had given him the 
remaining 5,000 lire that he was entitled to as part of his wife’s dowry.   
The arguments brought in by the husband, nonetheless, were not enough to convince 
the Real Senato, which, on 22 March 1839, delivered a decision in favour of the wife’s 
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relatives and claimed that the cause was not only crucial for the appellants’ own interest, 
but particularly for public morals. Although the woman’s relatives had to move through 
several judicial stages, the Real Senato ruled that the appellants were entitled to make a 
claim to avoid allowing the widower to keep the lucrum dotis. The couple did not reconcile 
as the husband had claimed, and the gift for the name day as well as the missing 5,000 lire 
were given before the cause for separation was presented to the Bishop (22 July 1836). The 
Real Senato also pointed out that it was not the sentence of separation itself that could have 
made him unworthy to obtain the lucrum dotis, but the actual facts that led to such a 
sentence.97 Even though, it is not clearly reported in the decision, one can argue that adultery 
and passing on of syphilis were not the only reasons that made the husband unworthy of the 
lucrum dotis: the subsequent death of his wife made public his betrayal of the family’s 
honour, and this was strongly blameworthy.   
In a world that revolved around marriage, which was considered indissoluble, the 
challenge to the legitimate family was a major concern. A marriage should only end with 
the death of one of the spouses, and causes regarding adultery and separation were few. 
Despite adultery being largely accepted when committed by men, courts nevertheless took 
into consideration the challenge it presented to the honour of the wife’s family. If a woman 
was asked to bear saevitae and adultery to some extent, once these injuries were made 
public, things changed. Women, who entered another famiglia through marriage, were not 
entitled to carry large amount of their family of origin’s wealth; they were entrusted, instead, 
with the task of preserving their prestige and honour. As during their lives their morality 
was deemed to impact on their natal family, similarly, a breach to their personal honour, if 
made public, was considered an offence to their family as a whole.   
                                                 






‘Non è possibile negare l’intelligenza di molte donne di più di quello 
 che si possa disconoscere l’imbecillità di molti uomini’ 
A.M. Mozzoni, La donna e i suoi rapporti sociali (Milan: Tipografia Sociale, 1864), p. 220. 
 
 
The Ottocento was a crucial period for women in the Italian peninsula. Both men and 
women acknowledged, and often shared, the new ideals of the Enlightenment, but changes 
were handled with extreme caution. And this was reflected in the law, resulting in a legal 
framework with judges, jurists and lawmakers who praised institutions such as marital 
authorisation, but, at the same time, included women among those entitled to access parental 
inheritance.  
Some interesting points can be inferred from the legal documents analysed in this 
study. First of all, the nineteenth-century family still bears significant traces of the Old 
Regime’s idea of a choral and collective moral body, which deployed its standing in society 
as a group. Within a context that relied on obedience, and valued it as a major virtue, what 
Luciano Guerci called a ‘crisi dell’obbedienza’ emerged. Women questioned men’s 
authority, sons disputed that of their fathers, challenging not only the family’s peace but 
also the hierarchical set-up of society. This crisis of obedience came together with, or – one 
might argue – was the cause of, the decline of the patriarchal family, a process which 
possibly began with the Enlightenment and found its embodiement in the individualism of 
the Napoleonic code.  
Women initiating lawsuits had a salient role in this process. They showed a certain 
degree of consciousness about their rights, and, when reporting their cases, also seemed to 
know how the law functioned in practice and how to seek advice.  
Although the rulings examined in this sudy were not always made in women’s 
favour, they could be interpreted in several ways. Poised between the Ancien Régime and 
the disrupting novelties of the Napoleonic code, and with an eye to the future, judges and 
jurists bore in mind the ways people could be affected by the outputs of the law in action, 
and how their decisions were understood in society. A possible image that emerges from 
the analysis of these rulings is their aim to avoid discord and disruption, by attempting, often 
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awkwardly, not to neglect anyone, and by always keeping in mind the importance of the 
family. 
In particular, courts – both ecclesiastical and secular – specifically ruled in favor 
matrimonii. For example, the Bishop’s court rejected the claim of Andrea Buttarini because 
he only wanted to carry out a ‘leggiadra vendetta’, but, in the case of Giovanni Battista 
Civieri, things were different: he had solid reasons to ask Luigia to keep her promise, not to 
mention that a breach of his honour before society was to be prevented. With regard to cases 
concerning money, decisions were often made so as to provide women with an addition to 
their dowries or to allow widows to access the quarta uxoria. In the cases described in 
Chapter five, the courts ruled in women’s favour, even though the value of their dowries 
was still far from the patrimony obtained by their brothers. The claims of Cattarina 
Montabone, in Chapter six, were met and her family was able to access part of her deceased 
husband’s patrimony. Similarly, Maria Vandoni was granted a portion of her third 
husband’s patrimony because she was poor and without dowry. This could imply an 
inclination to protect the weaker strata of society often represented by women. Cases 
regarding separation, by contrast, were thorny and their outcomes often unexpected to the 
extent that a woman, whose husband had passed syphilis on to her, was not allowed to 
separate, but only granted a refund for the expenses she had incurred: although her 
sufferings were acknowledged, there was something higher in play, that is, marriage, a 
‘foedus a Dio institutum’.  
These general positions, however, could also be read from a different perspective. 
One could suggest that society aimed not to be inclusive but to preserve its own stratification 
and its own static and hierarchical, male-dominated set-up. Thus, the Bishop’s efforts in the 
abovementioned case, rather than trying to satisfy the plaintiffs and safeguard the promise, 
may have been a means to convey and show his persuasive force. Indeed, the force of 
ecclesiastical courts in cases concerning marriage promises was mainly moral, and getting 
married or not primarily relied on a person’s will rather than on the sentence.  
Secular tribunals may have operated according to similar principles, thus 
redistributing wealth among children and widows not necessarily as an attempt to be fair, 
but aiming, instead, to avoid the concentration of goods and money in few hands. One might 
also argue that courts denied separation, because, within marriage, a woman was in the place 
where nature had destined her to be, not to mention the fact that separated women were a 
challenge to society and to the institution of marriage. 
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But the Ottocento was a period of transition: no matter how we read the outputs of 
lawsuits, changes were taking place and people had to establish a relationship with 
transformations. If after the Restoration the feudal ‘soggezione di persona a persona’ was 
formally abolished, nineteenth-century society refrained from removing this soggezione 
from everyday interpersonal relations, confirming the subordinate status of women. With 
the Unification of Italy, institutions such as marital authorisation were enshrined in the law 
also in the territories of the former Lombardy-Venetia: from being able to freely manage 
their assets, if married, women became dependent on men.  
After the drafting of the Pisanelli code, some voices against women’s inferior status 
began to rise from members of the Parliament, who noticed that the new legal system was 
taking Italy back to the past.1 After its enactment, both men and women intervened in public 
debates, highlighting the anachronism of those new rules confining women to a lesser status 
at a time when their contribution to the building of the nation, and to society, was widely 
acknowledged.  
A slow but unrestrainable process had been triggered. Especially from the turn of 
the century onwards, legal drafts calling for the removal of marital authorisation from the 
legal system, for example, were presented to Parliament, leading eventually to its abrogation 
in 1919, with the passing of Law n. 1176.  
Nonetheless, marital authorisation was not the only means to define women’s 
subordinate status, and there was still a long way to go. The right to vote, which up to 1918 
was not even granted to all men, was only given to women with the Decreto legislativo 
luogotenenziale of 1 February 1945, n. 23. The dowry, the physical representation of 
inequality, was still included in the 1942 civil code, and then formally abolished only with 
Law n. 151 in 1975.   
One might argue that in the present, at the cultural level, the path towards equality 
is not yet completed. With prejudices and stereotypes heavily persisting in and influencing 
Italian society, together with a considerable pay gap and the lack of adequate female 
representation in key private and public institutions, there is still much to do. However, 
formally and legally, men and women are equal. If the contribution of women and men such 
as Anna Maria Mozzoni, Anna Kuliscioff and Salvatore Morelli, to mention only a few, is 
                                                 




known and has been extensively analysed, the steps of ordinary people should also be 
acknowledged.  
These people were the women – and sometimes the men – who, in their everyday 
life, contributed to changing history with small, ordinary actions. Some of them have been 
described in this study: they were those who initiated lawsuits asking for larger dowries or 
to end their marriage to an adulterous husband. They did not only attempt to improve their 
situation, but also challenged commonplaces and society, thus demonstrating a strong self-
consciousness and an understanding of their subjectivity that theorists and moralists could 
no longer ignore. Although their encounter with the male-dominated, and often male-
oriented, justice did not always have a favourable outcome, it should be noted that, in many 
cases, sentences were made in women’s favour. These women, and these men, these 
anonymous and ordinary people, might not have had a prominent role in their world during 






















Table 1. Nineteenth-century coinage 
 
  Elaboration based 
on years 
Coinage Equivalent in lira 
italiana 
Kingdom of Sardinia  1830-1844 Lira piemontese 1.17 
Lombardy-Venetia 1830-1844 Lira Milanese 0.76 
 1830-1844 Lira austriaca 0.87 
 1830-1844 Lira veneta 0.71 
Grand-Duchy of Tuscany 1830-1844 Scudo 6.3 
 1830-1844 Lira 0.84 
 1830-1844 Paolo 0.56 
 1830-1844 Fiorino 1.4 
Papal States 1830-1844 Scudo romano 5.38 
 1830-1844 Lira bolognese 1.07 
Duchy of Parma 1830-1844 Lira 0.24 
Duchy of Modena 1830-1844 Lira of Modena 0.38 
Kingdom of Two Sicilies 1861 Ducato  4.30 
 
My elaboration is based on data included in D. Donini, La metrologia europea comparata con quella di Roma, 
di Bologna, e di Parigi, e viceversa (Terni: Possenti, 1833); L. Malavasi, La Metrologia Italiana, nei suoi 
scambievoli rapporti desunti dal confronto col sistema metrico-decimale (Modena: Malavasi and Compagno, 
1844); A Handbook for Travellers in Southern Italy: Being a Guide for the Provinces Formerly Constituting 
the Continental Portion of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (London: Murray, 1868), and on legal documents 





Ad sustinenda onera: to bear the burden. Usually, it refers to the dowry which is designed 
to bear the burden, or the expenses, of marriage. 
Bona extra dotalia: goods that were not part of the dowry and were not secured against a 
mortgage. A woman could dispose of these goods without having to ask for permission from 
a judge. 
Commune or commune civitatis: Medieval city-state. 
Controdote or antifactum or antefactum: counterdowry, a marriage gift of Roman origin 
given by the groom to the bride; usually its value was half that of the dowry. 
Dowry instrument: a written instrument concerning the dowry and containing dotal 
agreement, normally rogated by a notary. 
Familia: all people descending from the same ancestor. In a broader sense, familia is the 
whole household. It may also include servants and other collaborators. 
Fideicommissum: a testamentary disposition, by which a testator imposes on a person the 
obligation to held and transfer the concerned goods to a third person. This institution was 
used to preserve the patrimony and transmit it within the members of a family.  
Filiusfamilia or filiafamilia: literally son/daughter of a family, he/she was under the 
authority (guardianship) of his/her father or of the paterfamilias until his death or his/her 
emancipation. 
Hereditament: the property of a testator composed of a portion, which could be freely 
disposed of (the free estate or discretionary portion) and an indefeasible portion (forced 
heirship or legitima portio). 
Hotchpot: a fictious reunion of properties in orde to secure equal division among heirs in an 
ab intestato succession.  
Inter vivos donation: a donation which produces legal effects while the interested parties 
are still alive. 
Ius commune: literally ‘common law’; used to define Roman and canon law. The term 
commune meant that it was in use in several states. 
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Ius proprium: used in opposition to ius commune to indicate the law of a specific state. 
Lucrum dotis: the gain a man was entitled to keep before returning the dowry to his wife’s 
heirs after her death. 
Majorat: the right of succession to property accorded to first-born sons. 
Odium quartae: aversion towards the wife’s traditional claim to one-quarter of her 
husband’s property as her marriage gift. 
Paterfamilias: father or other male ancestor. He was the head of the family and could have 
under his power children and grand-children ex filio (from the side of his own son) but not 
ex filia. 
Paterna paternis, materna maternis: this expression was used to signify that goods coming 
from the father of a deceased person descended to his paternal relations and those from the 
mother to the maternal side. 
Peculium: the wealth that the filiusfamilia or filiafamilia could have which was not part of 
the patrimony of the familia. 
Portio legitima or legitima portio: the portion of inheritance that could not be bequeathed 
by will. 
Propter dotem: literally ‘because of the dowry’. Usually used to mean the exclusion of a 
woman from inheritance because she already had a dowry. 
Quarta: marriage gift of Lombard origin used in many Italian cities. The wife was granted 
the right to obtain a quarter of her husband’s property after his death. 
Successione ab intestato: an inheritance by intestacy, or the succession to the property of a 
person who dies without a valid will. 
Sui juris: of one’s own right. It defines an emancipated person who is not under the 
guardianship of someone else. 
Tertia: marriage gift of Frankish origin used in many Italian cities. The wife was granted 
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—— Observations sur le rapport du Comité de constitution concernant la nouvelle 
organisation de la France (Versailles: Baudouin, 1789). 
Sperino, C., Sifilizzazione nell’uomo ([n.p.]: Favale, 1851). 
Stella, L., ‘Alcune considerazioni sulla minore responsabilità penale della donna’, Archivio 
Giuridico, 4 (1869), 76-83. 
Tarabotti, A., L’Inferno monacale di Arcangela Tarabotti, ed. by F. Medioli (Turin: 
Rosenberg and Sellier, 1990).  
Tassoni, A.M., La religione, dimostrata e difesa (Naples: Società Editrice, 1854 [1805]). 
Tommaseo, N., Dell’educazione. Osservazioni e saggi pratici (Venice: Andruzzi, 1842). 
—— Delle nuove speranze d’Italia, presentimenti da un’opera di Niccolò Tommaseo 
(Florence: Le Monnier, 1848). 
—— La donna: scritti varii (Milan: Agnelli, 1872 [1868]). 
—— Sull’educazione, desiderii (Florence: Le Monnier, 1851 [1846]). 
Trivulzio di Belgioioso, C., ‘Della presente condizione delle donne e del loro avvenire’ 
[1860], in S. Bortone, ed., Il 1848 a Milano e Venezia: con uno scritto sulla 
condizione della donna (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1977), pp. 169-85. 
Tutini, C., Dell’origine e fundazione de’ seggi di Napoli, del tempo in che furono istituiti 
(Naples: Gessari, 1754). 
Vanni, I., I progressi della legislazione civile in Italia dopo la rivoluzione (Perugia: 
Santucci, 1878). 
Vescia, A., ‘Se l’autorizzazione maritale sia necessaria alla moglie il cui marito è 
inabilitato’, Archivio giuridico, 38 (1887), 33-43.  
209 
 
Vicat, B.P., Vocabularium juris utriusque, 2 vols ([n.p.]: Ex officina Bousquetiana, 1759). 
Voet, J., Commentarius ad Pandectas (Halae: Sumtibus Ioan. Ioach. Beyeri and Ioan. Iac. 
Curtii., 1776). 
Volpi, G.A., Che non debbono ammettersi le donne allo studio delle scienze, e delle belle 
arti ([n. p.]: [n. pub.], 1723). 
Von Zallinger, J.A., Institutiones juris ecclesiastici, maxime privati, ordine Decretalium, 5 
vols (Augsburg: Sumtibus Matthaei Rieger, 1793), IV. 
Winspeare, B., Del patto di Capuana e Nido, e de’ suoi effetti. Dissertazione (Naples: Trani, 
1823).  
Wollstonecraft, M., A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: With Strictures on Political and 
Moral Subjects (New York: Matsell, 1833). 
Young, A., Travels during the Years 1787, 1788 and 1789 (London: Richardson, 1792). 
Zecchini, P.I., Dì geniali della dialettica delle donne ridotta al suo vero principio (Bologna: 




Ago, R., Economia barocca: mercato e istituzioni nella Roma del Seicento (Rome: Donzelli, 
1998). 
—— ‘Ruoli familiari e statuto giuridico’, Quaderni Storici, 88 (1995), 111-33. 
Agostinelli, C., “Per me sola”. Biografia intellettuale e scrittura privata di Costanza Monti 
Perticari (Rome: Carocci, 2006). 
Aimerito, F., La codificazione della procedura civile nel Regno di Sardegna (Milan: 
Giuffrè, 2008). 
Alessi, G., ‘Il gioco degli scambi: seduzione e risarcimento nella casistica cattolica del XVI 
e XVII secolo’, Quaderni storici, 75 (1990), 805-31. 
—— ‘Stupro non violento e matrimonio riparatore. Le inquiete peregrinazioni dogmatiche 
della seduzione’, in Seidel Menchi and Quaglioni, eds, I tribunali del matrimonio, 
pp. 609-40. 




Alessi, M.L., Una giardiniera del Risorgimento italiano: Bianca Milesi (Genoa: Streglio, 
1906). 
Anderson, B.R., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 
Aquarone, A., ‘Aspetti legislativi della Restaurazione in Toscana’, Rassegna storica del 
Risorgimento: organo della Società Nazionale per la Storia del Risorgimento 
Italiano, 43 (1956), 3-34. 
—— L’unificazione legislativa e i codici del 1865 (Milan: Giuffrè, 1960). 
—— ‘La restaurazione nello Stato Pontificio e i suoi indirizzi legislativi’, Archivio della 
Società romana di storia patria, 78 (1955), 119-88. 
—— M. D’Addio and G. Negri, eds, Le Costituzioni italiane (Milan: Edizioni di Comunità, 
1958). 
Ara, A., Lo statuto fondamentale dello Stato della Chiesa (14 marzo 1848). Contributo ad 
uno studio delle idee costituzionali nello Stato pontificio nel periodo delle riforme 
di Pio IX (Milan: Giuffrè, 1966). 
Ariès, P., L’Enfant et la vie familiale sous l’Ancien Régime (Paris: Plon, 1960). 
—— Padri e figli nell’Europa medievale e moderna (Bari: Laterza, 1968). 
—— Western Attitudes toward Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present (London: 
Marion Boyars, 1994). 
Arrivo, G., Seduzioni, promesse, matrimoni. Il processo per stupro nella Toscana del 
Settecento (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2006). 
Ascenzi, A., Il Plutarco delle donne: repertorio della pubblicistica educativa e scolastica e 
della letteratura amena destinata al mondo femminile nell’Italia dell’Ottocento 
(Macerata: EUM, 2009).  
Ascheri, M., ‘Il Consilium dei giuristi medievali’, in C. Casagrande, S. Vecchio and C. 
Crisciani, eds, Consilium: teorie e pratiche del consigliare nella cultura medievale 
(Florence: Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2004), pp. 243-58. 
—— The Laws of Late Medieval Italy (1000-1500): Foundations for a European Legal 
System (Leiden: Brill, 2013). 
Astuti, G., ‘Gli ordinamenti giuridici degli Stati Sabaudi’, in D. Gribaudi, ed., Storia del 
Piemonte (Turin: Casanova, 1960), pp. 487-562.  
211 
 
—— ‘Il Code Napoléon in Italia e la sua influenza sui codici degli stati italiani successori’, 
Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, 179 (1973), 176-237. 
Badinter, E., L’Amour en plus: histoire de l'amour maternel (XVIIe-XXe siècle) (Paris: 
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